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 ‘Emerging Severe Personality Disorder in Childhood’: The reification 
and rhetorical functions of a proposed developmental disorder  
 
This research employed Discursive Psychology and some Foucaudian 
concepts to explore discourses concerning proposals for ‘Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder’ (ESPD) to interrogate potential ‘effects in the real’ for 
patients, clinicians and approaches to psychological interventions. The 
constructivist review of literature explores reification processes in 
propositions for ESPD in a brief reconsideration of historical ‘personality 
disorder’ discourses with a particular focus towards UK policy. This traces 
ESPD’s inextricable links to revival of the ‘psychopathy’ construct via 
invention of the ‘psychopathy checklist’, policy-makers ‘Dangerous and 
Severe Personality Disorder’ (DSPD) terminology and the ‘interventionist 
imperatives’ in youth justice driven by the Crime and Disorder Act (1998).  
Fourteen interviews highlighted rhetorical strategies by which practitioners 
worked up their epistemological entitlements to use ESPD appropriately by 
undermining entitlements of others. Some demonstrated autonomy by 
refusing to use the term ESPD at all. Other practitioners positioned those 
‘outside mental health’ as potentially misusing ESPD while erroneously 
reifying it themselves as a formal ‘diagnosis’ or something that children ‘are’. 
Associated repertoires concerned iatrogenic or exclusionary ‘effects in the 
 
real’ linked to frustration at being ‘forced’ by the government to work with 
the ‘untreatable’. Ideological dilemmas arose throughout, most notably where 
practitioners who were concerned  the label ESPD could exclude children 
from treatment discursively excluded ‘high-risk’ older children with beliefs 
‘early intervention’ only. This saw children subject positioned similarly to 
their historically assumed ‘untreatable’ adult counterparts with ‘personality 
disorder’ diagnoses rather than being ‘at risk of’. A final ideological dilemma 
arose for practitioners as many believed in ‘early intervention’ but conceded 
that risk prediction in psychiatry was unreliable and could lead to over use of 
ESPD, with potentially damaging outcomes.  
The review and analysis are discussed in terms of bringing about a new 
version of ESPD’s reification with emphasis on encouraging further 
discussion concerning potential objectification of future ESPD category 
recipients, assumed ‘prognosis’, advances towards clinical intervention and 
issues regarding possible further exclusion from services or residential care. 
It is argued studies with a discursive focus can investigate labelling concerns 
in ways which positivist methodologies in the medico-legal approach fail to 
and that this embraces counselling psychology’s historical aims towards 
‘social justice’ in its (assumed) critical approach to psychopathology which, 
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Situating the Research and Author Context 
 
‘Action must be taken quickly to nip youth offending in the bud’ 
The Crime and Disorder Act (Home Office, 1998:1) 
 
‘It was agreed that there was a need for appropriate and non-stigmatising 
language…..at the same time a balance must be struck between labelling a 
child or family and the need to nip emerging problems in the bud for a very 
small number of potentially dangerous and expensive young offenders’ 
Early Intervention in Personality Disorder Conference  
(Vizard et al., 2009:12)  
 
“However, their youth and developmental immaturity also give an 
opportunity to nip problem symptoms and behaviours in the bud. The key is 




 Michel Foucault (1977) advocated the utilisation of historical investigations 
for diagnosing the present. So, by following Nietzsche’s (1974 [1882]) 
assertion that ‘truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted 
because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process 
of history’ (p. 264) this research takes the position that Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder (ESPD) is a ‘situated knowledge’ (Harraway, 1991). 
That is to say, ESPD’s ‘existence’ as a category by which we may come to 
 
know ‘problem’ children (Butler, 1999) is assumed contingent on the socio-
political/historical contexts which produced it. Thus, this study is not 
concerned with evidence for the ‘truth’ of ESPD’s origins or aetiology in a 
positivist scientific sense as truth and method are at odds with each other 
(Gadamer, 1967). The foundation of this study is in the ‘details and accidents 
that accompany every beginning’ (Foucault in Bouchard, 1977:144) and the 
‘discursive history which makes [a] particular conversation possible’ 
(Wetherell, 1998:403).  
 
ESPD could not exist out of the confines of the English and Welsh legal 
system as it would make little discursive ‘sense’. ESPD was reliant on a 
particular UK political climate and there were several ‘ingredients’ required 
for the ‘baking process’ of its ‘truth’ (see appendix i). The James Bulger 
murder (see appendix ii) was pivotal to the New Labour government ideology 
leading to unprecedented legislative changes in youth crime policy in an era 
‘evidence based practice’ and ‘early intervention’ (Pitts 2001a; 2001b). 
Wording from the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) has also been used by 
ESPD’s proposers in their papers (Vizard et al., 2009; Vizard, 2013) leaving 
little doubt about the political nature of ESPD’s genealogy (McCallum, 
2001). Moreover, the politically driven Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder (DSPD) programme was also integral to proposition papers for 
 
ESPD (Vizard et al., 2004). From a semi-genealogical/constructionist 
approach it is assumed that ESPD’s ‘existence’ as a childhood ‘disorder’ is 
reliant on the social context in which those children exist.   
 
Defining mental illness and its aetiology are political issues impacted by the 
zeitgeist of the time (Evans et al. 2011). On 3rd February 1993, 2 year old 
James Bulger was killed by 10 year olds Robert Thompson and Jon Venables 
who were tried for murder in an adult court (Morrison, 1997). A catalogue of 
errors were noted across the case and their subsequent care/supervision 
(Smith, 2011) from issues concerning trial of children in adult courts (EHCR, 
1999, HMCS, 2000, UNCRC, 2000),  the judge’s decision to remove the boys 
right to anonymity in line with public and press demand which caused 
significant rehabilitative issues (Ormand, 2012) to serious concerns about the 
Home Secretary’s raising the boys tariff  in line with public opinion via a Sun 
Newspaper petition campaign (Fionda, 2005). The latter being what appeal 
Judge Lord Donaldson ruled as an exercise in ‘institutional vengeance’ by ‘a 
politician playing to the gallery’ (Green, 2010). 
 
This brought forth a climate of ‘institutionalised intolerance’ as youth crime 
was re-politicised and re-profiled (Muncie, 1999) and ‘risk society’ politics 
(Beck, 1992) of risk prediction and intervention took centre stage in policy 
 
reform (Muncie & Wilson, 2003). The Bulger Murder was seized upon by the 
New Labour Party (Green, 2010) keen to be seen as ‘Tough on Crime, Tough 
on the Causes of Crime’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997) as part of its 
‘ideological rebirth’ (Pitts, 2001; Drakefold, 1999; Butler and Drakefold, 
2001) following conservative penal populism before it (Seddon, 2007). 
 
The New Labour Government turned punitive in the 1997 white paper No 
More Excuses: Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales and ‘a new 
correctional continuum was put in place, with intensive intervention at one 
end and detention at the other’ (Muncie & Wilson, 2004). Of particular 
interest to the current study is the way in which new legislation introduced 
interventions with children below the age of criminal responsibility 
considered at risk of offending via identification, referral and tracking 
initiatives (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, my italics). 
Interventionist imperatives also extended to ‘Antisocial Behaviour’ which is 
believed or likely to cause intimidation/harassment (Home Office, 2003 my 
italics). Most controversially, guilt is no longer the founding principle of these 
interventions unencumbered by legal principles such as ‘the burden of proof’ 
and ‘due legal process’ (Muncie, 2010). As sections 65 and 66 of that act put 
an end to cautioning, children were therefore exposed to formal criminal 
intervention in respect of what they might do or who they are thought to be 
(Muncie and Wilson, 2004 italics in original). These new ‘politics of 
 
behaviour’ and discourses of ‘responsibilisation’ have been shown to 
disproportionately impact on marginalised children through ‘precautionary 
injustice’ strategies (Squires & Stephen, 2005) linked to growing child 
incarceration (Pitts, 2001).  In 1992, 100 children under 15 years old were 
detained under grave crimes provisions, in 2001 this had increased to 800 
(NACRO, 2003). This raised formal concerns about criminalising children 
(UNCRC, 2002) and ‘psychological interventions’ with those assumed to be 
at risk of future offending (Pitts, 2001a: 43).  
 
Where criminology theories fail psychology/psychiatry will fill the gaps 
(Russell, 1989). The erroneous assumption psychiatrists can predict risk 
(Foucault, 2003:34) appears ever stronger as we evolve into Beck’s (1992) 
risk society, particularly when viewed alongside ‘the psy-complex’ (Rose, 
1989). That is, the weight of attention given in modernity to risk and the ways 
we attempt to control it via government power and disciplinary technologies 
(Foucault, 1975) as social control agents (Cohen, 1975). A concept bringing 
together those two factors was termed by Foucault (1976) as 
‘governmentality’ which refers to those techniques and strategies by which 
governments make it possible for populations to enter into the calculations of 
political rule (Burchill et al, 1992). The concept of ‘governmentality’ has 
since been expanded on by academic explications of the ways governments 
exercise power and control in rationales, discourses, strategies, technologies 
 
and practices (see Burchill et al., 1991). In this respect it has been argued that 
‘childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence’ 
(Rose, 1989:121).  
 
However, there are ‘antisocial’ children and there are also seriously antisocial 
children who commit serious acts of interpersonal violence (Boswell, 1996) 
and grave or sexual crimes (Cavadino, 1996). Within that latter group, there 
may also be some whose behaviour (see Thomas, 1997, 2002) has been 
described using the adult construct ‘psychopathy’ (Blair et al., 2005). It is 
children thought at risk of this with which ESPD proposals are concerned 
(Vizard et al., 2004). Their needs are considerable (Salekin & Lynam, 2010) 
and difficult to meet clinically (Bleiberg, 2001) or residentially.  At the time 
of writing there are no residential treatment facilities for the most traumatised 
young people  in the UK (Batmanghelidjh, 2006) exhibiting the most high-
risk behaviour/conduct problems (Epps, 2006) let alone those who may 
demonstrate deficits consistent with descriptors of psychopathy (Hare, 1993; 
1997). Furthermore, any placements that do exist do not provide any 
meaningful therapeutic work (Harvey & Smedley, 2010) instead focus is on 
risk management and basic ‘care’ (Hagel & Jeyarajah-Dent, 2006). This is 
because non-health based ‘diagnoses’ such as ‘Severe Conduct Disorder’ fall 
outside the remits of Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) 
and social services (Carr, 2010). Thus no single agency will accept 
 
responsibility for these children (Epps, 2006) which is a similar situation to 
those adults who are given a diagnosis of Personality disorder (DoH, 2003). 
Particularly those who are thought to be at risk of violence (DoH, 1999). So, 
in this climate of risk management in healthcare ‘it would no doubt come as 
a shock to members of the public that some of the country’s most difficult 
and risky young people are living in bed and breakfast accommodation 
because they are too difficult to manage in any form of childcare unit, 
including secure accommodation’ which offer no intervention/treatment and 
consequently ‘these children bounce back and forwards between agencies’ 
(Epps, 2006:150). This is a familiar occurrence in children’s services/foster 
placements/mental health services (Boswell, 1996). Children are assessed, 
labelled and actively excluded by services (Hunter, 2010). Many have 
‘diagnoses’ for which we have no ‘treatments’ (O’Neil, 2001) and because 
most are looked-after children, new ‘treatments’ such as Multi Systemic 
Therapy are inappropriate for that group (Henggeler et al, 2009). This 
situation in the UK for ‘socially excluded’ youth begs the question ‘Can the 
state ever be a good enough parent?’ (Reeves, 2012:32).  
 
Throughout this author’s experience of employment, clinical training and as 
research assistant in NHS, HMPS and local authority settings with children 
and adults, the answer she would give to that question is a resounding ‘No’. 
Often, in cases of the most high-risk children/adults there seemed to have 
 
been child protection, safeguarding and services errors throughout their 
childhoods (Bentovim et al., 2009). Many child clients were angry and unable 
to ask for what they needed. Those most in need of services, were those whose 
neglect, abuse and trauma appeared so complex were referred to as 
‘personality disordered’ which saw them further excluded. Therefore, it was 
unclear as to how a label appropriating the PD diagnostic term might 
encourage inclusion and treatment. For this author, rationales for ESPD 
appeared to be based in government ideology and rhetoric, rather than 
‘science’. So, this research investigates what ESPD might mean to 
practitioners who may use it to describe this group (Butler, 1999) and 
explores how ESPD might become reified or function rhetorically and 
ideologically in talk (see McCallum, 2010; Potter, 1995; Billig et al., 1988). 
The study assumes the position then, similarly to Graham (2005) that in 
tackling the ideology of a science (Foucault, 1972) and its rhetorical functions 
(Potter, 1995) ‘in order to reveal and modify it’ one should ‘question it as a 
discursive formation’ (Foucault, 1972:205). This may help to explore the 
labelling issues which have been side-stepped by the proposers (Vizard et al., 
2004, 2007, 2009). Which may also help to investigate ESPD’s potential 
‘effects in the real’ (Foucault, 1980:237) for those children made subject to it 







This chapter outlines the background to the present study, focusing on  
conceptual confusions associated with personality disorder, the construct of 
psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder which have been 
appropriated recently in proposals for ‘Emerging Severe Personality Disorder 
in Childhood’ 
The review takes constructionist epistemological view and should be seen as 
‘constructing a constructionist introduction’ (Perry, 2007: 150). Therefore 
this review should be considered as generative to the research foci and thus, 
the way in which material is presented is a positioning and legitimation of a 
particular version of events (Craven & Coyle, 2007). Importantly, this review 
does not approach ESPD as an accepted label (which it is not) but rather as a 
political discourse and as such there are no attempts to prove or disprove it, 
or to evidence potential effect or theories regarding labelling. Any references 
to positivist studies here should not be taken as fact or as proven perspectives, 
rather as an attempt to represent some relevant, dominant and broad historical 
debates, discourses and knowledge constructions in the field 
 
 
The ‘Origins’ of Personality Disorder and Historical Links to Criminal 
Behaviour 
 The ‘problem’ we have come to conceptualise clinically as ‘Personality 
Disorder’ (PD) is thought to have originated sometime in the 19th century 
when clinicians noted that some individuals were not amenable to the 
psychoanalytic models of the day and were subsequently labelled with 
‘Personality Disturbance’ (Paris, 1996). The classification of ‘personality’ is 
traceable back to the Greeks and notions of abnormal personality types have 
been historically considered as variants of normal personality therefore 
‘disorders of personality have lain outside the purview of psychiatry’ (Paris, 
1996:.2). Until the 19th century psychiatrists were uninterested in whether 
these variations in personality become forms of ‘mental illness’ (Tyrer, 1988) 
and only one form of ‘pathological personality’ was recognised as valid 
diagnosis, that of ‘moral insanity’ which was later termed ‘psychopathy’ 
(Mason & Mercer, 1998).  
 
Over time the ‘Psychopathic Personality’ became the ‘Personality Disorder’ 
we refer to today (Parnell, 2010) though accepted authorities on the subject 
fail to explain when this metamorphosis took place (Livesley, 2001:6). Others 
write historical accounts appropriating ‘Psychopathic Personality’ and then 
‘Psychopathic Personality Disorder’ as they recount development of the 
 
construct. Then they moving into writing about ‘Personality Disorder’ 
without any explanation as to when or why that change occurred historically 
or within their books (Tyrer, 1988:6 in Parnell, 2010).  However, what is clear 
historically is that the original construct of ‘Psychopathy’ or ‘Psychopathic 
Personality’ could be defined by an inability to control criminal actions (Blair 
et al, 2005). Thus, personality disorder and criminal behaviour (Ellard, 1989; 
Russell, 1989) have an inextricably long, complex and somewhat ill-
explained interlocking history with one another (see Malatesi & McMillan, 
2010). As has psychiatry and the criminal mind (Mason & Mercer, 1998). 
The psychiatrisation of the criminal has proved a considerable force in 
academia (Mason, 2006), social policy (Seddon, 2007) and psychotherapeutic 
practice (Welldon & Van Velson, 1988). This medicalization of the criminal 
keeps the focus on the individual, leaving underlying ideologies remaining 
unquestioned and unchallenged as the emphasis on individual change rather 
than social change (Mason & Mercer, 1998). This depoliticises crime, 
transforming it into the professional territory of the experts (Foucault, 1978). 
This dates back over 200 years (Foucault, 1975) which, in respect of the 
current thesis can be evidenced historically through genealogical approaches 
(McCallum, 2010) to illustrate the medico-legal establishments growing 




Defining Personality and Personality Disorder 
 
There are difficulties in defining ‘personality disorder’ which is not helped 
by the fact that the concept of ‘personality’ itself eludes definitive definition 
(Livesley, 2001).  A recent Royal College of Psychiatrists (2013) leaflet for 
patients who have been diagnosed as having a ‘disordered’ personality 
illustrates this: 
“It's not easy to pin down exactly what we mean by the word ‘personality’. It 
seems obvious, but it can be hard to put into words. This can be because the 
words we use to describe people tend to have wide meanings – and these 
meanings often overlap. These words can also cover more than one kind of 
experience” RCPsych - 2013  
However, despite different theorists employing their own definitions of 
personality led by individual differences approaches or trait theories (see 
Allen, 2000) there appears to be a general agreement, with regard to ‘PD’ that 
currently:  
‘personality is seen as a complex pattern of deeply embedded psychological 
characteristics that are expressed automatically in almost every area of 
psychological functioning’ (Millon et al., 2004:2)  
 
and from a behavioural perspective personality is considered as a 
constellation of observable behaviours that characterise predictable 
interactions with the environment which is the most powerful determinate of 
individual behaviour and this overt behaviour is emphasised because it is 
often the reason for identification/intervention, is amenable to control and 
allows for documentation of intervention efficacy (Kazdin, 2001 cited in 
Freeman & Reinecke, 2007). Kurt Danziger (1990) suggests factors such as 
amenability to control and prediction are integral to the history of most 
psychological concepts. Despite its long history, the concept of ‘personality’ 
in psychology emerged at precisely the same time as the ‘personality test’ as 
many concepts which are taken for granted as truth or as objective science are 
often preceded by the invention of statistical methods or tools for their 
measurement by those whose professionalism is invested in them (Danziger, 
1985).   
 
W. John Livesley (2001) gives a comprehensive review of the conceptual 
problems that continue to arise when PD is used as a diagnostic category, 
highlighting issues such as failure to correlate the diagnostic category of PD 
with the many models of personality in psychology derived from multivariate 
analysis (p.19-25). There is also an associated issue with the diverse origins 
of the sub-types of PD, such as the psychoanalytic origins of the histrionic 
 
type, the social learning roots of the avoidant type and the psychiatric lineage 
of schizotypal type (Livesley:2001:16) so it is argued current classification is 
‘An uneasy combination of concepts derived from conceptual models that are 
not always consistent with each other. Under these circumstances it is not 
surprising that the operating characteristics of the system in terms of 
diagnostic overlap, coverage, and reliability are poor’ 
(Livesley 2001:16) 
These conceptual confusions and incompatible models work against the 
establishment of an overall theoretical rationale for the diagnostic category of 
Personality Disorder. Moreover, PD is not considered a mental disorder 
(Kendall, 2002), there is no distinct boundary between normal and disordered 
personality (Tyrer et al., 2007) and personality disorders have high 
comorbidity with other diagnostic entities, which can make these observed 
‘conditions’ difficult to manage clinically (Paris, 1996).  These obfuscations 
in defining PD bring serious confounding issues for diagnosis, research and 






The Classificatory Term and Diagnostic Construct Personality Disorder 
in the DSM 
The classificatory term Personality Disorder is used to describe a 
considerably ‘wide range of disparate behaviours’ (O’Rourke et al., 2003:1) 
and: 
‘enduring patterns of cognition, affectivity, interpersonal behaviour and 
impulse control that are culturally deviant, pervasive and inflexible, and lead 
to distress or social impairment’  
(Blackburn, 1998 cited in O’Rourke et al., 2003:1).  
Literature indicates the most predominant classificatory system used in 
Personality Disorder research is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders ‘DSM’ (Magnavita, 2004) and: 
‘The process of psychiatric classification and diagnosis involves the 
construction of representations of aspects of the patient in terms of a 
presumed underlying reality, constructed as part of biological, medical or 
social science. The use of these representations in clinical situations involves 
the practical application of scientific knowledge to solve problems as 
understood by psychiatrists and others in the clinical setting’  
 
(Manning 2000: 624-5) 
 
The DSM is an atheoretical classificatory text of nosological conditions used 
by clinicians to aid them in attempts to research and diagnose clusters of 
symptoms associated with ‘emotional, behavioural and mental disorders’. 
However, it is worth noting that the American Psychiatric Association (2000) 
 
who publish the DSM concede that defining mental disorders is also 
problematic:  
‘DSM-IV is a manual of mental disorders, but it is by no means clear just 
what is a mental disorder and whether one can develop a set of definitional 
criteria to guide inclusionary and exclusionary decisions for the manual. 
Although many have tried (including the authors of the DSM-III-R), no one 
has ever succeeded in developing a list of infallible criteria to define a mental 
disorder’  
 
- Allen J. Frances, Chair of the APA DSM-IV Task Force (1994: vii) 
 
 
The DSM-IV-TR currently defines Personality Disorder as: 
“An enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates 
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and 
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, 
and leads to distress or impairment.”  
and this should be manifested in at least two of the following areas:  
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, 
and events)  
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of 
emotional response)  
(3) interpersonal functioning  
(4) impulse control  
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of 
personal and social situations.  
 
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment 
in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration and its onset can be traced back 
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.  
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or 
consequence of another mental disorder.  
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of 
a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical 
condition (e.g., head trauma). 
(APA 2000:686).  
 
The DSM-IV-TR currently contains ten official Personality Disorders which 
are grouped into three clusters A, B and C also termed respectively as the 
‘odd’ or ‘eccentric’ cluster (paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal), the ‘dramatic’ 
or ‘impulsive’ cluster (Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, Narcissistic) and 
the ‘anxious’ or ‘fearful’ cluster (Avoidant, Dependent, Obsessive-
Compulsive) based on descriptive similarities (Paris, 1996). Alongside a 
specialist category ‘Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified’ which can 
be used by diagnosing clinicians in cases where traits of several PD’s are 
considered as present or where the person is considered as meeting the general 
 
criteria but is assumed to have a PD that is not included in the classification 
(APA, 2002:685). The cluster of PD’s with the most relevance for the present 
study are the Cluster B types and in particular, Antisocial Personality 
Disorder or ASPD (APA, 2000:686).  These four PD sub-types have also been 
termed ‘severe personality disorders’ because of the ‘enormous personal, 
social, and financial cost associated with them’ (Bleiberg, 2004:1).  
 
DSM definitions and criteria for PD are also affected by well-documented 
publication trends in individual PD’s since 1971 (Parnell, 2010) which tend 
to focus on the ‘severe’ PD’s with Borderline Personality Disorder 
dominating research interest along with strong publication rates for antisocial 
personality whereas others such as schizoid PD failed to attract research 
attention at all (Boschen & Warner, 2009). Hope Landrine (1989) also 
evidenced clear patterning in PD diagnosis suggesting that an individual’s 
positioning in the social power hierarchy is implicated in the PD assigned to 
them. Moreover, evidence indicates that the PD’s are class (Evans et al., 
2011) and gender biased (Nucknolls, 1992). These issues with PD become 
more concerning in review documents ready for the production of the DSM-
V (Parnell, 2010) and a prospective chapter ‘Personality Disorders and 
Relational Disorders: A research agenda for addressing crucial gaps in the 
DSM’ (First, 2005). It could be argued that a proposal for a category related 
to ‘Relational Disorders’ which are not seen to reside inside the person but 
 
between people (First, 2005:157:9 my italics) is an example of the way in 
which the DSM redefines its boundaries (Evans et al.,2011) and attempts to 
‘diagnose’ immeasurable phenomena reinforcing the arguments of its critics 
that one of its main functions is the psychiatrisation of everyday life (Parnell, 
2010; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Evans et al., 2011; Davies, 2013).  
 
The ‘Aetiology’ of Personality Disorder: Links to Childhood Trauma 
There are multiple theories concerning the assumed aetiology of those 
behaviours and affects thought to be consistent with diagnostic criteria 
produced for personality disorder (see Livesley, 2001) and textbooks are 
replete with multiple constructions relating to theories of functional and 
dysfunctional development (see Magnavita, 2004) which are beyond both the 
scope and the remit of this current study. As the study is not concerned with 
proof in the evidence put forward for Emerging Severe Personality Disorder 
in Childhood (ESPD), this section draws together some of the predominant 
theories, constructs and discourses referred to by most PD theorists (Livesley, 
2001; Paris, 1996; de Zulueta, 1994). It reviews those which may be most 
relevant to knowledge productions concerned with understanding the possible 
antecedents to the behaviours and affect observed in those children who may 
be labelled ESPD. These are drawn from developmental, neurological, 
psychoanalytic and cognitive perspectives. In this respect, this very brief 
 
constructionist review should not be considered exhaustive nor taken as an 
agreement that those theories are ‘fact’.  
The DSM-IV-TR states that PD categories can be assigned to 
children/adolescents in ‘those relatively unusual circumstances’ that the 
maladaptive traits noted are pervasive and can be noted over 1 year, though 
these are unlikely to persist unchanged into adult life (APA, 2000;687). The 
exception to this is ASPD which cannot be diagnosed before the age of 18 but 
is said to have ‘an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time’ 
(APA, 2000:700) and although this claim of stability over time has not always 
been borne out by research (Skodol et al., 2007) there is consistent agreement 
across texts that childhood trauma is implicated in development of the 
difficulties consistent with diagnostic criteria for PD and ASPD (Freeman & 
Reinecke, 2007). As Magnavita (2004) argues ‘There is little question that 
traumatic events are strongly implicated in personality dysfunction’ (p.17) 
because certain theorists suggest ‘repeated trauma in childhood forms and 
deforms the personality’ (Herman 1992:97). This brings about one of the most 
controversial questions in PD research, can children be classed as personality 
disordered? (Bleiberg, 2001) and perhaps more importantly should they?. The 
controversial nature of such a question arises across constructions of child 
development, mostly due to reported findings concerning an assumed 
continuous plasticity of the brain and synaptic pruning in adolescence 
indicating possibility for change (Gazaniga, 2002). This is not consistent with 
 
descriptions of adults with PD diagnoses. There are also issues arising from 
thoughts that typical adolescence can be a time of ‘storm and stress’ (Hall, 
1904; Freud 1958) characterised by identity crisis and psychosocial 
moratorium (Erikson, 1968) which has been said to cause negative mood, 
impulsivity, problematic relationships and ‘delinquency’ (House, 2002). 
Knowledges reproduced in ‘neuroscientific’ perspectives suggest conflicting 
combination of late maturation of the prefrontal cortex and changes in 
serotonin/dopamine neurotransmitters are implicated in difficulties 
experienced in adolescent relationships (Gazzaniga, 2000). Moreover, 
adolescents are often described as displaying non-reflective ‘adolescent 
egocentrism’ (Elkind 1967). Therefore, it may be worth being mindful that 
many constructions of child and adolescent development would concur that 
typical maturation can heighten certain difficulties associated with 
development of  behaviours consistent with PD’s in young people. This may 
be particularly relevant for those whose basic needs may be unmet (Maslow, 
1943, 1954) such as ‘ESPD’ samples (Hickey et al., 2007).  
 This controversy is perhaps best illustrated in the preface of ‘Personality 
Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence’ where the authors discuss the 
reaction to their proposal for the volume explicitly: 
‘Many of the colleagues with whom we discussed the idea were shocked by 
the project. For some the reaction was incendiary – they were appalled that 
 
we would even consider such a project. A smaller number agreed that these 
were important questions, but were discomforted by making the issue so open’ 
- Freeman & Reinecke (2007: iv) 
Freeman & Reinecke (2007) detail the reasons for this reception, including 
the conceptual and diagnostic ones already mentioned as stemming from 
historical discourses about treatability, exclusion from services, pejorative 
labelling, lack of evidence for treatments available and the negative attitudes 
and poor treatment of those people who have been given a diagnosis of 
personality disorder by practitioners (all discussed later) and they make the 
case for early intervention via psychiatric risk prediction for this group while 
young. Efrain Bleiberg (2001) in another one of the rare volumes to discuss 
working with children/adolescents ‘in the process of structuring a severe 
personality disorder’ (vii) writes these children are: 
 ‘Often strikingly arrogant, defiant and manipulative, they also convey a 
touching determination to survive and connect with others. Yet they excel at 
defeating the efforts to help them….Some of these children’s minds and bodies 
have suffered the destructive intrusions of sexual or physical abuse or the 
more insidious damage of neglect or sensitivity….yet regardless of the degree 
of environmental assault or biological misfortune that they experienced, they 
often display an uncanny sensitivity to other peoples mental states. This 
sensitivity incongruously coexists with striking self-centredness and callous 
 
disregard for the feelings of others. One moment they can be thoughtful and 
appealing the next moment, their rage, demandingness, destructiveness, and 
self-destructiveness become overwhelming. For many therapists the demands 
of carrying on a treatment relationship become difficult to bear as they find 
themselves falling into a dark despair, not unlike that experienced by their 
young patients’ 
Literature reviews support positivist constructions of knowledge which 
suggest that risk factors associated with PD are dysfunctional families, 
traumatic experiences, sexual and/or physical abuse and social stressors 
(Paris, 2001). With regards to PD and possible risk of violence (see 
McMurran & Howard, 2009) there is consistent evidence produced which 
infers that inadequate caregiving, emotional and physical neglect, cruelty and 
violence as being implicated in future violent acts (Miller, 1988) and youth 
crime presentations (Reeves, 2012). Indeed, it is argued that exposure to 
chronic trauma may predispose a child to abnormal personality pathology 
(Meichelbaum, 1994) and it is further suggested such adversities might 
increase the risk of personality disorders (Freeman & Reinecke, 2007). 
However, some theorists do urge caution here. These should not be thought 
of as primary cause of behaviours consistent with PD as the view has been 
put forward by some leaders in the field that some individuals may be more 
resilient to adversity than those who develop ‘clinical symptoms’ due to (an 
 
inferred) underlying vulnerability to those same risk factors (Paris, 1996, 
2001).  
 
There are several knowledges produced across theoretical perspectives, 
which construct a somewhat coherent narrative concerning the way exposure 
to childhood traumata may predispose a child to later ‘personality pathology’ 
and those reviewed here are those which are most pertinent to the proposals 
for ESPD, which posit neglect, cruelty/violence, poor attachment 
relationships with caregivers, low empathy and neurological deficit as risk 
factors (Vizard et al., 2004; Vizard, 2008). Felicity de Zulueta (1994) 
suggests that for perpetrators of violence (like those children who might be 
labelled with ESPD) the violence actually originates from the distress 
associated with their traumata (Garland, 1997) as victim.  Psychoanalytically 
constructed understandings of ‘typical development’ claim that a certain 
amount of loss and pain is necessary in infancy in order to be able to manage 
emotion connected to any ‘losses’ which is said to be integrally implicated in 
facilitating ‘well-functioning’ cognitive and emotional development (Sedlak, 
2004). Absence of a containing caregiver is thought to affect those typical 
‘defence strategies negatively. Some theorists will argue that this can see 
those ‘defense strategies’ can begin to form into more ‘maladaptive’ 
strategies (Steiner, 1993).  Those theorists who argue from this perspective 
 
view this as being the beginning point of an individual developing an adult 
‘pathological personality structure’ (Steiner, 1993; Sedlak, 2004).    
 
Attachment theorists also claim that early experiences of neglect, emotional 
or physical trauma erode quality and experience of future relationships with 
others across a variety of contexts (White & Swartz, 1999). According to 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969) early relationships are the formative basis 
for all interpersonal relationships throughout life. Many theorists and 
commentators argue relationships with others are particularly dysfunctional 
for those with PD diagnoses (APA, 2000). Attachment theory bridges 
cognitive and developmental models in psychology (Bowlby,1969, 1973, 
1988) and is a dyadic view of development which emphasises the importance 
of the proximity of a preferred attachment figure as crucial to the infant child 
facilitating a positive sense of self and development of future functional 
relational capacities, without which the opposite is predicted (Holmes, 1993). 
Poor infant/child attachment experiences have been linked to adult 
personality disorder by various writers (Bateman & Fonagy, 2000) because 
‘developmentally pre-established principles organize subsequent 
experiences’ (Stolerow and Atwood (1992:24) which, these theorists will 
argue over time these may become ‘representations of interactions that have 
become generalised’ (Stern, 1985, 2000). In this respect, in certain schools of 
thought the interpersonal and relational difficulties that are said to be 
 
observed in those with a PD diagnosis are partially due to continued 
dysfunctional relating throughout life (Butler et al., 2006) based on 
attachment experiences (Bowlby, 1975). De Zulueta (1994) proposes the way 
that people who may receive PD diagnoses might be seen to behave in 
relationship with others can be partially explained as connected to their early 
experience of attachment relationships.  
 
Case studies in neuroscience tend to construct development of adaptive 
interpersonal skills (Young, 1994) and individual capacity for emotional 
regulation (Siegel, 1999; 2001) or empathic response to others (Baron-Cohen, 
2011) as being reliant on development of neural networks in the prefrontal 
region of the brain (Gazzaniga, 2002). Certain knowledges produced in the 
neurosciences put forward the argument that these develop throughout life 
(Cozolino, 2002). Particular theorists have begun citing the dynamic 
relationship between neurological development and an individual’s 
experience of self and others as complexly and intrinsically implicated in their 
behaviours in and quality of interpersonal relationships (Siegal, 2001; Schore, 
2001).  In this way, the orbital frontal cortex is the area of the brain most 
consistently described as the particular brain region implicated in 
attachment/relationships (Ogden et al., 2006). Developmental child 
psychology perspectives which draw on this type of neuroscientific insight 
tend to suggest that early right hemispheric dysfunction involving the 
 
orbitofrontal cortex, in neglect and abuse cases can contribute to poor 
development of ‘theory of mind’ (Fonagy et al., 2004:24) and deficits in 
capacity to make sense of the minds of others, which may result in low 
empathic response (de Zulueta, 2010:48). This has subsequently led to further 
claims in recent developments in suggestions regarding personality disorder 
treatment that mentalisation capacity may be deficit due to early attachment 
experiences (Winnicott, 1964; Bowlby, 1973; 1988; Shore, 1994; Fonagy, 
2004). Some discuss this in terms of a deficit in ‘higher order emotional 
processing’ so emotionally-led behaviour might be seen as common in 
observations (Siegel, 2001; Fonagy & Target, 1997).   
 
Van der Kolk’s (1989) physiology of attachment reviews have suggested in 
some cases there addictive propensity to forge relationships redolent of ties 
to early objects even when these are traumatic. Arguments from certain 
perspectives tend to infer this could reflect neurochemical, psychological and 
emotional derivatives (Mitchell, 2000). Psychoanalytic thought would be 
inclined to suggest that in certain cases of developmental trauma clinicians 
might observe patients compulsion to repeat the event over and over, either 
directly or symbolically (Temple, 1998). Originally, in ‘Remembering, 
repeating and working through’ Freud (1914) conceptualised this as 
resistance to remembering something that has not been worked through, 
 
though contemporary analytic understandings informed by neuroscience 
would dispute this (see Bromberg, 2003).  
 
Further associated constructions of knowledge informed by advances in 
neuroscience technology suggest that due to an undeveloped hippocampus 
explicit memory is not available pre 18 months while the basal ganglia and 
amygdala are developed at birth (Oates et al., 2007:181). This sort of finding 
allows neuroscientists to infer that relationship-related memories are laid 
down in implicit memory early on (Gazzaniga, 2002:329).  These are not 
thought to be available for conscious recall due to knowledge which suggests 
we have two independent memory systems, but there is thought to be an early 
‘emotional sense’ of experiences at this age (Smith et al., 2003:94). Further 
evidence provided within these knowledge frameworks appears to strengthen 
the argument in that cortisol levels may also be implicated in damage to 
explicit memory in neglect/abuse cases (Gunnar & Donzella, 2002). 
Therefore some writers claim early trauma may result in irremediable damage 
to memory systems (Fonagy, 1999). Writing from a psychoanalytic 
perspective Bollas (1987) termed this ‘the un-thought known’ and this can be 
linked to the earlier concept of the ‘nameless dread’ an extreme sense of 
‘powerlessness’ in infancy (Stephen, 1941:181) which may leave a ‘residue 
of thoughts and feelings that have been stripped of their meaning’ (Bion, 
1962:99). According to Chodderow (2001) the ‘un-thought known’ refers to 
 
preverbal, un-schematised experience/trauma (p.252) that may determine 
one's behaviour unconsciously, barred to conscious thought (p.272). Taking 
further this line of thought, it has been suggested that the defensive 
mechanism most likely linked with developmental trauma is dissociation 
(Fonagy, 1996). Dissociation has been  characterised as a 
‘compartmentalization of experience: elements of a trauma are not integrated 
into a unitary whole or an integrated sense of self’ (Van der Kolk et al, 1996: 
303). Neuropsychological literature suggests during traumatic experiences 
the hippocampus is suppressed for rapid response so memories are context-
free (Van der Kolk, 1989). It has been argued that this can be considered in 
respect of understanding connected to typical human fight or flight response.  
From this perspective it is thought that there could be a kind of amnesia for 
specific traumatic events that the person has experienced but  can be re-
experienced in trauma-associations and loss of their affect regulation 
resulting in ‘fight or flight’ response to minor provocations (Van der Kolk, 
1996:219). It could be argued that this can lead to subsequent development of 
a ‘defensive script’ in people who receive diagnoses of PD with a history of 
attacking others and themselves (Nathanson, 1992:81).  
 
Cognitive-interpersonal theorists take the position that a child’s adaptive 
behaviours to chronic trauma and abuse in order to try to maintain proximity 
to their primary caregiver may become ‘schematised’ in that these theorists 
 
believe these early interactions may form a kind of template for expectations 
and roles in interactions (Young, 1994). From this particular view point these 
theorists would posit that such tempaltes formed at very early ages can affect 
future interactions and interpersonal relationships with others because, 
despite these behaviours being somewhat functional (and perhaps survival 
behaviours) in that dysfunctional and abusive environment, these could 
subsequently be viewed by others as maladaptive and unhelpful outside it 
(Herman, 1992) incurring relational difficulties for that individual.  
 
These theories, arguments and explanations (drawing from relevant 
constructs and knowledge constructions through the history of psychology, 
psychiatry and psychotherapy) when taken together, may offer one, very 
broad narrative which may or may not aid our understanding of the potential 
and inherently complex development of certain behaviours linked to PD. 
These narratives could also be called upon in an attempt to understand the 
issues of callous behaviour and low empathic response to others, alongside 
the impulsivity, violence and cruelty to animals and humans and ‘infantile 
rages’ which are often said to be observed in, or associated with antisocial 
personality disorder (McCallum, 2001) which ESPD is claimed to signal 




Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD/APD) is considered by some 
commentators as one of the most reliable diagnostic categories in the DSM 
(Coid, 2003). However, only three out of thirteen studies evidenced good 
reliability for DSM ASPD criteria (Rogers et al., 1994) and construct validity 
is often questioned as there is some confusion as to whether ASPD is 
psychopathy (Hare, 1996) or whether it is distinct from psychopathy (Skeem 
& Cooke, 2010) which has seen it termed ‘the most controversial of all the 
personality disorders’ (Frances, 1980:1053). This is because expert witnesses 
have used the term or variations of it to describe criminal defendants which 
have been evidenced as having aggravating effects on sentencing 
considerations as ASPD creates expectations that rehabilitation is impossible 
and future crime and/or violence is inevitable (Cunningham & Reidy, 1998) 
and therefore it is argued the ASPD construct takes on meaning beyond any 
scientific evidence to support such inferences (Widiger & Shea, 1991).  
 
Some claim ASPD has a sound basis in robust scientific evidence (De Brito 
& Hodgins, 2009) while others suggest it is merely a potential outcome of 
low socioeconomic status (Green et al, 2004 in McCallum, 2001). This is 
because a significant majority of those diagnosed with ASPD (or childhood 
Conduct Disorder) are living in poverty in deprived inner-city environments 
with high levels of unemployment (Grant et al, 2004 in McCallum, 2001). 
 
Pickergill’s (2011) review of documentation used by the APA for the 
standardising of PD connected to antisocial behaviour across DSM-I – DSM-
IV notes that contributors were concerned with refining ASPD criteria to 
ensure it would not lead to a preponderance of ‘inner-city lower-class black 
males’ being diagnosed with the disorder (p.552) or confounded with poverty 
as criteria included being on ‘public financial care’ (p.548). These issues were 
taken up by Griffith (1996 in Evans et al.,2011) who asserts that ASPD was 
an attempt to label an African American male in such a way as to ensure he 
does not receive support from the mental health system, but rather becomes 
enmeshed in the criminal justice system. Black males with ASPD diagnoses 
are also more likely to be assessed as being at a higher risk for violence than 
white counterparts (Adebimpe, 1981). 
 
Despite ASPD being over represented in prison populations, studies have not 
found ASPD to be consistently associated with violence, even in rare studies 
which include those with a high score on measures of ‘psychopathy’ in 
addition to ASPD (Hodgins & Cote, 1993). Moreover, most commentators 
agree that current understanding of ASPD, its antecedents and in particular 
any functional links with violence are very limited (Coid, 2013) as the few 
studies there have been obtain contradictory results (De Brito & Hodgins, 
2009). Moreover, most theorists assume ASPD to be a stable and untreatable 
condition (Hare & McPherson, 1984) though literature reviews have only 
 
identified two research projects investigating treatment (Duggan et al., 2007) 
and thus most commentators tend to advocate for ‘early intervention’ in 
ASPD during childhood, though despite considerable evidence collected to 
make the argument for this, as of yet there are no definitive explanations as 
to what this ‘early intervention’ might be or what it might look like in practice 
(De Brito & Hodgins, 2009). Those who do make suggestions as to what 
might potentially move a child off a developmental trajectory towards an 
ASPD diagnosis in later life all point to the same intervention, changing the 
child’s social environment (Mortberg et al., 2007 and Levy & Orlans, 2004 
in Pickersgill, 2010). Such suggestions cannot fail to lend weight to John 
Ellards (1989) argument which attempts to explain the weaknesses of 
psychiatric explanations due to a failure to separate medicine from morals in 
which he contests that the description of ASPD is essentially that of a 
‘hoodlum’ from a poor and disadvantaged family. Ellard (1989) suggests this 
is a judgement that arises from the customs and prejudices of a particular 
social group from which psychiatrists are drawn and who therefore fail to see 
this incongruity or to separate their object of enquiry from social and political 
strictures (McCallum, 2001:29). Nevertheless, psychiatric explanations of 
criminality as opposed to those drawn from criminology or law have come to 
dominate academic enquiry in this area and is often referred to as ‘bio-
politics’ which is the use of biological explanation to further political 
ideologies for social control (Cohen, 1975).  
 
 
The diagnosis of ASPD has been subject to significantly changing criteria 
which can be observed clearly in comparing the behavioural indicators across 
DSM editions and text revisions (Widiger & Corbitt, 1995; APA 1968, 1980, 
1987, 1994) whereby it has been noted that the ASPD criteria in DSM-II 
shares none of the common criteria for ASPD in DSM-III and only one with 
the DSM-III text revision, none of which changes were driven by research 
and appears to illustrate arguments that ASPD lacks descriptive consistency 
and validity (Rogers & Dion,1991). These inconsistencies bring about several 
issues, such as the ‘innumeracy problem’ which describes the enormous 
number of possible symptom variations that might result in a diagnosis of 
ASPD which as this number of variations increase, the likelihood of ASPD 
being a discrete clinical entity decreases which is a problem that remains 
despite deletion of several criteria and sub-criteria (Rogers & Dion, 1991). 
Furthermore, there is a confounding issue in the absence of symptom 
weighting in ASPD as all criteria are assumed to have equal significance with 
the diagnosis reliant only on a ‘pervasive pattern’ of misconduct relating to 
each criteria, though pervasive is not operationally defined and there is no 
mechanism by which symptom severity can be measured (Francess, Spitzer 
& Williams, 1988) and it has been argued that the relationship between ASPD 
and recidivism or violence may be more connected to frequency and severity 
of criterion than the diagnostic label itself (Cunningham & Thomas, 1998). 
 
Moreover, there are considerable issues with the assumptions that the 
behaviours and affects characteristic of ASPD will remain constant over time 
despite this assertion not being supported by research thus far as interrater 
reliability of ASPD diagnoses over time is between 41% - 58%, (Vandiver & 
Sher, 1991) it is not stable across the lifespan (Regier et al., 1988) criminal 
behaviours associated with the diagnosis also reduce as individuals age (APA, 
1994) or experience a change in context (Quay, 1994).  Denise Russell (1985) 
uses those aforementioned DSM comparisons to illustrate her points 
regarding the medicalization of criminality with specific reference to the 
DSM II and DSM III in their definitions of antisocial personality disorder. 
The description in the former concerns people whose behaviours ‘bring them 
repeatedly into conflict with society’ though there was a caveat that simply 
having ‘a history of repeated legal and social offences is not sufficient to 
justify this diagnosis’ in stark contrast, the DSM-III which states ‘the essential 
feature is a personality disorder in which there is a history of continuous and 
chronic antisocial behaviour’. As Russell points out the later version also 
emphasises outward behaviour as offensive to others rather than alluding to 
an inner state which may or may not be offensive to others.  Therefore, as 
Russell sees it, there is no distinction between the antisocial personality 
disorder of the DSM-III and criminality itself. Moreover, we could say this 
distinction between criminality and the definition of antisocial personality 
 
disorder has now been completely blurred in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
see appendix iii.   
 
DSM definitions of ASPD bring certain problems in that many theorists 
consider PD to be a condition which may emerge developmentally (Freeman 
& Reinecke, 2007) and the inclusion of the requirement that conduct disorder 
(CD) should be present before age 15 (though official diagnosis of CD as a 
child is not essential for a later ASPD diagnosis) makes this developmental 
emergence implicit (Duggan & Howard, 2009). However, ASPD cannot be 
diagnosed before the age of 18 despite many individuals receiving that 
diagnosis exhibiting a history of criminal/violent behaviour predating the 
ASPD diagnosis. Therefore the presence of CD as a requirement for a future 
ASPD diagnosis would suggest violent/antisocial behaviour (the outcome) is 
utilised as part of the PD definition and criteria (the antecedent) which means 
that any reasoning by which PD becomes functionally linked (Duggan & 
Howard, 2009) with antisocial/violent behaviour becomes a circular 
argument as we are effectively stating that antisocial behaviour causes 
antisocial behaviour (McCallum, 2001).   
 
Denise Russell (1985) argues that the growing dominance of bio-medical 
psychiatry in legal and penal academia and practice is largely due to the dearth 
of adequate alternative theories of criminality, the abundant marketing of 
 
psychiatric drugs in the penal systems and the increasing incorporation of the 
bio-medical model into criminology. With reference to the UK context and in 
particular youth crime (Muncie, 2010) that ‘dearth’ of criminology theories, 
might be better viewed as a dearth of criminology theories which point 
towards formal legal interventions at a young age (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007 
my italics) and therefore do not fit with current government interventionist 
stances on youth crime (Muncie & Wilson, 2004; Muncie, 2010; Squires & 
Stephen, 2005; Fionda, 2005). Thus particular psychiatric/psychological 
explanations may be preferred along with their promise of ‘evidence-based’ 
and ‘early intervention’ strategies for crime prevention (Pitts, 2001a). These 
link to legislative changes (Home Office, 2003) and government ideology in 
its ‘what works’ strategy (Pitts, 2001a) which stands in contrast to long-
standing, though often contested criminological theories that ‘nothing works’ 
in crime prevention (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007:42) or that poverty and 
unequal share of wealth are the main causes of crime (Atkinson, 1975; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). These conflations of certain definitions of crime, 
diagnostic categories and the resulting circular arguments of explanation and 
cause in ASPD criteria also have an intertwining history (Paris, 1996) across 
the interface between law and psychiatry in ASPD (Malesti & McMillan, 
2010). Such discourses have also taken a circular form (McCallum, 2001) as 
they both begin and (with specific reference to the developments concerning 
PD in the UK) end with the somewhat controversial and again, inconsistently 
 
defined construct of psychopathy (Cleckley, 1959; Hare, 1997; Millon et al., 
2004; Maddon, 2007; Skeem & Cooke, 2008). 
 
‘Psychopathy’ and ‘Callous-Unemotional’ Children 
The medical and legal status of psychopathy varies over time and one of the 
most remarkable things about the construct is that it is often conspicuous by 
its absence as a diagnosis in any diagnostic manual (Parnell, 2010) despite 
consistent associations made to it in commentary on ASPD (Malatesti & 
McMillan, 2010). Pickersgill (2011) illustrates how, despite this, the 
psychopathy construct has always ‘held particular traction in psychiatric 
history’ despite frequent acknowledgment that it was a problematic construct 
hotly debated ‘in terms of what it actually was, whether it could be treated 
and how it could be diagnosed’ (p.546). Commentary on the epistemological 
foundations of the concept of psychopathy (as it began to increase in 
popularity amongst psychiatrists) point to lack of agreement on classification, 
lack of clarity in terminology or aetiology (Parnell, 2010) and such an 
excessive broadening of the label: 
‘that, at some time or another and by some reputable authority, the term 
psychopathic personality has been used to designate every conceivable type 
of abnormal character’  
(Curran et al., 1944:278)  
 
 
‘Psychopath’ has become a household word (Ronson, 2012) because, 
similarly to ASPD, it retains the status of both explanation and cause whilst 
functioning in a way that maintains the social order (Ellard, 1989:29). Some 
writers claim psychopathy’s links with ill-defined conceptualisations of 
‘antisocial behaviour’ makes it ‘a catch all’ term (Mason & Mercer, 
1998:151). Such conceptual issues with the concept of psychopathy (see Blair 
et al., 2005) and its reliance on individual clinical (social) judgement (Evans 
et al., 2011) for its meaning in context are also illustrated in government 
policy and consultation documents (Mason & Mercer, 1998; McCallum, 
2001; Parnell, 2010). The Butler Report (1975) noted: 
‘a multiplicity of opinions as to the aetiology, symptoms and treatment of 
‘psychopathy’, which is only understood by reference to the particular sense 
in which the term is being employed by the psychiatrist in question’.  
Further to that the UK government consultation document ‘Offenders 
Suffering from Psychopathic Disorders’ (Home Office, 1986) states 
psychopathy: 
 ‘is not a description of a single clinical disorder but a convenient label to 
describe a severe personality disorder which may show itself in a variety of 
attitudinal, emotional and interpersonal behaviour problems’  
 
 
Despite the historical diversity noted across descriptions of psychopathy 
(McCallum, 2001) Harvey M. Cleckley (1941) provided the most commonly 
referenced definition of  the ‘psychopathy’ construct in which he considered 
‘psychopaths’ to be superficially charming, often intelligent individuals, with 
shallow emotional depth who engaged in antisocial, sometimes violent 
behaviour. However, despite the growing popularity of this term amongst 
clinicians it did not appear in the first DSM, instead the DSM-I contained the 
construct ‘Sociopathic Personality Disturbance’ emphasising callousness and 
lack of responsibility (APA, 1952) and the construct ASPD followed this in 
the DSM-II (APA, 1968). However, despite those issues, ASPD’s links (if 
indeed there are any) with psychopathy have been revisited by the DSM-V 
working group who did consider significant changes to PD diagnoses (certain 
criteria have changed) and had suggested ASPD should be termed 
antisocial/dissocial personality disorder with inclusion of a subtype 
"Antisocial/Psychopathic Type" (Hesse, 2010). Dissocial personality 
disorder is drawn from the lesser used diagnostic manual the ICD-10 (WHO, 
1992) and is closer still to descriptions of psychopathy, though at present 
there is almost no research on that construct at all (De Brito & Hodgins, 
2009). These issues and factors, taken together with the rate of renewed 
interest in ‘psychopathy’ could be seen to strengthen arguments that the 
popularity (or in this case a revival) of certain constructs in 
 
psychiatry/psychology are often preceded by the invention of methods to 
measure them (Danziger, 1990).  
 
The Psychopathy Checklist 
In the UK context, we have seen a revival of the construct of psychopathy 
(Millon et al., 2004) and of the downward extension of that adult construct to 
children in proposals for ESPD (Vizard et al., 2004; Vizard, 2008) in children 
who are often termed ‘Callous-Unemotional (Salekin & Lynam, 2010). This 
revival stems from the invention of the diagnostic tools known as the 
psychopathy checklist, along with its revised form or PCL-R/PCL-RV (Hare, 
1993) and the youth version the PCL-R-YV (Hare, 1997). The PCL-RV is a 
diagnostic instrument used to measure psychopathy in a 20 item checklist 
(See appendix iv). The PCL-R assesses both personality (interpersonal and 
affective) and behavioural (lifestyle and antisocial) deficits. As such, the 
research and clinical implications of psychopathy, as opperationalised by the 
PCL-R, cannot be readily extrapolated to the diagnosis of ASPD as the DSM-
IV-TR criteria are largely behaviourally based (Oglof, 2006). Other critics 
argue the checklist conflates antisocial personality disorder with 
psychopathy, whereas these can be two distinct entities (Skeem & Cooke, 
2010). Hesse (2010) argues these conflations could have serious 
consequences for people diagnosed with ASPD, in terms of treatment and 
 
criminal justice settings.  Such obfuscation of those constructs and difficulties 
with definitions have seen the PCL-RV both described as a valid and robust 
predictor of psychopathy and of violent recividism (Hare et al., 2000) and 
conversely, as less reliable than chance (Coid, 2013). In respect of the youth 
version there are considerable issues with downward extension (Skeem & 
Cauffman, 2003) of such an ill-defined adult construct (Skeem & Cooke, 
2010) which, for diagnosis in adults requires evidence of stable traits and 
behaviours across significant time frames and contexts (Hare et al, 2000) 
which cannot be evidenced in children (Malatesti & McMillan, 2010). 
Moreover, many items noted on the test can be seen as typical in ‘normal’ 
child development and in groups of children who offend, such as impulsivity 
(Salekin & Lynam, 2010).   
Robert Hare (1993) revived Cleckley’s (1941) definition of the psychopath 
as he devised the checklist while working in correctional facilities with 
detained individuals. Hare concedes this may see the construct biased towards 
criminal populations rather than others (Babiak & Hare, 1996). Hare has also 
pointed to issues with the ways the test is used by clinicians incorrectly as a 
‘framework to form’ their ‘professional opinions’ while citing this is not 
uncommon for clinicians who ‘often use formal diagnostic criteria only as 
guideline for forming opinions based on their own clinical experience’ (Hare, 
1993:191). Hare (1993) therefore advises ‘careful use of procedures derived 
from solid scientific research’ (p.191). However, ‘solid scientific research’ in 
 
‘psychopathy’ is at best contradictory (Millon et al., 2004; Blair et al., 2005). 
Hare (1993) is also unoptimistic about treatment for psychopathy, citing 
studies which have shown a resilience to therapy and studies which have 
made the psychopath worse (p.199). Although he is more optimistic about the 
‘young psychopath’ who he says as we learn more about psychopathy and if 
given intervention at a ‘very early age’ might be treatable (Hare, 1993:200). 
However, Hare (1993) doesn’t explain how those clinicians could predict, as 
he calls it the ‘budding psychopath’ at an early age (p.200) if they are so often 
wrong in their diagnosis of adults. Despite this, Hare (1993) concludes that 
‘logically our best chance of reducing the impact of psychopathy on society 
is to attack the problem early’ though he makes no suggestions as to how one 
might go about this and further concludes, without citing any studies, that so 
far ‘efforts have not been successful’ (p.200).  
 
The Fledgling Psychopath or Callous-Unemotional Child 
As far as describing the ‘fledgling psychopath’ (Lynam, 1996) or 
‘psychopathic traits’ in children (Salekin & Lynam, 2010) a term which is 
gaining considerable popularity and usage in the UK is ‘Callous-
Unemotional’ (see White & Frick, 2010 in Salekin & Lynam, 2010). This 
term is often used interchangeably with ‘psychopathic traits’ (See Vizard et 
al., 2009) to denote a lack of empathic response, emotional affect and 
 
resistance to punishment or treatment though some studies contest these 
deficits in children described as ‘psychopathic’ or ‘Callous-Unemotional 
(Van Baardewijk et al, 2009). The inherent controversial nature of extending 
downwardly to children, such a confused and ill-defined construct as 
psychopathy is perhaps most convincingly illustrated by this assumed need to 
replace it with another term altogether. Though, this also adds to conceptual 
confusions. Interestingly, the authors of the most widely regarded text on the 
subject ‘Handbook of Child and Adolescent Psychopathy’ (Salekin & Lynam, 
2010) warn that ‘Forensic evaluators may best refrain from referring to or 
classifying youth ‘psychopathic’ (p.391) and that the label ‘psychopath’ is 
potentially pejorative and excludes children from mental health treatments 
(p.390) while referring to these children using these terms in the title and 
throughout the text itself. Another serious ethical issue with such labelling of 
children is the assumed untreatable nature of psychopathy and the lack of 
treatments available. As far as treatment is concerned,  
‘a review of the literature suggests that a chapter on effective treatment 
should be the shortest in any book on psychopathy. In fact, it has been 
suggested that one sentence would suffice: No demonstrably effective 
treatment has been found’  
(Suedfeld & Landon, 1978:347).  
 
Indeed, this appears to follow in the text as only one chapter out of a possible 
sixteen is devoted to treatment and the authors conclude in their treatment 
reviews that studies show ‘something works’ with ‘psychopathic youth’ while 
contending those studies are ‘flawed in numerous ways’ (Salekin & Lynam, 
2010:343) and stating their own lesser reviewed studies are ‘promising’ 
(Salekin & Lynam, 2010:366-7). These kinds of ‘promissory discourses’ 
concerning understanding psychopathy and treatment have been evidenced 
before in discourse analytic studies which appear to illustrate rhetorical, 
rather than robust scientific arguments by those in the field (Pickersgill, 
2011).  
The potentially negative real world implications of using the label 
‘psychopath’ to describe certain observed deficits in children have been 
indicated in mock reviews of case material labelling juveniles as ‘psychopath’ 
which showed juries as more likely to recommend the death penalty (Edens 
et al, 2002, 2003 in Salekin & Lynam, 2010) and in a survey of US clinicians  
in youth justice settings, this term when applied to juveniles influenced 
ratings of future risk, violence and dangerousness, even when antisocial 
behaviour was not present (Rockett et al., in Salekin & Lynam, 2010). 
Similarly, in a survey of 100 judges psychopathy independently predicted less 
treatment amenability, higher perceptions of dangerousness and more 
recommendations for restrictive placements (Jones & Cauffman, 2008 in 
 
Salekin & Lynam, 2010). This picture becomes somewhat more disconcerting 
as those authorities on the subject urge considerable caution whereby: 
‘Given the ramifications associated with psychopathy and the potential for 
harm that can occur when an adolescent is assessed as having high 
psychopathic traits, forensic clinicians must be especially careful not to 
misuse the construct of psychopathy and to identify limitations appropriately 
when it is used’ (Salekin & Lynam, 2010;391). 
Thus, illustrating that applications of the child construct and identification of 
limitations to it are open to interpretation. This therefore allows for the 
individual clinical judgement (Evans et al., 2011) the PCL-R-V’s developer 
was critical of in adult presentations (Hare, 1993) which have had serious 
negative effects in criminal justice and clinical contexts (Malatesti & 
Mcmillan 2010). 
 
Practitioner Perceptions of Personality Disorder 
The continuing ‘problem’ people with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
pose for mental health professionals is widely and commonly acknowledged 
(Livesley, 2001; Bowers, 2002) though the well-documented negative 
attitude mental health professionals can have towards these ‘problem’ people 
is perhaps less widely acknowledged (Castillo, 2000; 2002). However, these 
historically pervasive negative attitudes were explored in a seminal paper 
 
‘Personality Disorder: The Patients Psychiatrists Do Not Like’ (Lewis & 
Appleby, 1988). Like definitions of personality which suggest that it is 
enduring, so too are clinical attitudes associated with PD which are 
inextricably linked to historical assumptions regarding treatability. Lewis and 
Appleby (1988) indicated that psychiatrists viewed patients diagnosed with 
PD diagnoses as a ‘problem’ group.  The study noted these individuals were 
viewed as difficult, annoying, manipulative, attention seeking, in direct 
control of their suicidal thoughts, behaviours and urges and that they were 
less deserving of care than other patients. The authors concluded that 
‘personality disorder appears to be an enduring pejorative judgement rather 
than a clinical diagnosis’ and called for ‘the concept of personality disorder 
to be abandoned’ (p.44).   
These calls for such abandonment of the PD term due to negative perceptions 
by practitioners may be further supported by studies showing biases in 
nursing care for this group and particular strategies being employed to ‘cope’ 
with care for this group, particularly when PD is associated with violence 
(Bowers, 2002). There is also evidence of moral judgements against this 
group (Hill, 2010) and evidence of an adoption of objectifying or bureaucratic 
language in certain presentations including PD by practitioners (Hamilton & 
Manius, 2006 in Hill, 2010) which in the case of those PD’s associated with 
lower social classes, such as ASPD, individuals may be further discriminated 
against clinically (Smith et al., 2011).  
 
 
Individuals with PD diagnoses are also publicly discriminated against in 
terms of the cost of their care and it would seem some are also quite aware of 
this. A consultant in Public Health published an article in The Guardian called 
‘Everyone’s life has a price’ (see Castillo, 1997:32) suggesting that money 
could be saved by denying hospital admission to those with PD. This 
prompted a local service user to write about their experience from hospital:  
 
‘I am a victim of childhood sexual and ritual abuse. I am not yet a survivor. I 
don’t see why I should be deprived of the care and expert counselling that I 
most definitely need. It was, after all, not me who carried out abuse on a 
minor. I am just trying to cope with the aftermath’. 
(Castillo, 1997:32) 
 
If one wanted further confirmation that this group might be viewed or treated 
differently by practitioners this appears to be evidenced by assumed need for 
the development of the Attitude to Personality Disorder Questionnaire 
(APDQ) which is used to score practitioner attitudes towards this group 
(Bowers & Allan 2006). Indeed, research would concur that professionals 
require and would benefit from more education, training and understanding 
to work with PD in positive and productive ways (Krawitz, 2004; Shanks et 
 
al., 2001). All these findings could suggest the PD label may have iatrogenic 
effects (Illich, 1975). If indeed we assume PD signals deficits in interpersonal 
relationships with others, it may be fair to say these could be potentially 
intensified by the way professionals interact with and treat those patients 




Patient Perceptions of Personality Disorder 
 
Although proponents of potential, though not yet well evidenced treatments 
for PD such as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (an off-shoot of Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy) for BDP have claimed that a diagnosis of PD is a 
validating experience (Lineham,1993, 1994) no evidence for this assertion 
has yet materialised.  This is not surprising as there is little research available 
concerning the experience of individuals who are given a PD diagnosis, 
although Clare Allen (2011) mental health author and recipient of a BDP 
diagnosis has said: 
 
 ‘A personality disorder is precisely that, a disordered personality; the 
problem is not an illness, the problem is you…. I was summarily discharged 
 
and the BPD was handed to me like a parting gift, an explanation as to why 
it was I had failed to respond to "treatment". One is tempted to suggest that 
it might be more helpful to diagnose the treatment than the patient who fails 
to respond to it ".  
 
Allen is a rare commentator on personal experience of PD and her experience 
seems far from a ‘validating one’. Traditionally, the experiences of people 
with PD diagnoses have not been well researched (Castillo, 2000). Moreover 
the experiences of people who are considered ‘mentally disordered offenders’ 
are rarely researched as they have been assumed to lack objectivity (Coffey, 
2006). More recently though, mental health service-users including those 
‘with PD’ have been evidenced as being able to provide valuable insights and 
feedback (Ryan et al., 2002; Sainsbury et al., 2004).  
 
Heather Castillo (2000, 2001, 2002) conducted the only research from the 
individual’s perspective on PD. When those who had been given a PD 
diagnosis were asked what PD meant 26% did not know, 22 % said it was a 
label you get when ‘they’ don't know what to do with you, 18% described 
mood swings or personality change and 10% described it as a ‘life sentence’, 
‘untreatable’ or as having ‘no hope’. Other responses appeared to indicate 
identity confusion (‘I don’t know who I am’) or deficits in emotional 
development (‘I didn't develop emotionally as a child') and dissociative or 
 
self-destructive tendencies, relationship difficulties, (‘I'm angry and 
disappointed and not able to cope ") and relationship difficulties with some 
feeling ‘tarred with a brush of being bad as well as mad’ and being treated 
like ‘outcasts’. Castillo’s findings indicated that many participants felt they 
had been categorised as having enduring, inflexible and undesirable character 
traits which were untreatable and thus they were ‘hopeless’ cases. Participants 
also described feelings of alienation and reported stigma associated with the 
PD diagnosis from both society and the professionals tasked with caring for 
them. Castillo (2000,2001,2003) also researched her participants experiences 
of professionals working with PD and those practitioner attitudes documented 
in the prior section were interpreted by the participants as `not deserving of 
attention'. By way of explanation for behaviour, many participants pointed to 
childhood traumata as covered earlier however, few felt they were receiving 
any validation or treatment in how to deal with this. Castillo’s research 
projects concluded that patients with PD diagnoses were aware of negative 
practitioner perceptions, confused by their diagnoses, excluded from services, 
denied treatment and were very aware they were treated differently to other 





The Politics of Personality Disorder in the UK: No Longer a Diagnosis 
of Exclusion? 
The long-standing issue of PD serving to exclude people from services and 
engendering negative attitudes from practitioners has put PD on the UK 
political agenda over the last ten years (Parnell, 2010) most notably in the 
policy document Personality Disorder: No Longer a Diagnosis of Exclusion 
(NIMH (E) 2003). Another government initiative which also confirms the 
long-standing negative perception practitioners may have of this group was  
government introduction of the ‘Knowledge and Understanding Framework’ 
(KUF) which is an initiative providing professionals with better skills and 
understanding in order to work with this group of individuals. However, 
policy makers in the UK (DoH, 2003; NIMH(E) 2003c) also concede to the 
problematic of PD: 
 
‘Despite over two decades of extensive research, psychiatrists and 
psychologists remain divided as to how these disorders should be 
conceptualised. ….in addition, clinical and research methods for diagnosing 
personality disorders diverge and the level of agreement between schedules 





Despite which research funding increases to better understand PD’s 
epidemiology and facilitate services for treatments which are being developed 
(Department of Health, 2003) though efficacy research is inconclusive 
(Stanislow & Glashan, 1998) which conflicts with government priorities such 
as  ‘evidence’ and ‘efficacy’ based practice (Proctor, 2010). In a review of 
treatment for severe PDs comparison of findings was confounded by different 
criteria describing PDs and inconsistent measures, thus recommendations 
based on efficacy could not be made, though the authors recommend future 
research required better definitions of PD (Warren et al., 2003). Lack of 
treatment is often implicated in PD discourses concerning ‘early intervention’ 
(Bleiberg, 2001) which is commanding significant UK mental health research 
funding with little evidence for its efficacy (Pelosi, 2008). 
 
Conceptual confusions and problematic definitions also blight any research 
into children suspected of developing PD (Freeman & Reinecke, 2007) which 
brings questions about UK propositions for ‘Emerging Severe Personality 
Disorder’ (Vizard et al., 2004) in that, if we have such difficulty in defining, 
researching and treating adult PD, how might we define, research and treat 
those groups in which it is suspected of ‘emerging’?. Particularly, when these 
proposals ostensibly embrace the UK political climate in the therapeutic 
professions towards ‘evidence-based practice’ or ‘efficacy-based’ treatments 
(House & Loewenthal, 2008) via ‘early intervention’ (Allen, 2011).   
 
Though, before those ESPD proposals could be made concerning children and 
serious violent or sexual offending, the factors and developments briefly 
stated here can, in the case of  adults with PD diagnoses and a history/risk of 
violence, be seen as culminating in a significant intervention by the 
government via their proposals for the ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder’ programme.   
 
The Politics of Personality Disorder in the UK: Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorder 
The UK government intervention into personality disorder and violence 
somewhat ironically, made potentially permanent exclusion from society a 
very real outcome for some recipients of PD diagnoses in the UK, in the form 
of preventative detention under the ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder’ provision (DoH, 1999). Similar to the arguments of Danziger 
(1990) Anthony Madden (2007) asserts that the UK could not have had the 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder Term (DSPD) and pilot 
programme (DoH, 1999) without the growing popularity of the psychopathy 
checklist (Hare, 1993, 1997) and the highly publicized Lin Russell murder. 
The accused, Michael Stone was reported in the press as having been refused 
psychiatric treatment and services due to having an untreatable personality 
disorder (Seddon, 2007). Seizing on assumed public outrage (Parnell, 2010) 
 
Home Secretary Jack Straw stated the responsibility for this laid with the 
psychiatric profession: 
 
Quite extraordinarily for a medical profession, they have said they will only 
take on those patients they regard as treatable. If that philosophy applied 
anywhere else in medicine there would be no progress whatsoever. It's time, 
frankly, that the psychiatric profession seriously examined their own 
practices and tried to modernise them in a way that they have so far failed to 
do. 
 
(Hansard 26 Oct 1998) 
However, a report written in 2000 which was only published in 2006 due to  
legal challenges by the Independent Inquiry into the care and Treatment of 
Michael Stone concluded that services had not refused to treat Stone and  it 
was in fact his own psychiatrist who brought him to the attention of the police 
(Francis et al., 2006). The failure of the government to release this may have 
perpetuated assumptions concerning violence risk and PD and refusal of 
psychiatrists/services to intervene (Parnell, 2010) which were the main 
arguments for the DSPD pilots (Seddon, 2007).  
The green paper Managing dangerous people with severe personality 
disorders (Home Office/Department of Health, 1999) proposed development 
 
of new legislation and development of services for individuals who may pose 
a serious danger to others as result of their PD.  Subsequently, reforms to 
policy on the clinical management of personality disorder and significant 
changes to the Mental Health Act were recommended by The National 
Confidential Inquiry and the Department of Health (DoH, 1999; 2001). This 
led to fierce debate concerning the proposition for new powers of detention 
under a new category of ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder’ 
(DSPD) (Department of Health 2003).  
Most importantly for the current study is the understanding that DSPD was a 
term created by policy makers (DoH, 2004) and is not a recognised diagnosis 
as it has been erroneously referred to by academics and commentators since 
its conception (e.g. White 2002). Therefore it should be clarified that: 
‘The term Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) is not a 
diagnosis, it is a working title used to describe a programme of work to 
develop better ways of managing the very small number of people with 
personality disorder who, because of their disorder, also pose a significant 
risk of harm to others’ 
(Home Office, Her Majesty’s Prison Service & Department of Health, 2004) 
 
And that small number of males were assessed on a particular criteria using 
the psychopathy checklist (See appendix v) have been described as 
exhibiting:  
 
"... dysfunctional traits of personality disorder such as impulsivity, hostility, 
irritability, anger, egocentricity, dependency, lack of empathy, lack of 
perspective taking, cognitive distortions and relationship problems... they 
may present with a variety of other clinical problems such as mood disorder, 
anxiety and post-traumatic stress. Finally, they are likely to present with 
specific criminal and antisocial behaviour or lifestyles. "  
 
(O'Rourke et al., 2003: 9) 
 
Although the term DSPD was explicitly intended to describe a pilot 
programme of work, without reference to the individual or diagnosis, 
gradually in academic and other commentaries, those individuals meeting the 
DSPD pilot criteria began to be referred to as ‘having’ DSPD (Vizard et al., 
2004) and DSPD began to be referred to as a diagnosis (see White, 2002).  
 
Again, conceptual confusions blighted this terminology as consultation 
documents referred to ‘Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality 
Disorders’ (DoH, 1999) whose PD was assumed to be ‘functionally linked’ 
 
to their violence/violence risk when there is no way of measuring 
‘dangerousness’ (Sarbin, 1969). Functional links made between PD and 
violence are virtually impossible to evidence (McMurran & Howard, 2009; 
Malatesti & McMillan, 2010). Currently psychiatric standardised assessments 
of future violence risk prediction in those with psychopathy, using tests like 
the PCL-R-V have been evaluated as less than chance (Coid, 2013) and this 
made the DSPD proposals particularly controversial in that they allowed for 
detention of individuals with PD diagnoses that met the DSPD pilot criteria 
but had not actually committed a violent offence (Seddon, 2007). In a 
systematic review on the detention of those thought to have met the criteria, 
the lack of clarity over the DSPD term was cited as a possible factor in the 
finding that six people may require preventative detention to prevent one 
violent act (Buchanan & Leese, 2001) causing considerable political 
objection across political parties (House of Lords & House of Commons, 
2005).  
 
Psychiatrists also objected to DSPD proposals. They were concerned that 
their role might be focused more on public protection than care of the patient. 
This contravenes General Medical Council guidelines (Haddock et al., 2001). 
This was due to the fact the DSPD proposals announced significant changes 
to the treatability clauses in the Mental Health Act (1983) which formerly 
stated that individuals could not be detained under section if they are not 
 
deemed medically treatable. Later the government announced that they would 
clarify the treatability clause with regard to PD via a wider concept of 
‘appropriate treatment’ as basic care (Dillon-Hooper, 2006; Bowers, 2002) as 
there is no consensus on how to measure/assess treatability (Stansilow & 
McGlashan, 1998; Sainsbury et al., 2004). Large-scale research reviews into 
studies of treatment for severe PD have been difficult to evaluate as all studies 
used different criteria to describe their participants (Livesley 2001). 
Furthermore the reviews showed that researchers used incomparable 
measurements for outcomes (Warren et al, 2003). Other reviews indicated 
that there was no evidence that any model (Paris,1992) had capacity for 
reducing the risk associated with people who are deemed ‘dangerous’ and had 
a PD diagnosis (Burke & Hart, 2000). 
 
In terms of practitioner attitudes towards people with personality disorders 
and a history of violence Len Bowers’ (2002) interviews with psychiatric 
nursing staff in a high-security hospital DSPD unit suggested that those 
nurses who had positive attitudes expressed respect for their patients and were 
better able to invest in relationships with them and positive attitudes 
correlated positively with the ways in which staff managed their reactions to 
patients, understanding and their own moral commitments to their work with 
this population. Furthermore a later longitudinal study on a prison-based 
DSPD unit (Bowers et al., 2005; 2006b) concluded that positive change 
 
events were strongly influenced by prison staff maintenance of a positive 
attitude towards DSPD unit prisoners and understanding patients difficulties, 
being able to make relationships with prisoners and a strong belief in a good 
therapeutic relationship with those DSPD unit prisoners.   
 
The importance of maintaining these positive attitudes, and the importance of 
understanding from staff tasked with working with people with a personality 
disorder diagnosis who have offended, has been illustrated in the rare, but 
insightful investigations into DSPD unit patients/prisoners feedback in which 
the most valued qualities in staff were ‘caring and understanding’ and 
‘experience’ (Ryan et al., 2002:254). Similarly, forensic and PD diagnosed 
people who have offended said motivation for engagement in treatment was 
reliant on feeling contained by confident staff and professionals tasked with 
psychological interventions (Sainsbury et al., 2004). Taken together these 
insights from research findings would suggest that the interpersonal approach 
and attitudes of staff towards this group are crucial for those individuals 
engagement in services and treatments.  
 
Another insight of particular interest to the present study, which concerns 
children who may be hard to find placements for (Epps, 1999) came from Dr 
Jose Romero-Ucaly of the PD directorate at Broadmoor High Security 
Hospital and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist on their DSPD unit (until it was 
 
disbanded) who told this author ‘we were very proud of the work we did with 
the DSPD unit, though problems did arise when we had to reintegrate those 
individuals back into the community services because no one wants to take 
on someone labelled DSPD’ (Personal communication, April, 2012). This 
appears to reflect the findings in research reviews that 
 
‘Mentally disordered offenders are often treated differently from other groups 
and consequently they experience discrimination and social exclusion, 




The DSPD programme received mixed reviews after it was disbanded 
(Duggan, 2007; Beck, 2010) though most review summaries seemed to 
indicate similar outcomes to prior PD research, that therapeutic treatment 
varied widely over DSPD sites, it was difficult to measure and compare 
outcomes as each participant had differing PD’s, pathways out of care were 





The Politics of Personality Disorder in the UK: Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder in Childhood 
The DSPD programme, along with the political climate in youth crime 
mentioned in the preface provided the context for ‘Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder in Childhood’ (ESPD) to be proposed. This section does 
not concentrate on ‘scientific evidence’ for ESPD nor is it intended to refute 
or interrogate that evidence, as these are the positivist projects of the 
proposers. Moreover, only one research study in ESPD has been conducted 
by its proposers, other than this present study, thus there is little evidence to 
critique. Instead, proposals and conference documents (Vizard et al, 2004; 
Hickey et al., 2007; Vizard, 2008; Vizard et al., 2009) are explored 
discursively (Billig, 1987) with attention to the rhetorical arguments for 
ESPD and any concerns about its meaning in the clinical context. This is an 
attempt at avoiding drawing on positivist arguments to refute certain claims, 
which can be problematic in DA studies, as our focus is not compatible with 
such approaches (Wetherell et al., 2001).  
 
ESPD: Proposals 
In 2004 proposals were made for a new developmental disorder using the term 
‘Severe Personality Disorder Emerging in Childhood’ (Vizard et al., 2004) 
which was later referred to as ‘Emerging Severe Personality Disorder in 
Childhood’ (Vizard, 2008) then ‘Emerging Severe Personality Disorder traits 
 
in childhood’ (Vizard et al., 2007) and as both ‘Early Severe Personality 
Disorder’ and ‘Early Severe Personality Disorder traits’ (Vizard et al., 
2009:17). Most frequently ‘Emerging Severe Personality Disorder’ was used 
along with its acronym ESPD which was employed in the first research study 
employing this concept (Hickey et al. 2007) so that term was used throughout 
this study.  
 
Proposals for ESPD integrated diagnoses of PD according to the DSM-IV-
TR and the ICD-10 (APA, 2000; WHO 2003) and psychopathy (Hare, 1993) 
with a child development perspective (Vizard et al., 2004).  In the only 
research study in which the ESPD term was appropriated (Vizard, et al., 2007) 
ESPD was described as ‘the presence in childhood or adolescence of above 
average levels of both conduct disordered behaviour and psychopathic 
personality disorder traits’ explaining the term ‘emerging’ is ‘used to signify 
that at the time of assessment these traits were observed, but it is recognised 
they may not persist into adulthood’ (p.62). The position paper discussed the 
more recent use of the concept of ‘Severe Personality Disorder’ (SPD) that is 
applied to adults showing serious antisocial and offending behaviours while 
drawing attention to the fact that there is no similar diagnostic classification 
for children showing similar behaviours (Vizard et al., 2004).  The authors 
suggest the ‘existing evidence base strongly supported the presence of a 
developmental trajectory from childhood to adult life for the small number of 
 
children who show early signs of severe personality disorder’ and that these 
vulnerable children ‘go on to become high-risk, personality disordered 
offenders, some of whom are serious sexual offenders’ (Vizard et 
al.,2004:17). It was also suggested that this ‘omission from diagnostic 
nomenclature prevents the appropriate early identification, assessment and 
management of these young people’ (Vizard et al., 2004:17).  
 
The proposers then outlined existing positivist evidence for this 
developmental trajectory to make their case, asserting that the clinical and 
financial ramifications of severe PD are well known, citing public health 
perspectives and ‘gains to the public purse’ in identifying and intervening 
early in suspected cases of childhood onset of severe PD (Vizard et al., 
2004:17) stating research was needed to ‘identify appropriate interventions 
for the small number of children and adolescents who are on this 
developmental pathway with all of the associated costs for public funding and 
immeasurable consequences for victims’ (Vizard et al., 2004:26). The authors 
concluded their arguments with the assertion that ‘a critical research effort 
must continue to be the creation of a new, evidence-based definition of early-
onset severe PD so that those at risk can be differentiated from other 
offenders’ (Vizard et al., 2004:26).  
 
 
The first position paper also relates these proposals explicitly to the DSPD 
programme and appears to present DSPD as a form of disorder rather than a 
programme of intervention as there are several references to DSPD as 
something an individual may ‘have’ with an aetiological origin. From a 
discourse analytic perspective, this illustrates how certain terms and phrases 
can become reified (Potter, 1996). For example the proposers give a Home 
Office definition of DSPD, while reminding the reader that the definition only 
applies to individuals over 18 years old and introducing that definition by 
stating ‘A recent Home Office consultation document referred to individuals 
with DSPD as follows’ while suggesting that ‘the early origins of DSPD are 
not addressed despite an evidence base confirming life course persistence of 
such behaviours’ (Vizard et al., 2004:19 my italics). Any evidence which may 
indicate otherwise (see Skodol et al., 2007) is not reviewed and it is unclear 
as to why DSPD is treated like a diagnosis. This continues in later papers, 
where the principal proposer refers to the way ‘government initiatives have 
invested in secure facilities for adults with ‘Dangerous Severe Personality 
Disorder’ (Vizard, 2008:389). This kind of use of the DSPD term, which has 
been seen in other academic papers (White, 1999) not only misappropriates 
the term but also homogenises that group.  
 
Vizard and colleagues (2004) argue that ‘the case for a developmental 
conceptualisation of severe and enduring personality disorder is therefore 
 
based on the common-sense notion that such difficulties do not ‘start’ at the 
age of 18 without prior manifestation’ (p.23) and discuss comorbidity of 
particular diagnoses in children who are at risk of SPD/DSPD in adulthood 
drawing together evidence for this in the links made in diagnosis of ‘Conduct 
Disorder’ or CD in children (APA, 2000:98) which has subtypes of 
childhood-onset, adolescent-onset or unspecified-onset (APA, 2000:9) and 
future development of Antisocial Personality Disorder or ASPD in adults 
(APA, 2000:701).  
 
Conduct disorder itself though is not considered a PD as it is diagnosed by 
behavioural rather than interpersonal and affective criteria (Carr, 2010). The 
criteria for ASPD diagnosis includes the requirement that the individual had 
a diagnosis of CD before 15 years old, though an individual can still receive 
an ASPD diagnosis without that prior diagnosis (APA, 2000:706). The 
proposers for ESPD also suggest there may be, in addition to CD, high levels 
of comorbidity of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and low 
intelligence quotient (IQ) in those children later diagnosed with ASPD 
(Moffitt, 1993, 2001 in Vizard et al., 2004). In brief, ADHD is another 
behavioural disorder said to be characterised by persistent patterns of 
inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more severe than that 
observed in others at a comparable stage of development (APA, 2000:85) and 
there are sub-types in the DSM noted as ADHD, combined type which is what 
 
most of those children are diagnosed with while the remainder are assessed 
as having either ADHD, predominantly inattentive type or ADHD, 
predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type (APA, 2000: 87). Both ADHD 
and CD are common disorders diagnosed in child populations along with 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) which is said to be characterised by 
persistent negativistic, defiant, disobedient and hostile behaviour towards 
authority figures (APA, 2000:100). Although there is a single conduct 
disorder category for those children under 15 who may show persistent 
behavioural problems such as violence or cruelty to people or animals or 
deceitfulness, theft and serious rule violation, these three diagnoses are also 
often collectively termed ‘conduct disorders’. It is suggested approximately 
40% of children with conduct disorders may develop ASPD as adults 
(RCPSYCH, 2013).  
However, those childhood conduct disorder diagnoses are also considered 
rather controversial for several reasons, firstly in a similar fashion to the adult 
PD types, there is considerable overlap between the conduct disorders (Carr, 
2010) as well as there being issues of gender and class bias in diagnosis      
(Folz, 2008) and those diagnoses are heavily dependent on individual clinical 
judgement (Evans et al., 2011). Secondly, their criteria have changed rapidly 
in the DSM editions (Harwood, 2005) the first DSM stating these are 
‘transient situational personality disorders’ and subsequent editions see 
continual differences, similarly to those of ASPD definitions with criteria 
 
such as ‘swearing’ being added or deleted at particular times without research 
studies to support it (For a historical review see Mallett, 2006). Thirdly, there 
are well documented links between particular pharmaceutical companies and 
their drugs to ‘treat’ conduct disorders which is said to be implicated in their 
growing prevalence (Breggin, 1996). These issues with conduct disorders has 
seen them criticised for many years as ‘psycho-technologies’ for social 
control (Brown, 1975; Cohen, 1975; Foucault 2003) and therefore considered 
as worthy topics for discourse analytic critique (Graham, 2005).  
 
The first study employing the ESPD terminology, but referring to it as ‘ESPD 
traits’ was funded by the Home Office and was linked to the DSPD service. 
The research report ‘Links between juvenile sexually abusive behaviour and 
emerging severe personality disorder traits in childhood’ (Hickey et al., 
2007) using data from retrospective file reviews investigated whether the age 
of onset of sexually abusive behaviour (SAB) could distinguish distinct sub 
groups of  juvenile sexual abusers (JSA’s). These were termed early onset 
(before 11 years old) and late onset. The study also investigated whether a 
subgroup could be identified ‘on the basis of emerging severe personality 
disorder traits’ who were said to have ‘marked conduct disorder and 
psychopathic personality disorder traits’ (Hickey et al., 2007: i). Though it is 
not clear what ‘marked conduct disorder’ is and as the authors of that study 
illustrate, there is currently no adult psychopathic personality disorder (PPD) 
 
in any diagnostic nomenclature (APA 2000; WHO, 2003). Instead, the criteria 
for this is taken from Hare’s (2004) psychopathy checklist youth version to 
measure interpersonal traits such as manipulation, affective trait deficiencies 
such as callousness and behavioural traits such as impulsivity (Hickey et al., 
2007). Although, regardless of psychopathy and its associated features being 
unlikely to emerge suddenly in adulthood it should be reiterated that the PCL-
R-YV should not be used to diagnose youth as psychopathic (Salekin & 
Lynam, 2010) as high scores require evidence that behaviours and traits are 
extreme across substantial time periods and contexts (Malatesi & McMillan, 
2010:100). It is unclear how this was evidenced in children from age 5 and 
when the mean age in the study was 13 (Vizard et al., 2007).  
The authors of the ESPD study then go on to detail how these diagnoses of 
ASPD and ‘psychopathic personality’ are rarely applied to children and 
adolescents despite the traits associated with them being unlikely to emerge 
in adulthood and they draw on their own proposals for a developmental 
trajectory understanding of that emergence while acknowledging that the 
model includes potential for resilient children, and those who receive 
appropriate treatment to move off that trajectory towards those adult 
diagnoses, though no treatments are specified (Vizard et al., 2004). However, 
the authors contend that more valid and reliable methods for assessing 
particular traits in young people are required and that due to certain trait such 
as impulsivity being a trait observed in ‘normal’ adolescents ‘clear 
 
developmentally appropriate definitions’ of those traits must be developed 
(Hickey et al., 2007:6).  
 
The study indicated that the ‘ESPD group’ were more likely to have early 
difficult temperaments, more insecure attachments, inconsistent parenting, 
placement disruption and parents with mental health problems (See Bowlby 
1988; Epps, 2006; Straussner & Fewell 2011). In addition within the 
identified ‘ESPD group’ sexually abusive behaviour was viewed as more 
premeditated and predatory and their conviction rate was almost double that 
of the ‘non-ESPD group’ (Hickey et al., 2007).  
 
ESPD: Labelling Issues 
With respect to potential labelling issues due to the appropriation of PD or 
‘psychopathy’ terms in ESPD, authors contend that there are ethical, 
methodological and developmental concerns regarding extending the ASPD 
and PDD constructs downwards to children (Marsee, Silverthorn & Frick, 
2005 in Hickey et al., 2007) as psychopathy is frequently correlated with poor 
treatment prognosis (Blair et al., 2005) and PDs traditionally exclude adults 
from mental health services (Livesley, 2001). The authors further conclude 
that these issues are the primary deterrents for labelling children using these 
constructs (Hickey et al., 2007). However, one of the proposers argues that: 
 
‘Clinicians do not routinely assess aspects of a child’s personality as part of 
a mental health examination’ and she acknowledges this may stem from a 
fear of ‘labelling’ 
(Vizard, 2008:389) 
though this potentially confounding issue is not explored any further.   
 
Indeed, practitioners did demonstrate concerns regarding labelling children 
with potentially stigmatising labels to describe a range of overlapping 
symptoms, diagnoses and behavioural difficulties at the 2007 ‘Early 
Intervention in Personality Disorder’ conference in London (Vizard et al., 
2009:32). The seminar was commissioned by the Department of Health and 
brought together practitioners and academics working in the fields of 
childhood conduct disorders and antisocial behaviour. Concerns about  
possible effects of labelling were noted mostly in respect of the downward 
extension of ‘Psychopathy’ to children and concerns extended to the newer 
term ‘Callous-Unemotional’ or ‘Callous-Unemotional traits’ (CU) to describe 
suspected childhood-onset of psychopathic traits (Vizard et al., 2009:17). It 
was suggested by conference speakers that the CU term should be referred to 
as ‘Stress-resilient temperament’ to avoid stigmatisation and better reflect 
presentations which may not follow a stable developmental trajectory towards 
adult psychopathy (Vizard et al., 2009:18).  
 
There were also associated concerns from practitioners regarding the use of 
the term ‘High Risk/High Harm’ to describe suspected ASPD traits in young 
people (Vizard et al., 2009:32). This was described by Vizard and Colleagues 
(2009) as a term to refer to ‘children and youth who have traits consistent 
with early emerging antisocial personality disorder and who place an undue 
burden on services’ and the conference report further explains that ‘High 
Risk/High Harm’ has double meanings in that it is intended to refer to both 
‘the risk suffered by these children or the harm that could be inflicted on them 
and also to the risk they pose to others or the harm suffered by others because 
of their antisocial behaviour’ (p.4). There were issues noted by clinicians and 
delegates regarding this term, such as what concept was actually being 
identified in its usage and what type of harm was it actually identifying. 
Additionally, clinicians felt that there was a strong political drive towards 
intervening in harm towards others, when harm to self in those children often 
remained unaddressed (Vizard et al., 2009:25).   
 
Although there was some agreement at the conference that researchers require 
a ‘common language’ in order to replicate findings, it was acknowledged 
there are arguments for and against labelling in a clinical context (Vizard et 
al., 2009). However, conference documents detailing delegates input 
indicated that the ‘common language’ was not only questioned in its negative 
overtones and potential effects but also, due to the adult constructs these terms 
 
are associated with this ‘common language’ possibly had multiple meanings 
and possibly multiple definitions. Following from this the conference paper 
noted several clinical concerns, such as how it would be undesirable for a 
child to be labelled in a way that was more of a ‘hindrance than help’, there 
were issues raised concerning ‘a label implicating a certain profile will lead 
to a particular attitude or outcome’ and there were concerns that a child with 
a label of callous-unemotional traits might lead clinicians to think about adult 
psychopaths, and the prevailing attitude ‘nothing can be done’ though this 
was disputed by a number of delegates in attendance (Vizard et al., 2009:25) 
a significant majority of whom were working in these fields or were 
researchers with professional interests in these areas (Vizard et al., 2009, 
appendix i).  
 
Further concerns noted were the possible adoption of a ‘nihilistic’ attitude by 
clinicians towards children labelled in such ways as it was felt by some that 
this ‘was the case with adults who had severe personality disorders with 
psychopathic traits and by giving children similar labels surely we might be 
pushing them towards a hopeless future’ (Vizard et al., 2009:32). Associated 
issues were raised concerning the fact that psychopathy is an adult construct 
and thus its validity was in question and there was concern regarding lack of 
‘evidence-based effective interventions for adult psychopaths many of whom 
are over-represented in secure units’ (Vizard et al., 2009:32). Moreover, it 
 
was agreed that there were no effective treatments for children regarded as 
displaying ‘Callous-Unemotional traits’ and labelling them as such without 
available treatments appeared to be a strong reason for refraining from doing 
so (Vizard et al., 2009). Throughout the conference report, the clinicians 
concerns that it was not always clear what each term was actually identifying 
appeared to be illustrated as the  ‘Emerging’ SPD study (Vizard et al., 2007) 
was presented and referred to as ‘Early’ SPD  without explanation (Vizard et 
al., 2009:17) 
 
The authors of the conference report also acknowledged a caveat with regard 
to controversial labelling of children, which was that ‘the right terms in the 
wrong hands can still result in the pejorative use of an otherwise non-
pejorative label’ though, as the current review has detailed, these terms are 
historically pejorative, even amongst psychiatrists (Lewis & Appleby, 1988) 
though the historical picture is side-stepped in the conference document by  
stating there was a difficulty in identifying a problem if common language is 
not used and they concluded that: 
 ‘creative solutions to the problem need to be generated, rather than fears 
about labelling leading to the topic being ignored, which is leading to both 
identification and the concomitant treatment not taking place’  
(Vizard et al., 2009:26) 
 
Again, no evidence to support this view was offered in the report and it was 
later claimed there was good agreement amongst clinicians present that 
‘individuals with signs of psychopathy (high levels of CU traits) in their 
personalities can be distinguished reliably from other adolescents’ (Vizard et 
al., 2009: 32) so it was unclear how that assertion that ‘fear’ of labelling was 
leading to the topic being ignored or children not being identified. 
Interestingly, despite these issues being raised about labelling of children with 
controversial or pejorative terms drawn from adult constructs and diagnoses, 
there was no discussion noted concerning use of the term ‘Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder’ or ‘Early Severe’ as it was termed in  the conference 
report (which can be taken as an all-encompassing term covering children 
with both CU traits and high risk/high harm presentations). ESPD was not 
discussed even though the ESPD research was presented and it can be argued 
that the clinicians comments detailed above surrounding controversial 
labelling could all be just as easily extrapolated and applied to the ESPD term 
in its various guises, all of which may bring slightly different meanings which 
perhaps does not best exemplify the assertion that ‘a consistent language 






This review attempted to detail some of the conceptual confusions and 
clinical discourses noted regarding personality disorder and psychopathy 
constructs which have been recently appropriated in proposals for ESPD. The 
review also noted where there has been a failure to explore any potential 
effects which may come about as a result of using the term ‘Emerging Severe 
Personality Disorder’ to label and describe certain children or young people’s 
clinical presentations. It is hoped this chapter has provided a context to the 
aims of the present study, which, is approaching ESPD as a discursive 
formation to explore how ESPD might become reified or function rhetorically 
and ideologically in practitioners talk by asking what ESPD might mean to 
practitioners, what it might say about these young people, their prognosis and 















 In the spirit of discourse analytic research aims to situate knowledge 
(Harraway, 1991) and knowledge production, this section traces the academic 
history and contexts which made such methodologies viable for 
psychological enquiries (Wetherell et al, 2001).  
 
Methodology and Qualitative Research 
 
Methodology can be considered as the procedures of the research that ‘flows 
from one’s own position on ontology, epistemology and axiology’ 
(Ponterotto, 2005:132). Qualitative researchers tend to believe that methods 
produce knowledge rather than being strategies for revealing existing 
knowledge (Hollway et al., 2007) and it has been argued that choice of 
methodology is tactically driven (Harper, 1994; Henwood & Pigeon, 1992) 
which may give space ‘to those whose accounts may have been marginalised 
or discounted’ (Willig, 2001:12). Thus the researcher intends to ‘develop 
understandings of the phenomena under study, based as much as possible on 
the perspective of those being studied’ (Elliot et al., 1999: 216). Practitioners 
potential beliefs and opinions concerning ‘labelling’ and the well-studied 
controversies with regard to ‘diagnosing’ personality disorders or ‘emerging’ 
 
personality disorders in children have been mentioned very briefly in ESPD 
propositions and associated papers (Vizard et al., 2004:, Vizard et al, 2007) 
but these have not been explored before popularising this term in conferences 
for practitioners (Vizard et al, 2009). Although Stiles (1993) acknowledges 
differences in qualitative approaches, he has traced some common themes and 
features in these, describing the investigations as being reported linguistically 
rather than empirically using interpretation in results which are reported in 
context. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative methods are erroneously assumed as competing 
with each other, when it might be better to think of them as addressing very 
different types of research questions (Silverman, 2000). We might say that 
quantitative methods hold a realist position, assuming that knowledge exists 
and can be quantified with statistical methods which, in terms of 
methodological advantage, is useful in hypothesis testing, standardising and 
generalising trends (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Henwood & Pigeon, 1992).  
However, issues with this brought about the ‘crisis in psychology’ whereby 
much social psychological research was questioned and the discipline was, 
according to Ring (1967) falling into ‘profound intellectual disarray’ (p.119). 
Researchers began to acknowledge that statistical methods may be ‘essential 
where the subject of investigation is itself an aggregate …but [not where] the 
subject is the individual’ (Yule, 1921 cited in Danziger, 1990:225). This crisis 
 
continued throughout the 1970’s with criticisms of the manipulation of 
variables, deceiving of participants and the production of reductive and 
irrelevant findings (McGuire 1973; Silverman, 1977) along with criticism of 
the links to the US cultural ideal of self-contained individualism whereby ‘a 
substantial burden of personal and social responsibility for success or failure 
is placed on the individual within an individualistic perspective (Sampson, 
1977:779). There are different perspectives on the crisis and its effects. Those 
who favour statistically inferential methods claim there was no crisis (Jones, 
1985) while others believe the development of increasingly sophisticated 
methods resolved this (Reich, 1981). In the 1970s, social psychologists 
challenged cognitivism (Gergen, 1989) and in the 1980s the ‘turn to language’ 
saw DA introduced into ‘mainstream’ psychology (Parker, 1992). 
 
The discursive turn in psychology 
Critical Discursive Psychology (CDA) approaches in DA have been 
influenced by psychology’s ‘turn to language’ in the 1950’s (Woolgar, 1988), 
the 1960’s - 1970’s (Parker, 1992) and beyond that into the ‘discursive turn’ 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Parker, 2004). This turn towards the ‘discursive’ 
was epistemologically influenced by hermeneutics, linguistics, post-
structuralism and ethnomethodology (Wetherell et al, 2001). The 
philosophical underpinning of the movement could be said to be found in 
hermeneutics via Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, one of the earliest Western 
 
philosophical works to deal with language in a formal way (Whitaker, 1996). 
There was also major contribution from  George Herbert Mead (1934) on 
‘symbolic interactionism’ which placed importance on symbols (such as 
language). This lead to focus on the micro-processes of ‘interaction order’ 
(Goffman, 1955, 1983; Garfinkle, 1967) and Conversation Analysis (Sacks 
1964, 1972).  
 
During the 1960’s two seminal texts on the function of language, Austin’s 
(1962) How to do things with words and Searle’s (1969) Speech Acts: An 
Essay in the Philosophy of Language, implied that discourse might be better 
studied in the context of social action/practices. It was this interest in the 
performative and functional use of language, or its constitutive aspects with 
which academics began to challenge the positivist-empiricist conception of 
knowledge, for example Wittgenstein’s (1963) Philosophical Investigations 
into ‘language-games’ though there have been debates that this influence was 
preceded by the works of Emmanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche amongst 
others (Edley, 2001). Although it was Saussure’s (1983) semiology which 
made way for poststructuralists, like Michel Foucault (1972).  
 
 Michel Foucault’s relativist works questioned the ‘truth’ of taken-for-granted 
subjectivities and cultural representations by placing a specific focus on how 
 
subjects and social reality are historically situated. This culminated in what 
Donna Harraway (1992) later termed ‘situated knowledge’s’. Harraway, 
drawing from Foucault, explores how all knowledge is culturally, historically 
situated and thus how particular knowledge’s are dependent on the socio-
historical climate in their development and construction. This is a ‘top-down 
approach’ which attempts to identify wider cultural representations and 
subjectivities which circulate through everyday discourse, showing how 
power operates and how dominant representations can reproduce inequalities 
and have social consequences. 
 
 
The concept of discourse 
 
According to Link (1983) discourse can be defined as an ‘institutionalised 
way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power’ 
(p.60). To this Jäger & Maier (2009) add that discourse is a ‘flow of 
knowledge throughout time’ and different discourses are ‘intimately 
entangled’ forming the ‘giant milling mass of overall societal discourse’ 
(p.35). This connects to power, an example of which can be seen in the 
complex ways that discourses ‘delineate a range of ‘positive’ statements 
which are possible while simultaneously inhibiting a range of other 
statements (Link & Link-Heer, 1990 cited in Jäger & Maier,2009). We might 
add to that in this context that, at any given time, some realities are more 
 
possible than others, which is what Rose (1990) argued as making ‘new 
sectors or reality thinkable or practicable’ (pp.105-106).  
 
Link (1992) further claims discourses are fully valid material realities among 
others, therefore discourse cannot be reduced to a ‘notion of ‘false consciousness’ 
or a ‘distorted view of reality’ as in Marxist approaches to ‘ideology critique’. 
Importantly then, DA is not the ‘retrospective analysis of allocations of meaning 
but also the analysis of the on-going production of reality through discourse 
conveyed by active subjects’ (Jäger & Maier, 2009:37). Many discourse theorists 
adopt a critical relativist view; assuming there are no objective grounds on which 
the truth of claims can be proven proposing that the value of knowledge should 
be evaluated according to criteria like usefulness (Potter, 1996). Whereas critical 
realists agree that knowledge is always mediated by social processes, whilst 




DA examines language in use, rather than the psychological phenomena, 
which traditional research assumes can be objectively revealed through it 
(Wetherell et al., 2001). It is a social constructionist approach which assumes 
reality and identity are constructed and maintained through systems of 
meaning and social practices (Gergen, 1985). Haraways (1991) situated 
knowledges concept is derived from a social constructionist perspective 
 
(Gergen, 2009) which as a theory of knowledge is positioned against 
essentialist assumptions that knowledges are trans-historical essences of 
human judgement (Hacking, 1999). Thus, social constructionist perspectives 
focus on the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the 
construction of a perceived social reality by uncovering the way social 
phenomena, like knowledge are created, institutionalised and accepted by 
humans (Gergen, 2009). Importantly, from this viewpoint language and talk 
are not seen as tools to merely describe things or facts, but to convey beliefs 
about them (Hacking, 1999). Parker (1999) calls DA ‘practical 
deconstruction’ of these systems reversing the priority given to certain 
concepts and which ‘locates those concepts in certain relations of power and 
supports resistance on the part of those subjected to them’ (p.105). 
 
There are several schools of thought in DA, including Foucauldian (FDA), DP 
Discursive Psychology (DP) and critical discursive psychology (CDP). The 
central tenets of each have been drawn upon in this current study in ways which 
are appropriate for the current investigation. DA does not have a standardized set 
of methodological principles (Billig, 1987) therefore it can be considered as 
somewhat more paradigmatically incoherent than some other qualitative 
approaches (Coyle, 2007). As Graham (2005) argues DA is a ‘flexible term’ (p.2) 
which is dependent on what the analyst is researching. This ‘flexibility’ is 
important in respect of claims to truth and power within the prescribing of 
 
methods which enable some knowledges and disable others. Thus, DA might be 
‘best understood as a field of research rather than a single practice’ (Taylor, 2001 
in Graham, 2005). Moreover, the methodological principles of this research are 
in line with Teo (2009) in that the methodology is not considered ‘independent 
from the subject matter and independent from the socio-historical context from 
which it emerges’ (p.44). This field of research is also made up of different 
epistemological elements which may be:  
 
‘combined in a variety of ways to produce different types of analysis that focus 
on a particular range of practices and issues. They are not part of a method to 
be applied, but resources in an interpretative art’  




FDA (and dispositive analyses) aims to identify the knowledges contained in 
discourses to reveal how these knowledges  may be connected to power 
relations in power/knowledge complexes to subject them to critique (Wodak 
and Mayer (2009).  As Jäger and Maier (2009) explain ‘Dispositives can be 
understood as the synthesis of discursive practices (speaking/thinking on the 
basis of knowledge), non-discursive practices (acting on knowledges) and 
 
materialializations (material products of acting on the basis of knowledge)’ 
(p.35).   
The Foucauldian critical approach to power is not ideological, because 
ideology makes claims to absolute truths (Althusser, 1971) thus it should be 
recognised foucauldian critique does not exist outside discourse and therefore 
any invoking of rights or values brought forward by the Founcauldian analyst 
must be acknowledged as being discursively constructed (Parker, 1995). This 
then differs from Marxist false consciousness and the fetishism of 
commodities which stipulate that social existence determines consciousness 
(See Fish in Parker, 1999). Foucault’s works reverse this emphasising the 
materiality of discourse (Link, 1992 in Wodak & Mayer, 2009). So discourses 
can be understood as material reality  (Foucault, 1977). As Jäger & Maier 
(2009) assert, Foucauldian Analysis deals with material realities, not ‘mere 
ideology’ (see Althusser, 1971) discourses produce subjects and reality and 
as they sum it up: 
 
 ‘discourses exert power because they transport knowledge on which 
collective and individual consciousness feeds. This knowledge is the basis for 
individual and collective, discursive and non-discursive action, which in turn 
shapes reality’ (italics in original p. 39). 
 
 
The interaction between discursive and non-discursive practices and 
materializations is referred to as a dispositive (Wetherell et al., 2001). As 
Foucault explains in the Archaeology of Knowledge we can consider 
discourses to be ‘practices that simultaneously form the objects of which they 
speak ‘ (Foucault 2002:54) and he refers to the non-discursive practices that 
also play a role in forming objects as ‘discursive relations’ (p.50). However, 
Foucault never solves the problem of discourse and reality (Langdridge, 
2007). Foucault further suggests if a discourse changes the object can become 
‘discursified anew’ (Jäger & Maier,2009: 43) Thus the object turns into 
another object. Foucault (2002) does not define objects with reference to the 
‘ground foundation of things’ (p 53) but relates them to the ‘body of rules that 
enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the 
conditions of their historical appearance’ (p. 53). Though as Jäger and Maier 
(2009) point out Foucault becomes confounded at this point as he fails to 
conceptualise subject and object, society and discourse as connected by 
activity or non-discursive practices (Hollway et al, 2007). Other theorists 
have therefore argued that ‘Foucault drove himself into a blind alley when he 
first conceptualised the formations of the of the order of history as orders of 
knowledge (epistemes) and then conceptualised them as orders of speech 
(discourses), instead of assuming an order that is shared by all behavioural 
registers of people’ (Waldenfels, 1991 in Wodak & Mayer 2009). We may 
overcome these issues by drawing on Leontjev’s activity theory-based 
 
understanding (which was not in existence at the time of Foucault’s writing) 
of materializations and non-discursive practices as realisations of discourse 
(Bublitz 1999 in Jaiger & Maier, 2009).  However, issues of causality remain 
contentious (Fairclough et al, 2004). 
 
There are basic distinctions made in FDA between special and inter 
discourses, the latter being scientific discourses and the former non-scientific 
with a continuous flow of elements of the former into the latter (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). Each discourse strand consists of a multitude of elements often 
referred to as texts/discourse fragments and the combination of these 
fragments form a strand which has a history, present and future and analysis 
of those periods over which these develop are referred to as archeologies or 
geneaologies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). There are slight differences between 
discourses and strands in that discourses are an abstract concept located at 
statement level the strands, in contrast, are conceived of as being at the 
‘concrete utterance level’ with synchronic dimensions, when cut through at 
particular discursive events analysis can highlight changes/continuities of the 
strands over time (Wodak & Mayer, 2009).  However, each topic has a 
genesis, so the analyst must reconstruct the genesis of the topic (Foucault, 
1980). Each discourse delineates a range of statements that are ‘sayable’ and 
inhibits others (Wetherell et al., 2001). These are ‘discursive limits’ and 
 
through the use of certain rhetorical strategies these can be extended or 
narrowed (see Wodak & Meyer, 2009).   
 
Discourse entanglements can take the form of one text addressing several 
topics or one topic (Wodak & Meyer 2009). Statements where several 
discourse strands entangle is a discursive knot (Link, 1983 in Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009). In this theoretical perspective all events are rooted in discourse 
(Wetherell et al,2001), however it is only a ‘discursive event’ (Graham, 2005) 
if it appears on the discourse planes of politics and media intensively, 
extensively and for a long period of time (Link & Link-Heer, 1990 in Wodak 





Another approach, discursive psychology (DP), drew upon linguistic 
philosophy, semiology, the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and rhetorical work in psychology 
(Wiggins & Potter, 2008). DP is primarily concerned with discursive 
practices, that is to say, with the ways in which speakers in everyday and 
institutional settings negotiate meaning, reality, identity and responsibility.  
Discursive psychology draws from Austin (1962) in its approach to the 
constitutive function of words or the action language performs. It is a micro 
 
approach (Edwards 2007 in Hollway et al., 2007). One particular area of 
interest to discursive psychologists is the ways in which certain rhetorical 
strategies in talk are accepted as factual by speakers who have stakes in the 
outcomes of what they are saying (Edwards & Potter, 1992). DP comes from 
the epistemological position that truth is ‘always contingent or relative to 
some discursive and cultural frame of reference’ (Wetherell, 2001:61 392) 
which is a relativist position (Parker, 1997) and critique of cognitivism 
(Willig, 2007). However, there have been arguments that the relativist 
position ignores extra-discursive factors and are not compatible with 
‘realism’ (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). Though such criticisms have been 
rebutted in arguments suggesting:  
 
‘Like Foucault, discursive psychologists are not denying the existence of a 
material world or that this materiality may have unavoidable consequences 
for people. But they are pointing out that, once we begin to talk about or 
otherwise signify or represent the material world then we have entered the 
realm of discourse; and at that moment we have engaged in social 
constructionism’  





Critical Discursive Psychology 
 
The Critical Discursive approach used in the present study (Wetherell, 1998; 
Edley and Wetherell, 1999, 2001) focuses on: 
 
‘The situated flow of discourse, which looks at the formation and negotiation of 
psychological states, identities and interactional and subjective events. It is 
concerned with members methods and the logic of accountability while 




Potter and Wetherell (1995) acknowledge that there are differences in FDA and 
DP but say that these should not be ‘painted too sharply’ (p.81) while 
recommending a ‘productive synthesis’ of the critical realist and critical relativist 
approaches (Wetherell, 1998). This provides a more integrated methodology for 
analysing different levels of discursive action (Wetherell, 1998) while perhaps 
going some way to rebutting the individual criticisms of each (Edley, 2001). 
However, that debate is a continuing one. The negotiation of those tensions 
within each have been suggested to bring about a productive discursive emphasis 
on action orientation in local interactions between participants and researcher 
(DP) while also illuminating where discourses have a history to interrogate the 
 
power relations and positions within (FDA) them (Parker, 1992). This approach 
was particularly suited to the ESPD topic as analysis concerns local interactions 
but also a concept derived from diagnostic constructs, all of which have particular 
discursive histories within specific times, events and socio-political contexts. 
Through this productive synthesis, the present analysis can attend to both the 






The link between language and psychotherapy cannot be overstated and the role 
of talk in therapeutic change was perhaps best illustrated by Freud’s ‘talking 
cure’ (Ellenburger, 1970). In this respect, a CDP approach with its strict focus on 
the function of language in the construction of reality has a particular value for 
the field of mental health and in particular, the ‘social action’ of doing 
psychotherapy and counselling (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). In the field of 
counselling and psychotherapy DA studies have interrogated the ways agency 
and meaning are transformed in therapy, rhetorical justifications of 
blame/responsibility in psychotherapeutic relationships, power relations in 
therapist constructions of patients accounts and the role of hegemonic discourses 
in therapeutic intervention (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007). Further discourse analytic 
 
interrogations of power relations in mental health research spans the psychiatric 
subject (Roberts, 2005), interrogative explorations of the historical trajectories of 
clinical and diagnostic categorization (Hepworth, 1999), ways in which 
professionals construct clinical cases and justify their practices (Griffiths, 2001; 
Stevens & Harper, 2007; Craven & Coyle, 2007) and the construction of mental 
health/illness in policy documents and texts (Harper, 2004, 2006). Moreover, 
such studies highlight the constraints imposed on ‘reality’ by hegemonic 
discourses in mental health by highlighting their effects on those subject to them. 
Interrogation of these power relations may help to bring forward alternative 
constructions affording those subjects empowerment and perhaps helping 
practitioners and policy makers move towards a more ‘ethically just’ 
psychotherapeutic practice (Parker, 1999).  
 
 
The rationale for this piece is a combination of Potter (2003) and Parker (1992)  
in that it is interested in how actions are performed in discourse and the reframing 
of psychological concepts in discursive terms to explore how statements 
construct an object. This study assumes that to ‘tackle the ideological function of 
a science’ and its rhetorical functions (Billig, 1988) in this case ESPD with ESPD 
following Graham (2005) ‘in order to reveal and modify it’ one should ‘question 
it as a discursive formation’ which involves mapping the systems by which 
particular objects are formed and the kinds of ‘enunciations implicated’ 
 
(Foucault, 1972:205). As Foucault (1980a) further suggests “for it really is 
against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific 
that the genealogy must wage its struggle” (p.84) The present study is not 
intended to be ‘a battle on behalf of the truth’ by debating the ‘philosophical 
presuppositions that may lie within’ that truth nor the ‘epistemological 
foundations that may legitimate it’ (Foucault, 1972:205). Therefore, the objective 
of the current study is not to consider whether ESPD is ‘real or true’ as the claim 
to truth can itself be a powerful rhetorical practice (Edwards and Nicoll 
2001:105). Instead, the present study is interested in how ESPD’s objects might 
become formed in practitioners talk. Similarly to Linda Graham (2005) who 
opperationalises Scheurich’s (1997) use of Foucault’s discursive/technological 
grid which is ‘ontological and epistemological; it constitutes both who the 
problem group is and how the group is seen or known as a problem’ (p.107) to 

















This chapter presents the method employed covering recruitment, sampling, 
ethics, data collection, analysis and evaluative criteria. Decision-making is 




The fourteen participants were multi-disciplinary practitioners working in 
therapeutic services with children/adolescents with behavioural/mental health 





Clinical Psychologist Secure Children’s Unit and Forensic 
CAMHS  
Consultant Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatrist 
Secure Children’s Unit and CAMHS 
service 
Senior Therapeutic Intervention 
practitioner 
Children’s Secure Accommodation 
Unit 
Community Psychiatric Nurse and 
ex - Youth Offending Institution 
Mental Health Nurse 
Community CAMHS 
 
Counselling Psychologist and 
Clinical Supervisor 
Local Authority Children, Youth and 
families services 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist Forensic CAMHS and Secure 
Children’s Home 
Residential Social Worker and 
therapeutic group worker  
Secure children’s residential unit 
Counselling Psychologist and 
family therapist 
Social services 
Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and 
ex - Youth Offending Institution 
Psychiatrist 
NHS  
Care and Sentence Planning 
Manager and Senior Practitioner 
Children’s Secure Accommodation 
Unit 
Senior Counsellor, Psychotherapist 
and Therapeutic group worker 
Secure Children’s Home 
Senior Specialist Practitioner Secure Accommodation Unit 
Consultant Child and Adolescent 
Forensic Psychiatrist 
Specialist Forensic CAMHS 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist Community CAMHS and Secure child 




The decision to use practitioners from different professions was influenced 
by the need in DA to ‘situate’ the sample and by the research topic under 
investigation (Willig, 2006). The table above was provided to ‘describe the 
research participants and their life circumstances to aid the reader in judging 
the range of people and situations to which the findings may be relevant’ 
(Elliott et al., 1999: 228). Interviewing practitioners from different disciplines 
and targeting higher tier services was essential with regards to the concept of 
ESPD. The practitioners must have available to them the discursive resources 
to draw upon to talk about ESPD (Howkins and Ewens, 1999) because they 
 
‘are not selected because they fulfil the representative requirements of 
statistical inference but because they can provide substantial contributions to 
filling out the structure and character of the experience under investigation’ 
(Polkinghorne, 2005: 139). However, although ‘we do need to identify 
persons (or dyads or groups) or sources that are likely to provide the discourse 
of interest, we need to keep our attention on the type of discourse, not the 
person who produces it’ (Wood & Kroger, 2000:78). Importantly, 
professional discipline/interventions provided are not integral to this study.  
 
The sample size of fourteen far exceeds the minimum of five for postgraduate 
DA research (Turpin et al., 1997). This size can also be further justified by 
epistemological position. Primary importance is richness of data DA studies 
are not concerned with the speakers, but their use of discursive resources and 
the sample is thus represents a ‘specimen perspective’ (ten Have, 1999:50) as 
we not making generalizations about the prevalence of ‘attitudes’ expressed, 
or claiming degrees of representativeness (Wetherell, 2001). Rather, the aim 
is to identify ways certain versions are produced as authoritative and 
investigate the rhetorical and ideological functions of versions of   ESPD’s 
‘truth’. DA assumes that this may help illustrate availability of specific 
discursive resources which may be drawn upon to organize the 
socially/professionally shared lexicon of common/professional knowledge 
about ESPD. From this epistemological position the presence of reoccurring 
 
themes and ways of accounting due to the richness of DA itself, may 
reasonably be expected to be found in the wider professional culture from 




Participants across England and Wales were recruited via professional 
contacts in local authority services and CAMHS. There were also 
letters/emails to the youth justice board and individual children’s secure units 
(See APPENDIX). Interviews were arranged via emails. Some recruitment 
‘snowballed’ with one participant/service recommending another.  
 
Ethical Considerations, Risk Assessment and Confidentiality 
 
Research ethics have a long philosophical history (Coyle & Olsen 2005 in 
Tribe & Morissey, 2005) with two basic principles which are often 
highlighted, those of beneficence and non-malefience (Emmanuel et al., 
2000).  Ethical clearance for this study was obtained prior to data collection 
through university ethics boards. This required submitting an application 
covering procedures, risk-assessment, participant-facing documents, 
confidentiality and data management. In terms of confidentiality, identities 
were anonymised, as were any identifying features in interview data. In 
 
several transcripts some information was removed as interviews contained 
excessive information about individual children/cases. For this reason no 
external transcriber was involved. 
 
Due to the fact all the participants were working with or had worked with 
children who might be referred to as ‘high risk/high harm’ in the literature, it 
was assumed that personal distress due to the subject matter would be 
minimal. However, participants were made aware of standard confidentiality 
clauses (BPS, 2006b) and attempts were made to conduct interviews with 
ethical attunement (Brinkman and Kvale,2008).  With regards to risk/safety 
all interviews were conducted in participant’s place of work.  The research 
was designed and conducted in line with Division of Counselling Psychology 
Professional Practice Guidelines (BPS, 2006b) and the British Psychological 
Society Code of Ethics and Conduct (BPS, 2006a) incorporating researcher 
reflexivity (Ely et al., 1999).  
 
Procedure 
Contacts were made initially by letter and interviews arranged via email.  
Consent forms with briefing and debriefing information were signed and 
copies were retained by researcher and participants (See Appendices vi-vii).  
Interviews were conducted individually between April-October 2012 at 
 
participant’s workplace. With respect to situating the research, interviewing 
was less than a year after the 2011 riots and write-up coincided with the 20th 
anniversary of the murder of James Bulger.  
 
Data Collection 
Semi-structured interviews (Smith, 1995) were not employed to reveal the 
‘truth’ of claims (Potter, 1996) but as an arena where discourse resources are 
available and rhetorical strategies may be employed. These are popular in DA 
(Wetherell et al. 2001). However, interviews are specific situations with a 
focus and using ‘contrived data’ within an approach that assumes 
construction, rather than reports on reality may incur unavoidable ‘bias’ 
(Speer, 2002). Moreover, interviews reflect power relations in questioning 
(Harper, 1999) which are pervasive with regard to the researcher’s agenda 
which is always imposed on the participant/research itself by the very fact it 
is being conducted. This brought reflexive concern as a novice DA researcher 
but power imbalance and ‘agenda-pushing’ are somewhat unavoidable. In an 
attempt to acknowledge where this analysis may have fallen foul to common 
difficulties identified in DA interviewing (see Speer, 2002) the following 
were used as a guide for awareness/reflexivity and transparency which, 
although in mind while conducting interviews, became more of a guide during 
analysis where attempts were made to avoid ‘flooding’ interviews with a 
 
social science agenda (Potter and Hepburn, 2005) as participants were asked 
about their opinion on controversies concerning PD in children, their thoughts 
about ESPD and potential reasons for it or treatment for it (See appendix ix).    
 
Data Transcription 
Interviews were transcribed on computer by chief investigator after each 
interview to develop data familiarity and improve interviewing skills 
concurrently (Saldana, 2013). The process was considered a ‘reflexive act’ 
which ‘requires the transcriber’s cognizance of her or his own role in the 
creation of the text and the ideological implications of the resultant product’ 
(Bucholz, 2000:1440). Transcription conventions (See appendix viii) were  
cited in Atkinson and Heritage (1984). Transcripts were stored on USB and 




Science progresses through processes of conjectures and refutations and no 
theory represents the complete truth (Popper, 1959, 1962, 1972). Moreover, 
science is a social activity (Kuhn, 1962). It is the poststructuralist belief that 
‘the process of analysis is always interpretative, always contingent, always a 
 
version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical 
standpoint’ (Wetherell, 2001:384) and therefore it is acknowledged that the 
activities carried out in ‘application’ of the ‘method’ cannot be separated from 
the ontological, epistemological and theoretical assumptions of the 
researcher. Qualitative analysis intends to bring as much significant meaning 
as is possible to the data (Saldana, 2013).  Drawing from Foucault’s (1980) 
assertion that he ‘cared not to dictate how things should be’ DA researchers 
refrain from systematising/prescribing methods while believing it is possible 
to identify stages to ‘identify contradictions, constructions and functions of 
language’ (Parker, 2004:151). 
 
Familiarity with data took place over several months beginning from 
transcription, with a focus on relevant material, to recognition of systematic 
ways of talking, through to coding into units and thematic analyses (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, Mitchell, 2009, Harper, 1995, Saldana, 2013) . Transcription 
necessarily entails interpretation (O’Connell & Kowal, 1995). Text was 
selected which were assumed demonstrable of consistent and variable 
language patterning and macro surface material was thematically coded and 






Stages of Analysis 
Stages Actions:  
1 Interviews transcribed on PC (Atkinson & 
Heritage, 1981) 
2 Thematic analysis of individual transcripts 
(Saldana, 2013) 
3 Thematic analysis across data set (Ely, et al., 1991) 
4 Extracts representative of each theme collected 
together 
5 Most dominant themes extracted 
6 Each collection of most dominant themes analysed 
in terms of subject positions, interpretative 
repertoires and ideological dilemmas (see 
Wetherell et al., 2001). 
7 Extracts selected. 
8 Extracts chosen on basis of representativeness of all 
speakers in dominant theme group (see Scheurich, 
1997). 
9 Final extract selected for thesis chosen on basis of 
representativeness of themes in that group and 
factors such as ensuring each participant was 




The analysis was intended to move between micro and macro levels of 
concern common to DA studies (Edley & Wetherell, 2001) incorporating a 
‘productive synthesis’ of more Foucauldian ‘top-down’ (the study of 
discursive resources) and discursive psychological ‘bottom-up’ (studies of 
discourse practices) approaches to the data set (Wetherell, 1998). It is this 
synthesis of approaches which see this research moving closer to definition 
of ‘critical discursive psychology’ as it employed three analytical 
 
concepts/tool identified in CPD for analysing text, subject positions, 
Interpretative Repertoires and Ideological Dilemmas (Wetherell et al., 2001). 
 
Analytical Concept: Subject Positions 
 
Louis Althusser (1971) argued subjectivity is an ideological effect (Henriques 
et al., 1984).  Through explanations of the process of ‘subjectification’ 
Althusser posited individuals as produced by/subject to ideology. Using his 
concept of interpellation, Althusser argued individuals are ‘hailed’ by 
particular discourses in that ‘ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that 
it ‘recruits’ subjects’ (p.48). Following this, Michel Foucault (1982) was 
concerned with ways in which human beings are made subjects, ascribing 
interconnected but differing meanings to the term ‘subject’. Firstly, that 
human beings are ‘made subject to’ others via ‘control and dependence’ and 
secondly, in terms of their subjective identity being ‘tied’ to a specific identity 
through a ‘conscience or self-knowledge’ which comes from dominant 
discourses circulating in society (p. 212). Foucault obscured the influence of 
‘ideology’ and Marxism in his theories and it is worth acknowledging power 
relations involved in popular adoptions of Foucault as originator of ‘subject 
positioning’ over Marxist theorists such as Althusser. As Fish (1999) argues, 
proliferation of Foucault’s work in this respect owes much to the US political 
 
climate in the US with regard to anti-Marxist sentiment at the time Foucault 
was writing. 
In terms of subject positioning in this research, CDP views identities as 
dynamic and produced through discourses rather than internal or fixed. Edley 
(2001) likens the construction of identities in talk to that of a ‘jelly that never 
sets’ (p.192). For CDP, this subject positioning (self and others) refers to 
culturally available categories (Discourse Resources) that define persons and 
their identities. From a ‘top-down’ (Foucauldian) view subject positions 
already exist in discourse but they can change according to historical and 
cultural context, thus they are defined through pre-existing discourses and 
subject positions available within a particular culture. However, as Edley 
(2001) demonstrates with a ‘bottom up’ (ethnoethodological) approach, 
despite a limited range of culturally defined subject positions in the context 
of particular social interactions, some agency is involved in actively ‘taking 
up’ subject positions as ‘locations in conversation’. 
 
Analytical Concepts: Interpretative Repertoires 
Potter and Wetherell (1987, 2005) attribute the term ‘Interpretative 
Repertoires’ to Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) who used it to describe 
contradictory ways scientists explained discovering/building scientific 
knowledge. Potter and Wetherell (1987, 2005) suggest interpretative 
 
repertoires are made up of the lexicon of common (or as in this study common 
and professional/scientific) knowledge, ideas, explanations and terms and 
metaphors that everyone ‘knows’. These repertoires are drawn on to build 
explanations/descriptions, accounts and arguments (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987: 138). Edley (2001) has further described interpretative repertoires as 
the building blocks of conversation, drawing on the analogy of ‘conversation 
as a dance’ and repertoires as the ‘dance steps’. Although the concepts of 
‘Discourse’ and ‘Interpretative Repertoires’ are not interchangeable, both are 
linked by ties to ideology (Edley, 2001:202).  Interpretative Repertoires are 
often used in research which, like this study, moves towards a critical 
approach to ideology and to some Foucauldian concepts (Edley & Wetherell, 
1995; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Interpretative repertoires are used in 
Foucaudian and discursive analyses (Parker, 1997).  
 
 
Analytical Concepts: Ideological Dilemmas 
The term ‘Ideological Dilemma’ (Billig et al., 1988) suggests that since 
common knowledge and cultural wisdom is so full of contradictions and 
inconsistencies, everyday discourse can be dilemmatic. The book ‘Ideological 
Dilemmas’ (Billig et al., 1988) was intended as a contribution to the 
complexities of the ideology debate (see Eagleton, 1991; McLellan, 1986). In 
 
short this book focused on problematizing dominant Marxist notions that 
ideologies were always integrated, coherent sets of ideas which served to 
represent domination of the ruling sections of society as ‘inevitable’ or 
‘natural’. What Billig and colleagues (1988) suggested with their concept of 
‘lived ideologies’ was that there was another ideology distinct from 
‘intellectual’ Marxist-defined ideologies which were composed of the beliefs, 
values and practices of a given culture or society and most importantly, unlike 
their ‘intellectual ideological’ counter-parts, lived ideologies are not coherent 
or integrated, but the reverse - contradictory, fragmented and inconsistent. 
This work put forward the ideas that expressed beliefs and values were not 
internal attitudes that are fixed and expressed in consistent ways but rather 
these are ‘lived ideologies’. These ‘lived ideologies’ are the ways of 
explaining and interpreting used in discourse as flexible, rhetorical resources 
which are put to work as ‘winning arguments’ (Edley, 2001). As Edley (2008) 
further explains ‘different ways of talking about an object or an event do not 
necessarily arise spontaneously and independently, but develop together as 
opposing positions in an unfolding, historical, argumentative exchange’ (p. 
204). Thus, we might say  CPD aims to identify the variety of common-sense 
explanations (interpretative repertoires) that people use and what kind of 
dilemmas may arise from their complex and contradictory nature. We might 
also say that it is within those contradictions and inconsistencies power and 
 
ideology (Wetherell, 1998) or power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980) can be seen 
to reside.  
 
Reflexive Analysis 
This study drew from several sources in guiding the reflexive additions to the 
account of the research. John McLeod (2010) suggests that researchers should 
keep a journal from which their reflexive analysis of their own research can 
be drawn.  This can be used to assess personal biases/prejudices. Prior to this, 
and to the research being conducted, investigators should have written as 
much as possible about the final report which helps externalise personal 
biases (Ely et al.,, 1991) while describing the ‘internal processes’ (Stiles, 
1993) and ‘progressive subjectivity’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1989) associated 
with the research. All of the above were adhered to in a journal prioritising 
transference and unconscious motivations (Steier, 1991) in the research (see 
discussion). 
Evaluative Criteria 
Qualitative researchers adopt different criteria from quantitative researchers 
when evaluating quality of research (Elliot et al., 1999). In DA it is 
inappropriate to use empirically-based tests which measure reliability and 
validity as these assume researcher and topic under investigation are 
independent of each other (Coyle, 2007). Moreover, generalizability is 
 
inappropriate in DA as Guba & Lincoln (1981) suggest ‘what can a 
generalisation be except an assertion that is context free’ (p.62). Indeed, 
qualitative researchers tend to think more in terms of dependability or 
credibility through transparency (Ely et al., 1999) and reflexive comment 
where required as a way of evaluating qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). 
In DA this is done by resourcing prior DA studies research strategies 
(Wetherell et al., 2001) as this study does. 
 
An evaluation criteria for DA studies has been proposed by Antaki (2003) 
consisting of six short-comings in analytic studies, under analysis through 
summary, under analysis through taking sides, under analysis through over-
quotation or isolated quotation, the circular discovery of discourses and 
mental constructs, false survey and under analysis through spotting. Yardley 
(2000) suggests rigour is achieved through attention to inconsistency and 
diversity of accounts, within a transparent and situated recounting of the 
research process, accompanied by reflexivity and in terms of the study’s 
usefulness and applicability. These appear to be of particular value in 
evaluating the integrity of DA research which does not have a set structured 
method and readers can follow these criteria as a way of evaluating the present 
study. One particular evaluative criteria to which the current research did not 
adhere, is to that of participant validation. Due DA’s central assumptions 
concerning participant’s positioning and use of discursive resources it seems 
 
nonsensical to ask research participants to validate something of which they 
may not be actually conscious of doing (Harper, 2003; Coyle, 2000). 
 
Thus, attempts were made here to avoid those aforementioned pit-falls. 
However, certain aspects are problematic. For example, under analysis 
through taking sides (Antaki et al., 2003) suggests the analyst may take a 
moral/political stance, although it could be argued the analyst automatically 
takes a political stance by adopting a DA perspective, or focus on perceived 
social inequality (Wetherell et al., 2001). DA studies can easily be viewed as 
politically biased in their focus and choice of method, as can positivist studies 
(See Dryden, 1999; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003). Furthermore,  DA in 
psychological research brings problems in terms of politics and its own 
critical credentials as: 
‘there is no place in psychology or even in discursive psychology for critical 
work to start. A critical psychology has to be constructed from theoretical 
resources, life experiences and political identities outside the discipline’  
(Parker, 1997:298 italics in original).  
 
Taken together, it is accepted that the current study will have elements of 
‘bias’ in terms of political stance due to its topic, methodology and the 
researcher’s own ambitions. Moreover, it is accepted readers may interpret or 
 
evaluate this research according to their own political stance and 
interpretation (Parker, 1995) as ‘there will always be other perspectives from 





















This chapter presents discourse analysis of the interviews. Following Willig 
(2009) this section also contains discussion as the analytical concepts used 
are resources in an interpretative art (Edwards & Nicol, 2001) which yield 
results dependent on ways they are used (Gee, 2011). This is what Gary 
Thomas (1997) terms ‘methodological ad hockery’ to avoid ‘hegemony of 
theory (p.76) which requires reference to use of concepts in other DA studies 
(Nikander, 2008). Thus, it is acknowledged readers may have alternative 
interpretations to those presented. 
 
ESPD Discourses 
The repertoires, subject positions and ideological dilemmas that were 
identified as most dominant across the data set have been summarised here 
and will be discussed further. 
Table 2 
Discourses 
Interpretative Repertoire: ESPD Use and Misuse 
Subject Position: Other Professionals as Misusers 
Subject Position: Society as Misusers 
 
Subject Position: Media as Misusers 
Subject Position: Practitioners as Misusers 
Subject Position: Biased Misusers 
Interpretative Repertoire: ESPD Evoking Images 
Subject Position: Child as Psychopath 
Subject Position: Child as Fictional Monster 
Subject Position: Child as High Profile killer 
Interpretative Repertoire: ESPD Excluded and Untreatable 
Subject Position: Practitioners as Excluders 
Subject Position: Practitioners as Frustrated  
Subject Position: Practitioners as Forced 
Ideological Dilemmas: 
Our Label vs. Their Label 
Looking past the label/Unable to look past the label 




REPERTOIRE 1: ESPD: Use and Misuse 
 
The potential use and misuse of ESPD was an interpretative repertoire (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987) drawn upon by all participants. Subject positioning 
(Althusser, 1971) varied throughout. 
 
EXTRACT ONE: Participant 1 
Some participant’s subject positioned other professionals ‘outside’ mental 
health as potentially misusing the term. Interestingly, many did so while 
inappropriately referring to ESPD as a ‘diagnosis’. 
 
 
1  Participant:    I think it’s a very difficult label (.) and I think once            
2  they’ve got it (.) it’s a very difficult one (.) and also once it goes in notes     
3  and things like that other professionals will leap on it. I think it’s one              
4   that’s not fully understood by people maybe outside of mental health.  
5  Interviewer:   Right 
6  Participant:   I mean certainly for me (.) I want that diagnosis to come                              
7 from a consultant psychiatrist, someone who’s really reviewed notes,                 
8 spent some time with the young person, someone who’s got that                            
9 experience I have heard this said in meetings and I think who qualified  
10 you to say that? 
 
Here, the participant draws on strategies achieved through ‘footing’ 
(Goffman, 1981) positioning those with the qualifications to diagnose 
psychiatric conditions as doing so appropriately (Lines 3-4). This is an 
example of category and epistemological entitlements (Whallen and 
Zimmerman, 1990 in Potter, 1996:114) where categories of actors are 
positioned as though they are entitled to use particular knowledge (Line 7). 
In working up these category entitlements the speaker undermines the 
entitlements of other professionals (Line 9). This is also a form of interest 
management (Potter, 1995: 115) in that she uses this epistemological 
entitlement to manage the interests of those inside mental health, like herself 
 
and the consultant psychiatrists whose opinion she appears to trust. This may 
also have the added function of persuading the researcher to trust these 
arguments as she shares this epistemological entitlement (Edwards and Potter, 
1992:117; Potter, 1995:125). However, the participant can be seen as reifying 
ESPD (Line 6) by inappropriately referring to it as a diagnosis (Tillich, 1988; 
Potter, 1996:107; Foucault, 1980a:237). 
 
EXTRACT TWO: Participant 14 
Other participants subject positioned ‘society’ as potentially misusing the 
ESPD term inappropriately, counter-positioning researchers/clinicians as 
using it appropriately. 
 
1 Participant: I guess the dilemma is, as we have seen in the way                                    
2  schizophrenia is bandied around is (.) actually what is kept as a pure                
3  diagnostic instrument, even as a research diagnostic instrument to begin             
4   with and then how the term is then used in society more generally 
 
This can be seen as an example of interest management (Potter, 1995: 115) 
the idiom ‘bandied around’ tends to suggest ESPD would be used carelessly 
by society while reinforcing the position of those with stake or interest (Lines 
 
2-3) as careful (Potter, 1995:121). The use of a descriptive word like ‘pure’ 
is a form of categorisation (Grace, 1987). It is through categorisation that a 
specific sense of something is constituted (Potter, 1996: 177).  Again this 
constructs researchers as epistemologically entitled to use the ESPD term in 
ways which will prevent societies ‘contamination’ of it (Lines, 2, 4). This also 
positions psychiatric language as separate from ‘society’ when psychiatry and 
psychology are themselves social practices (Parker, 1999).  
 
EXTRACT THREE: Participant 9 
The media were similarly subject positioned by some participants as 
mishandling information about ESPD. 
 
1 Participant:  I think that’s another thing about the media, they’ll put out     
2 this thing and they’ll put out snippets of information (.) examples of really           
3 horrific cases where kids have got this and people will >they will not be       
4 using it properly and before we know it they’ll be sticking it on every                                 
5 Tom, Dick and Harry< Every young person who’s ever done anything,                                   
6 ESPD! They do it with ADHD now. 
 
 
 Again, epistemological entitlement is worked up by undermining the 
entitlements of others (Potter, 1995). This emphatic talk and extreme-case 
formulation is an example of script-formulation (Lines 2-3) whereby the 
speaker constructs hypothetical use of ESPD by media as in-discriminantly 
driven by their own interests (Edwards, 1995:328). According to Drew & 
Holt (1989) idiomatic expressions like ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ (Line 5) tend 
to occur at specific junctures in talk rather than being randomly distributed. 
This expression may reflect the well-documented gender biases in ASPD 
(Nucknolls, 1992). The use of ADHD (APA, 2000:85) may also reflect 
gender biased diagnosis (Breggin, 1991:282). In line 6 media are presented 
as being predictable due to their own interest management (Potter, 1996:124) 
and relating argument to ADHD the speaker formulates this predictability as 
a shared knowledge without explanation (Edwards & Potter, 1992:18). 
Positioning of media as overusing ESPD similarly to ADHD also appears to 
obfuscate criticisms concerning misuse and overuse of the ADHD diagnosis 
by practitioners (Breggin, 1991:274).   
  
EXTRACT FOUR: Participant 13 
Other participants positioned researchers/practitioners as potentially using the 




1 Participant:   We don’t know for certain that that child will develop a                    
2 severe personality disorder, so as we don’t know that, I don’t think we                    
3 should be using a label which implies that we do know that (1) you know,   
4 it’s a bit like seeing someone who is behaving slightly oddly and you say               
5 they have got prodromal schizophrenia (.) >you only know that someone’s                          
6 got prodromal schizophrenia with the benefit of hindsight<when you look                                
7 back and say ‘Well (.) actually what happened then was in fact the early                      
8  stages of this illness which we now see in front of us today’ 
 
The speaker questions ‘our’ epistemological entitlement to use the term ESPD 
(Lines 1-3). He also questions notions of risk prediction in psychiatry and his 
account becomes more rhetorically powerful as he uses an example from the 
diagnostic category of schizophrenia (APA, 2000:298) which may be better 
understood. The participant appears to use an argument similar to Foucault’s 
(2003) own concerning the ‘childish discourse’ of the ‘expert’ in psychiatry 
which Foucault argues is based on hindsight (p.36). The speaker’s rhetorical 
use of prodromal schizophrenia is similar to Ashmore’s (1993) findings that 
speakers may use a combination of narrative detail and ridicule to undermine 




EXTRACT FIVE: Participant 11 
Some positioned practitioners/researchers as potentially misusing ESPD in 
biased ways. 
 
1 Participant:  A lot of the young people we know about who are going to     
2 get this diagnosis are going to be the very visible ones. It’s not going to be    
3 the lad at public school who’s been torturing animals since he was little        
4 >stapling the goldfishes tails together< that sort of thing (.) and putting the           
5 kitten in the dishwasher to see what happens, and then bullying the                          
6 younger children. Most of them don’t go on to kill >some of them do<                        
7 there are some high profile cases, but these are hushed away (.) or                                          
8 somehow they channel their ruthlessness (.) their lack of guilt, their lack                                      
9 of emotion into sometimes quite successful careers. So I think there’s a                                       
10 class dimension. 
 
The participant reifies ESPD as a formal diagnosis (Tillich, 1988; Potter, 
1995). Lines 1 and 2 suggest she thinks we may already be misusing ESPD 
as this is in direct opposition to the proposers arguments we need to identify 
these children (Vizard, 2004 ).  However, the speaker does not say who these 
children are. Instead, she tells the researcher who they are not by positioning 
 
the ones ‘we know about’ against ‘the lad at public school’. Formulating in 
classes of two is common rhetorically and binary contrast structures are 
worked up in talk (Sacks 1981 in Wetherell et al., 2001:168). They are not a 
reflection of the world that ‘happens to fall naturally into two-set classes’ 
rather, this is a ‘discursive device’ for constructing the world as such 
(Edwards, 1997: 237). Here, ‘the rich’ are positioned against ‘the poor’ with 
no one in between (Lines 2-3). The speaker then uses extreme case 
formulations in descriptions of animal torture (Pomerantz, 1986) and works 
her argument up with rich description and offensive rhetoric (Potter, 1995) 
before arguing about those who go on ‘to kill’ in a bottom-line argument 
(Edwards et al., 1995). Sarbin (1969) argued the word ‘dangerous’ and its 
associated connotations ‘seems to have been shaped out of linguistic roots 
that signified relative position in a social structure’ (p. 77 italics in original). 
The participant seems to position ‘those we know about’ (ostensibly the poor) 
as more likely subjects of psychiatric intervention but also as more likely to 
be dangerous/killers while positioning ‘the lad at public school’ (despite 
animal torture) as ‘ruthless’ instead in his ‘good career’ (Lines 3 and 8). She 
also builds up her ‘scene’ (Lines 4-6) with narrative organisation in a similar 
way as one might in a novel (Fowler, 1977 in Potter, 1995:118).  However, 
she does not explain how something ‘high-profile’ might be ‘hushed away’. 
Here the ambiguity becomes rhetorically defensive (Line 7) because ‘hushed 
away’ in a contrast structure against ‘visible one’s’ is a powerful strategy 
 
(Potter, 1995) when ‘class dimension’ (Line 10) is her bottom-line argument 
(Edwards et al.,1995).  
 
REPERTOIRE 2: ESPD Evoking images 
Another repertoire in the practitioners talk about ESPD was that it evoked 
certain images of potentially violent children.  
 
EXTRACT FIVE: Participant 5 
Some practitioners cited links to adult psychopathy and its associated 
‘Callous-Unemotional’ term for children. 
 
1 Participant:   I think that ESPD has a link in people’s minds about                              
2 psychopathy, um and that’s very much more in (.) kind of the wider                            
3 community (.) professionals (.) and in terms of the public, if you say                             
4 someone is ‘Callous and Unemotional’ you know, people start to sit                              
5 forward, um (hhh .hhh) I have worked with lots and lots of young people                              
6 and I think I have only ever worked with one, maybe two who I would say                               
7 ‘Yup, they would, they would fit that Callous-Unemotional (.) description’                  
8 but I have heard it about lots, and lots and lots of youngsters so it makes                          
9 me uncomfortable.  
 
 
Some participants thought the links to psychopathy evoked morbid 
fascination as this participant suggests ‘people start to sit forward’  
positioning the child as dangerous rather than as having potential for high risk 
behaviours (Line 4). The speaker used her own experiences with the ‘Callous-
Unemotional’ term to illustrate her argument that ESPD might be used 
erroneously for ‘many’ whom it may not be appropriate using extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986).  
 
EXTRACT SIX: Participant 12  
Others positioned professionals who might already have a relationship with 
the child in question as being provided with a framework to see the child 
through with ESPD which could be a benefit while also positioning those who 
might not be familiar with a child as potentially having nothing but fictional 
characters to draw upon in their images of them. 
 
1  Participant:   For those who know the youngster >they will still know               
2  them and have a relationship with them< and it might help them have                 
3 some kind of framework for seeing the youngster and be quite                                            
4  empowering in a sense of ‘So I wasn’t imagining it all then. This really is                                      
5  a difficult child’. If it’s a new referral coming in (.) well that is going to      
 
6  be a lot more worrying (.) with no picture in their minds, that someone                                      
7  could be, a real life >Hannibal Lecter < {laughs}  
 
The participant draws popular fictional images as he cites Thomas Harris’s 
portrayal of a psychiatrist-turned- killer who might be commonly understood 
as a psychopath (Harris, 1981, 1988, 1999, 2006). Dr. Hannibal Lecter has 
been cited as giving the public ‘a distorted view of the disorder’ of 
psychopathy (Hare, 1993:74).  The speaker’s intonation and laughter (Line 7) 
indicates he finds the image ridiculous (Potter, 1995:167) and that he may  
assume the researcher also would, perhaps because both have access to 
academic knowledge which largely renders Harris’s character laughable 
(Salekin & Lynam, 2010). Line 7 is an illustration of category entitlement 
drawing on shared experience (Sacks, 1992:243) and knowledge (Whallen & 
Zimmerman, 1990). Throughout the speaker uses words such as ‘imagining’ 
and ‘pictures’ suggesting ESPD is open to interpretation.  
 
EXTRACT SEVEN: Participant 7 
Certain participant’s thought ESPD would ‘demonise’ children evoking 
images of high-profile child criminals in the press. Most often mentioned 
were Robert Thompson and Jon Venables and the ‘J’ children (see appendices 
ii and x).  
 
 
1  Participant:  ESPD labelling is (.) I think (.) kids are demonised, you see    
2  ‘Hoodie’ slogans bandied around (.) gun crime (.) but ESPD’s because of                                   
3  the cases like James Bulger (.) and them other relevant cases that are in                                
4   the press                                                                                                                                
5  Interviewer: The Edlington, Doncaster case? 
6  Participant:  Yeah, >they are the only ones the public get to read about,          
7  so these places must be full of kids like that< because this is all they                                     
8   know                                                                                                                                          
9  Interviewer: Yeah                                                                                                               
10 Participant: >Do you know what I mean? <                                                                    
11 Interviewer: Absolutely                                                                                                   
12 Participant: They don’t realise there are also kids that are here because      
13 of their circumstances, or they’ve been forced (.) or had to commit this                                                                       
14 crime to survive so >I think the public have got a very blinkered view in                                      
15 terms of the type of kids that are actually in these places < because they                                     
16 are not all Robert Thompson’s and Jon Venable’s 
 
In Line 1 speaker draws on historical binary category constructions of 
children as angels/demons (Reicher & Hopkins, 1989) referring to media 
 
representations (Green, 2010). However, while suggesting ESPD is ‘because’ 
of high profile cases he thinks it evoke images of violent children rather than 
indicating ‘risk’. Though like most participants he positioned Robert 
Thompson and Jon Venables as ‘different’ to other kids ‘in these places’ (Line 
15-16) who might be demonised overlooking Thompson and Venables well-
documented ‘demonization’ (Young, 1996). ‘Other’ section 59 offenders 
(Boswell, 1996) were always constructed against these high profile children, 
who were demonised by participants (Potter, 1996). Binary contrast structures 
(Wetherell et al., 2001:168) of ‘these’ children and ‘regular’ children in units 
(Lines 12-16) appeared a popular discursive device (Edwards, 1997: 237) 
when suggesting  ESPD evokes images of children in secure units as killers 
(Cavadino, 1996). Interestingly, positioning ‘other’ violent children as 
products of their environment/circumstance saw Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables positioned as ‘something’ else, which was never explained but was 
assumed ‘known’ (Butter, 1997) limiting other discourses about them 
(Wetherell et al., 2001). Lines 12-16 can be seen in terms of adjacency pairs, 
where one action leads to another (Heritage, 1988) illustrating power relations 
(Foucault, 1991a:201) in processes of objectification (Butler, 1997:358) 




REPERTOIRE 3: Excluded and Untreatable 
This repertoire was common to all, though accounts and positioning varied 
widely. 
 
EXTRACT EIGHT: Participant 5 
Some participants thought the ESPD label could become iatrogenic (Illich, 
1975). 
 
1 Participant:   I think the moment you get a them and us > ‘actually this                                  
2 isn’t a mental health difficulty, or developmental difficulty, this is a severe                                     
3 personality disorder, or emerging severe personality disorder, it’s not                                  
4 treatable’< people then get pushed aside and isolated and the traits they                           
5 are showing become more and more ingrained (.) So I think there’s                                 
6  potential for difficulties seen within an (.) emerging difficulty to actually                                  
7 become consolidated by the way professionals and other people are                                 
8  treating and interacting with young people. 
 
In lines 1-4 the speaker points out where the child labelled ESPD becomes 
subject (Henriques et al, 1984) and through the lens of ESPD and processes 
of objectification (Deleuze, 1992) how this group may become ‘seen, or 
 
known as a problem’ (Scheurich, 1997:107) which may in itself have 
iatrogenic effects via practitioners through the act of labelling (Illich, 1975). 
In lines 5-8 the speaker appears to be describing a similar process to Butler 
(1997b) who argues that when people are constituted as an object they 
become subject to discourses and practices by ‘the very operation of 
interpellation’ that not only place them in particular spaces in the social 
hierarchy but whereby continual and repeated subjugation those objects come 
to know and accept this place (p.358-359).  
 
Most importantly, in lines 2 and 3 the speaker is explicit in her use of ‘severe’ 
and ‘emerging severe’ personality disorder to make clear what she is referring 
to. However, she chooses to illustrate her points by replacing the PD label 
with ‘emerging difficulties’ positioning herself apart from practitioners who 
might use ESPD and thus as someone who does not ‘consolidate’ these 
difficulties through her labelling and treatment of  children. Line 6 is an 
example of how in a CDP framework a participant’s agency can be reworked 
(Ashmore et al, 1994). This is also the reflexive part of her talk (Garfinkle, 
1967) because strategic efforts in line 6 not to use ‘ESPD’ is an example of 
skilled talk in-action (Ryle, 1949 in Potter, 1996). Here, in contrast to 
Foucault’s notion of discourses as ‘practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak’ which views the individual as determined by 
particular constraints (1972:49) the participant demonstrates a central tenet of 
 
CDA which ascribes a certain degree of agency in the production/negotiation 
of discourses/meaning (Gramsci, 1971 in Speer, 2001).  Discourses can be 
reworked and the assumptions embedded within discourses can be contested 
in action (Jørgensen and Phillips 2004:16).  
 
EXTRACT NINE: Participant 11 (Part One) 
Others thought ‘professionals’ might be angry or frustrated at having to work 
with something they thought was untreatable, while admitting they would be 
the same. 
 
1 Participant:   So I think my argument is >fine, get your diagnosis< but                            
2 what are you going to do with them? That’s what I find so worrying (.)          
3 and some of them are going to live up to it and I think (.) the bit we were                         
4 talking about earlier (.) about professionals (.) I think that might also                    
5 create ‘Bloody personality disorder! What do you expect me to do?’ 
 
Most wanted to know what we ‘do with them’ after ‘diagnosis’ which is a 
reification of ESPD (Tillich, 1988; Potter, 1995) and were concerned 
practitioners might be frustrated or angry when faced with children they can’t 
 
treat or place. Though many, like this participant conceded they were the 
same. 
 
EXTRACT NINE: Participant 11 (Part two) 
1  Participant: And once they’ve got that label unless there’s a whole new                                 
2  body of research about marvellous new treatment, what’s the point of it?                               
3  It feels like we are boxing ourselves into a corner with that one. I mean                                 
4  certainly if a young person was referred to me and they came with that                              
5  diagnosis, I’d be looking around thinking what the hell am I meant to do? 
 
Here the participant continued to reify ESPD as a diagnosis (Tillich, 1988, 
Potter, 1995) and used sarcasm regarding treatment. Her emphasis in line 2 
on ‘marvelous’ suggests need for something extraordinarily special in terms 
of treatment and  ridicules ESPD as a research instrument to find treatment 
(Ashmore, 1993). This can be conceptualised as a concessionary element to 
her talk, which can make the speaker vulnerable to challenge, in this case her 
rhetorical question ‘What’s the point of it?’ can be answered and defended 
against in terms of the proposer’s intentions which is to study these children 
and to treat them (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). In line 3 the speaker then uses 
offensive rhetoric to counter alternative argument (Potter, 1995:107) in the 
idiomatic expression ‘boxing ourselves into a corner’ with the ESPD label 
 
which is not randomly deployed but rather at a specific juncture in talk (Drew 
& Holt, 1989). This is robust due to its figurative and formulaic qualities 
which (as in line 5) is difficult to counter with fact when someone rounds off 
a sequence (Potter, 1995: 168). It seems the speaker is most concerned 
therapeutic practitioners will be ‘hit’ with criticism if they cannot work with 
these children and then as her bottom-line argument she positions herself in 
the same way which is again difficult to argue against as this is how she feels 
(Edwards et al., 1995). Considering the governments criticism of the 
psychiatric establishment in regards to PD these fears were commonly drawn 
upon by speakers. 
 
EXTRACT TEN: Participant 4 
Some participants thought there was ‘no hope’ for children described by 
ESPD and demonstrated frustration with government initiatives to encourage  
treatment of PD/DSPD/ESPD groups.  
 
1  Participant: Ummm, it is controversial. >This is entirely understandable.  
2 Why it is controversial?< Because clearly it is a label and sometimes                                 
3  labels stick and particularly when you start to talk of personality disorders                                  
4  in young people, people say well are not developed completely and in my                                  
5  view its almost academic (.) which it is because what needs to happen is                              
 
6  that you can almost predict where some young people are going with their                                    
7  behaviours and the behaviours that we see now are almost forming the                           
8  personalities of the future (.) so today they may be extremely, severely                               
9  conduct disordered, with no hope in hell of changing they are likely to                 
10 develop the ESPD. The diagnosis (1) I think in the past (.) the discussion                           
11 of the DSPD diagnosis, was it was being used to divert people from (.)                                
12 from, the custodial institutions into the health institutions, because they                              
13 say if someone is DSPD or ESPD we can treat them but > surprise,                                 
14 surprise! < Nothing works.  
 
In Lines 1-9 the speaker presents a two-sided argument (Abel & Stoke, 1999) 
and appears to be referring to neuroscientific evidence on synaptic pruning in 
adolescence as he explores what ‘people say’ (Gazzaniga, 2002). The speaker 
is ambiguous here and does not say who these people are. He then moves into 
an offensive rhetoric in lines 5-8 (Potter, 1995:107). Here, the speaker appears 
confused which could be caused by ideological dilemmatics in 
institutionalised language and ‘scientific evidence’ or ‘fact’ as he appears to 
be arguing strongly for the predictive value of psychiatry (Billig et al., 1988). 
However, in lines 5-6 the speaker uses ‘almost’ twice suggesting he may 
doubt his own rhetorical arguments (Potter, 1996) based on academic 
arguments which are often criticised (Coid et al., 2013). The speaker’s use of 
the idiomatic expression ‘no hope in hell’ in respect of  these children’s 
 
potential for change appears to evoke images of demons without chance of 
repentance (Drew Holt, 1980). This is also an interesting expression 
considering the topic as it appears to feed into long-standing and monolithic 
discourses (Foucault, 1972) concerning children, morality, innocence and 
religion (Loach, 2009; Postman, 1994). The speaker also reifies ESPD twice 
in line 10 and 13 (Tillich, 1988; Potter, 1995).  
 
IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA 1: Our label/Their label 
  
A reoccurring dilemma for participants that appeared to arise out of their use 
of each of the above interpretative repertoires was that of ESPD not being 
very helpful or beneficial but because it was a psychiatric label, it was 
preferable to other labels when both appeared to bring similar connotations 
and actions (Potter, 1996:15). 
 
EXTRACT ELEVEN: Participant 6 
 
1 Participant:  ESPD’s dangerous (.) People have an instant attitude                                  
2 towards the young people but also (.) I think the risk is that, you give them                              
3 the diagnosis and the diagnosis may not serve much intent at the end of it                  
4 so they are still exactly the same and then you think ‘Oh why did I do                            
5 that?’ On the other hand, if the media has also given them a name, if there      
 
6 is no label to it they just become evil (.) the evil children, for want of a                                  
7 better word. 
 
In lines 1-2 the speaker puts emphasis on ESPD being ‘dangerous’ in  
positioning others as less informed about it while reifying it as diagnosis 
(Tillich, 1988; Potter, 1996:107; Foucault, 1980a:237). The speaker suggests 
the label is useless and he would be likely to question his own actions should 
he ‘diagnose’ a child  ‘with’ ESPD (which at time of interview he could not). 
Then the speaker enters into a two-sided argument (Abel & Stoke, 1999) and 
begins to argue from the opposite position that if there is no psychiatric label 
children are labelled ‘Evil’. Interestingly, he refers to ‘evil’ as a ‘word’ and 
ESPD as a ‘diagnosis’ which is a further reification (Lines 3,7) illustrating 
power relations in assumed superiority of categorisation of subjectivities 
drawn from diagnostic nomenclature (Foucault 1991:203). Thus ESPD is 
better than ‘evil’ in his bottom-line argument (Edwards et al., 1995) though 
lines 1-2 suggest they may amount to the same thing for ‘people’. There is 
also a blurring of the distinction between the hypothetical and the actual with 
this if-then structure (Lines 2-6) which becomes a difficult to counter-argue 
(Widdicombe & Woolfit, 1995:120) and is a product of interests or strategy 
(Woolgar, 1983).  
 
 
IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA 2: Looking past labels/not being able to 
look past labels 
Many practitioners appeared to present ‘looking past’ labels as an ethical 
stance but this became dilemmatic as ESPD would see them demonstrate 
difference of approach.  
 
EXTRACT TWELVE: Participant 2 (Part one) 
1  Participant:   How would I feel about it? (1) I suppose we are always                               
2  conscious of labelling young people and giving young people labels                       
3   anyway and my personal (.) and professional standpoint would be that,        
4   well before anything else, they are a young person, or a child, which is                                  
5   the most important aspect before a label of Emerging Severe Personality                               
6   Disorder or likewise, offender (.) or sexual offender or anything else. I                         
7   suppose we’d treat it like that, it’s a child, it’s a young person firstly and                                   
8   foremost (.) I suppose with an element of realism, perhaps not everybody                                   
9   will treat that young person in that way, but I believe I would, >or we                          





EXTRACT TWELVE: Participant 2 (Part two)  
1  Participant:   I would be anxious, mainly around the manipulation that            
2  you tend to see with the young people with more severe personality                              
3   disorders, I’d be conscious of, I suppose, protecting my own staff, or up-     
4  skilling or training my own staff team to deal with that sort of challenging      
5   behaviour. 
 
In extract one an interesting position taken up by many appeared as some 
form of ethical standpoint (Tribe & Morrissey, 2005) stemming from 
concerns about pathologizing identity (Goffman, 1986). The speaker asserts 
his category entitlement to comment as a professional in a way that suggests 
professional opinion is perhaps better rhetorically regarded than personal thus 
staking his interest claims (Potter, 1995). He also appears to draws on 
discourses concerning the separation of children from adults in his positioning 
(Postman, 1996) emphasising his abilities here with extreme case formulation 
(Pomerantz, 1986) using ‘sexual offender’ which is one of the more feared 
classifications of offender/child offender (Weldon, 2011; Keogh, 2012; 
Erooga and Masson, 2006). Three-part lists (Lines 4-8) are a common feature 
in conversation (Lea, 2007:502) and their rhetorical effectiveness is well 
established (Edwards, et al., 1992). These may be used to construct arguments 
such as the speaker does here which work up his ability or the ability of his 
 
institution to see past labels (Jefferson, 1990). This increases the plausibility 
of what the speaker says by his ‘embedding it into a particular narrative 
sequence’ which discursively encourages expectation of an action/event 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992:161).  The speaker then reiterates these abilities 
by undermining abilities of others in lines 8-10 (Potter, 1995).  
 
However one should also consider the effects of the interview context here 
which was the participant’s place of work which may have a confounding 
effect (Wetherell, 1998). This speaker may have felt he had to position his 
institution in particular ways (Lines 9-10) as discourse is influenced by 
institutional contexts (Boyle, 2005). Despite this, later the speakers talk 
becomes more ideologically dilemmatic with regard to the ESPD label (Billig 
et al., 1987) as the speaker states he’d want to be ‘protecting’ his own staff, 
thus re-positioning the child, due to ESPD as someone staff need protection 
from using more institutionalised language ‘up-skilling’ his staff to deal with 
‘that sort of challenging behaviour’ which is ambiguous (Potter, 1995). The 
speaker talks of manipulation drawn from descriptions of adult psychopaths 
as intelligent/manipulative (Hare, 1993) which doesn’t fit with intellectual 
disabilities in ESPD (Vizard et al, 2007). Despite earlier suggestions the child 
would be treated as a child, he appears to treat them as an adult psychopath  
as the child is positioned as particularly powerful, intelligent and someone 
 
staff require protection from, which considering ESPD is to signal risk of 
developing these behaviours may be problematic. 
 
IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA 3: Early Intervention as Exclusion 
A significant dilemma for all participants appeared to be ESPD’s links to 
early intervention and this arose in complex ways throughout the participants 
interviews as illustrated by these two extracts from the same participant’s 
interview (Billig et al., 1988).  
 
EXTRACT THIRTEEN: Participant 8 (Part One) 
1 Participant:  not only that I think it has a lot of impact in terms of                      
2 excluding from services so I’ve known when I’ve worked in adult with           
3 people who’ve got a label of personality disorders and you are trying to               
4 engage them in different services in the community or you’re trying to            
5 engage them in different treatments, /erm/ many, many, many services                                 
6 have on their exclusion criteria personality disorder because they see it as,                                 
7 /erm/ (.) too complex or it’s too difficult to treat or (.) so it’s very                                         




EXTRACT THIRTEEN: Participant 8 (Part Two) 
1 Participant:  if you protect a child at naught to age three from the                                                                    
2 abuse  that they’re (1) you know, they can make a lot more                                   
3 significant repair  than the ones we see all the time that have kind   
4 of not had the protection that they needed, they’ve been  
5 emotionally abused, if not physically, sexually and neglected for 
6significant amounts of time, so their, the  developmental trauma 
7they’ve experienced is so prolific that they experience extremely 
8high-risk behaviours (1) which is what we see and  so, the kind of 
9amount of money that costs /erm/ in terms of keeping them in 
10secure units, school exclusions, paying for placements, looked 
11after children all the things that cost so much money and it just 
12makes sense 
 
The speaker first sets out her concerns about the potential exclusionary 
properties of ESPD as a label, relating it to her experiences with adults (Part 
One) then moves on to argue for early intervention as a means to include and 
treat specifically ‘at naught to age three’ (Part Two). Drawing theoretically 
from Foucault’s concept of ‘effects in the real’ (Foucault, 1980a:237) 
methodologically ‘part of the job of the rhetorical analyst is to determine how 
constructions of “the real” are made persuasive’ (Simons, 1990:11) and which 
competing arguments are undermined by the account (Dillon, 1991). We 
 
could say the speaker discounts other neuroscientific evidence regarding 
synaptic pruning into adolescence and beyond (Gazzaniga, 2002) and 
longitudinal studies that developmental trajectories in PD are not consistent 
in children/adolescents (Skodal et al., 2007).  In lines 1-2 (Part two), drawing 
from Lyotard’s suggestion that a characteristic of the postmodern condition 
is its emphasis on local rhetorical wars (1984:17) the speaker uses an offensive 
rhetoric in so far as it undermines alternatives to early intervention (Potter, 
1996:106 italics in original). In part two this concept of offensive/defensive 
rhetoric is the value of taking a double-analytic focus, whereby studies can 
explore procedures by which factual versions are built up (Lines 1-3) and 
others are undermined (Lines7-12) or ‘ironised’ (Potter, 1996:107). This can 
be seen as a product of interests or strategy (Woolgar,1983). However, by 
employing this offensive rhetoric to make her claims for the early intervention 
argument when asked about treatment options for those presentations which 
might be conceptualised as ESPD, she linguistically does that which she was 
concerned the ESPD label itself might do. The speaker excludes from 
treatment the very children who might meet the criteria for ESPD with a mean 
age of 13 (Vizard et al., 2007). 
 
This ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) is interesting in that ‘Early 
Intervention’ is both an intellectual ideology (Lines 2-3) and a lived ideology 
(Line 12) by which an intellectual system of ideas become ‘commonsense’ 
 
ideologies (p.28). The notion of a lived ideology is assumed to differ from the 
view of ideology as an intellectual system of ideas or formalised philosophy 
which ‘presupposes an apparently systematic formalization of facts, 
interpretations, desires and predictions’ (Aron, 1977:309). However, the view 
employed here, which focuses on ‘the dilemmatic aspects of ideology can be 
seen as opposed to those which assume the basic internal consistency of 
ideology’ (Billig, et al., 1988:29).   
 
When the speaker talks of the prolific abuse (Part Two line 7) she uses 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986). This is a rhetorical feature that 
may increase the persuasive power of an account (Walton, 2007) which may 
be deployed by a speaker to remove warrant for the pursuit of an account, and 
to leave the speaker impervious to critique or doubt (Sacks, 1995). She also 
appears to make her account even more persuasive in her use of 
psychodynamic conceptualisation of the children’s presenting issues in using 
‘developmental trauma’ by relating it to theory from the psy-complex (Rose, 
1989; Parker, 1999c). This could be seen as an attempt to appeal to the 




In lines 8-12 (Part Two) the speaker then adds to this the economic argument 
which is rhetorically powerful in early intervention discourses (Pelosi, 2008). 
She literally offers the common-sense ideology in early intervention 
discourses by adding ‘it just makes sense’ (Line 12). This can be seen in terms 
of Habbermas’s (1984) life world concept, whereby the speaker re-positions 
herself from an ‘expert’ with ‘expert knowledge’ and takes up a life world 
identity position where she speaks the ‘common sense’ that ‘everyone 
knows’.  This could also be said to create the illusion of coherence in her 
argument as she brings together the intellectual ideological aspects (science 
and economics) with the lived ideological aspects insisting this is ‘making 
sense’ to make a bottom-line argument to both the lay person and the ‘expert’ 
(Edwards et al., 1995). It is this bottom-line argument drawn from the early 
intervention discourse that excludes by positioning children conceptualised 
as displaying ESPD traits from intervention or as not amenable to intervention 
because they are aged over three years old (Line 1 Part Two). This also 
illustrates well how intellectual ideologies can become lived ideologies for 
society more generally (Billig et al., 1988: 29-32). It should also be 
acknowledged there is another ideological dilemma within this extract in that 
the speaker mentions several forms of early interventions from stays in secure 
units and paying for residential or foster placements alongside placing 
children into the looked-after children system as not being sufficient but does 
not seem to conceptualise these as early interventions (Lines 9-11). The 
 
potential political aspects of this, with respect to the political context at the 
time of interview are explored further in the discussion section.   
 
EXTRACT FOURTEEN: Participant 3 
An associated issue here which also brought about ideological dilemmas for 
the speakers arising from holding the tension between a professional belief in 
early intervention and knowledge that risk prediction in psychiatry was not 
reliable. 
1  Participant: I think the big opportunity is to intervene early when people   
2 are still developing relationships and still developing patterns ofinteracting                       
3 with others and when behaviours are not so deeply ingrained and                         
4  particularly with people who haven’t had secure attachments during their    
5 childhoods and adolescence, if you can provide the security and the                                    
6 relationships which they haven’t had up to that point I think it will                                    
7  profoundly affect how their personality then develops, so I do think as I      
8  said before there’s a very strong case to be looking at this area and to be                                   
9  thinking about working very differently with young people with emerging                                   
10 personality difficulties 
11 Interviewer:    yes, but do you think we have the tools to best predict                                    
12 which of these young people are going to be the Dangerous Severe                                     
13  Personality Disordered offenders of the future? 
 
14  Participant:   Risk assessment is not an exact science (1) we are limited  
15  I think (.) we are nowhere near to the position where we can predict with  
16  a hundred percent accuracy, I’d be guessing as to how accurate we cane    
17 and I think whatever we do there will be individuals that will not be                                      
18 identified and perhaps there will be people who are not going to develop   
19 such profound problems who end up (.) are going to end up being                  
20 identified as potentially being individuals that will develop those                  
21 problems, so false positives and false negatives are bound to occur. 
 22 Having said that I do think the young people with the most profound  
23 difficulties are fairly easy to identify and chances are that group of  
24 individuals who are, who have been in children’s homes, who have been 
25 in YOI’s, who’ve started offending, who’ve come from traumatic,  
26 abusive homes, those are the individuals who perhaps nine times out of    
27 ten are going to develop significant personality difficulties later in life      
28 unless something significantly changes for them, for the better in their      
29 lives. So I do think we can identify those people who are most needy and 
30 who are most likely to benefit from appropriate interventions 
 
The participant also thought ‘the big opportunity is to intervene early’ 
although he does not present this as being at quite as early as the speaker in 
the prior extract. He also worked up a strong argument for early intervention 
 
(Lines 1-8). This can be seen as an example of conflict positioned on a local 
moral landscape (Harre et al., 2009) which is achieved through a form of 
Goffman’s (1981) ‘footings’. Similarly to other participants in Lines 10 and 
22 he exercises agency in his not using the term ESPD (Speer, 2001). 
Following the researchers question, the participant appears to take a more 
defensive stance as he states ‘Risk assessment is not an exact science’ and 
attempts a qualification in stating psychiatrists are nowhere near ‘a hundred 
percent accuracy’ and follows this up with stating he’d be ‘guessing as to how 
accurate’ risk assessment could be. Though he says these children are ‘fairly 
easy to identify’ as he works this argument up with lists (Luke, 1999). Again, 
Lines 17-25 are so ideologically dilemmatic it is unclear as to how we might 
be able to say ‘nine out of ten cases’ when risk assessment is so poor (Coid 
et al., 2013). We also see a potential waste of money (Lines 20-21) which has 
been highlighted as an issue with the government funding of early 
intervention in psychiatry (Pelosi, 2008). There is also ambiguity in the 
speaker’s argument as he does not explain why the case is so strong for 
working differently if we can already identify ‘at risk’ youngsters and again, 
the identifying factors listed seem to be poverty rather than pathology which 
relates to arguments concerning ASPD which suggest this is a category 
constructed for the poor (Russell, 1989). 
 
 
In this extract the participant appears to be using a sandwiched argument, that 
is, account, counter argument and account (Riley, 2002).  However, it should 
be noted that the researcher may encourage this (Lines 11-13) as she presents 
the participant with a ‘yes-no interrogative’ (Raymond, 2002). This could 
have influenced the speaker in lines 16-26 to further present what can also be 
seen as a two-sided argument (Abel & Stoke, 1999) to avoid that interrogative 
set by the researcher. Here it should be acknowledged that the ways in which 
individuals position themselves in talk may need to be considered within ‘the 
surrounding conversation activities’ (Wetherell, 1998:395).  
According to Burr (2003) ideological workings of discourses are not 
exclusively located in language but also in social practices, including the 
practices of psychology/psychiatry. It could be argued the speakers dilemma 
arises due to the inherent ideological dilemmas in psychiatric discourses 
concerning risk assessment (Beck, 1992) illustrated by the ‘Ubu-esque’ 














This chapter is a continuation of those discussions which began in the results 
chapter. There are also explorations of authenticity (Fairclough, 2001), 
reflexivity (Sheurich, 1997) applicability (Misra, 1993) and potential 
transferability of findings (Seale, 1999) and the associated consideration of 
further research opportunities and limitations to the current study. 
 
Authenticity and Transferability 
A claim related to issues of research authenticity is that of relevance and in 
the case of the present research it can be argued that there is a clear connection 
between the topic of research and a social issue/political event (Wetherell et 
al., 2001:323). As Norman Fairclough (2001) argues DA is suited to 
investigation of ‘social problems with a semiotic aspect’ (p.230). It is 
assumed this research falls within those confines due to the political nature of 
the categorisation (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) and the appropriation of  
language drawn from diagnostic nomenclature (Edelman, 1977). However, it 
is accepted these findings may only refer to the specific circumstances in 
which the research was conducted (Wetherell et al., 2001).  
 
In terms of notions of applicability, this study should be viewed in 
conjunction with models of usefulness (Wodak, 1999; Misra, 1993) rejecting 
‘the dogma of immaculate perception’ in that it does not deny the will and 
desires of the perceiver (Nietzsche, 1997). It is further acknowledged that ‘all 
epistemology, ontology and the ways of thinking that yield such categories as 
epistemology and ontology are socially conditioned and historically relative 
or contextual’ (Scheurich, 1997:33). This is important in terms of the 
researcher who is also embedded in particular contexts and as Habbermas 
(1971) wrote ‘the interpreter cannot abstractly free himself from his 
hermeneutic point of departure’ (p.181).  So it is argued that this study may 
be useful to readers, in different ways but not that the findings should be 
viewed as truth claims (Wetherell et al.,2001) as it is result of a co-
construction between researcher and participants (Mauthner & Doucet, 
2003).  
 
In respect of these notions of usefulness (Misra, 1993) a DA study such as 
this may be academically useful in that it may generate new theory or 
hypotheses (Seale and Silverman, 1997:380). Or it may provide novel or 
original explanations of the topic other than that that is currently being studied 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987:171). This is often described as ‘transferability’ 
which is close to the concept of generalizability and is discussed below 
(Seale, 1999:45). However, Widdicombe (1995) has argued researchers 
 
should not make recommendations based on their research or impose 
categories on others.  
 
Potential Applications 
Hammersley (1992) accepts we cannot have neutral knowledge about reality 
but suggests we can have knowledge ‘about whose validity we can be 
reasonably confident of’ (p.50). Therefore, it is accepted that current findings 
may have some transferability (Wetherell et al.,2001). Willig (1999) has 
suggested DA research has five types of potential application. The first three, 
providing a space for alternative constructions or versions, campaigning or 
lobbying are linked to critique. The fourth is through therapeutic intervention 
to resist established forms of therapy discourses and the fifth is education 
itself. It is possible that this research could have elements of each.  
 
Some writers see the application of DA research as relating to its critical status 
in that it challenges established authorities to expose dominance and 
encourage empowerment (Wetherell et al., 2001:326) which links to the 
power/knowledge concept (Foucault, 1980). Though, it has also been counter 
argued DA can have the opposite effect and ‘lock’ oppressed groups ‘into 
different restrictive discourses’ (Willig, 1999:9). More often though, DA 
 
studies have demonstrated the processes by which this may happen and it is 
hoped this study falls into this latter category (Wetherell et al., 2001).  
 
The Reification and Rhetorical or Ideological Functions of ESPD 
This section will review the discourses identified earlier in the researcher and 
participants local interactions (Wetherell, 1998). The intention is to continue 
and contextualise those results discussions while providing space for the 
reader to take what they may find ‘useful’ (Misra, 1993).  
 
The Use and Misuse Repertoire 
The first repertoire was drawn on by all participants and could be discursively 
analysed largely in terms of the concepts of ‘footing’ (Goffman, 1981), 
category/epistemological entitlements and as managements of stake or 
interests (Potter, 1995: 122-140). Footing (Goffman, 1981) refers to 
relationships speakers have to their descriptions or between their identity and 
the versions produced (Potter, 1996). The related concept of category or 
epistemological entitlements refer to the notions that certain categories of 
individuals in particular contexts, are assumed entitled to use particular 
epistemologies (Potter, 1996). However, this also illustrates how assumptions 
of category ‘membership’ attempt to obviate the need to ask how someone 
knows something (Potter, 1995). As Widdicombe & Woolfit (1995) have 
 
illustrated ‘being a member’ is not enough, category memberships are worked 
up or undermined in discourse in a variety of ways.  For example, by 
undermining those with the ‘wrong hands’ the proponents of these new terms 
such as ESPD reinforce the assumption that category members with 
epistemological entitlements will use such terms appropriately and these 
terms are the ‘right ones’ without having to explain why (Vizard et al., 
2009:29). This also has a further connection to the concepts of stake and 
interest, which suggests speakers are not disinterested, they actually have a 
stake in the action the description relates to, or there are personal, professional 
power relations to consider and descriptions can be inspected with regards to 
competences, projects, motives and values (Potter, 1996:124). Interests may 
also be invoked by undermining certain versions (Potter, 1996). 
 
Some participants subject positioned other professionals ‘outside’ mental 
health as not having the ‘qualifications’ to use the ESPD term appropriately. 
Undermining the epistemological entitlements of other professionals in this 
way was a common rhetorical strategy for participants to work up their 
epistemological entitlement. Other professionals were also positioned as 
uneducated, unconsidered or impulsive which counter positioned mental 
health professionals as more considered and sensitive to individuals with a 
PD diagnosis which is in opposition to considerable historical and 
contemporary literature reviewed earlier. The rhetorical strategies used to 
 
work up category and epistemological entitlement by undermining 
entitlements of others often caused powerful ideological dilemmas (Billig et 
al., 1988) particularly when the participants did so while inappropriately 
referring to ESPD as a ‘diagnosis’ similar to academics commenting on 
DSPD (White, 1999)  
 
Others  subject positioned ‘society’ as potentially using the ESPD research 
term in careless ways working up their entitlements to keep ESPD ‘a pure 
diagnostic instrument’ whilst undermining society as potentially 
‘contaminating’ the term. This also saw participants using rhetorically 
powerful devices to manage their own stakes in psychiatric labelling (Potter, 
1996:115).  There was a tendency towards presenting diagnostic categories 
or research terms as being somehow protected by those who use them and 
them becoming tainted by the public’s potential misuse of them. This 
rhetorically powerful device of stake and interest management positioned 
mental health professionals as being fully informed and having shared 
understandings which were uncontested and ‘uncontaminated’. This would 
also suggest that psychiatric labelling is not tainted by professional 
interpretation, which again is contestable, and so needs working up in 
arguments (Caplan, 1992; Kutchins and Kirk, 1997; Davies, 2013). 
Moreover, psychiatric terminology was positioned as separate from society 
when psychology/psychiatry are themselves social practices (Parker, 1992) 
 
and judgements about psychiatric categorization are made by society, albeit 
a particular section of society (Ellard, 1989). 
 
The media were also often positioned as potentially misusing the ESPD term 
and were most often cited as the potential source of misinformation. This 
might not be surprising due to the UK’s penal populist culture (Green 2010).  
Arguments here were worked up using offensive rhetoric which undermined 
the press due to their own interest management (Potter, 1996:107). However, 
this also obfuscated the links professionals and academics have with the 
popular press and thus their potential culpability. This link to professional 
knowledge in this misinformation been noted in DA studies concerning 
psychopathy (Paulsen, 2010:60). Moreover, positioning appeared to present 
the press and/or public as mislabelling children which rhetorically avoided 
popular criticism of mental health practitioners over labelling children 
(Breggin, 1996: Rutter et al., 2010; Carr, 2010).  
 
Some participants positioned ‘us’ researchers and practitioners as potentially 
using the ESPD term in inappropriate ways, with many questioning the 
appropriateness of the term altogether. Many thought it suggested ‘we’ knew 
something we couldn’t possibly know. This was often due to the issues 
concerning the unreliability of risk prediction in psychiatry (Beck, 1992) or 
 
unreliability of tools like the PCL-RV (Hare, 1993, 1996). This positioning 
fits with Foucault’s positioning of psychiatric experts as having little more to 
offer other than hindsight presented as expertise and causal explanation 
(Foucault, 2003:36). Other participants also positioned 
practitioners/researchers as potentially misusing the term most notably in 
class-biased ways (Guttwell & Hollander, 1996). This was often formulated 
in classes of two, the rich and the poor with no one in between (Sacks, 1981). 
The rich and poor were positioned as very different in terms of their crimes. 
This appeared to illustrate the argument that dangerousness signifies a relative 
position in the social structure (Sarbin, 1969:77). ). Importantly, participants 
often referred to ‘us’ which was a powerful reminder that the interviewer also 
has an interest here to manage.  
 
One possible criticism here concerning category membership/ 
epistemological entitlement is that, if a reflexive analysis is made, 
assumptions of category membership/epistemological entitlement were also 
assumed for participation in the study. This brings the author to an ideological 
dilemma herself as she has expected these participants to have the knowledge 
concerning ESPD required for participation, without explanation. Thus the 
author is highlighting power relations that she herself is perpetuating. In 
reflexive critique terms the author is also, like all the participants, not 
disinterested in certain arguments, she too has stake and interest as she is 
 
employed by the state and it is her sense of epistemological entitlement that 
also allows her to research this topic without explanation other than that 
provided by her training context. Another issue here concerns how ESPD is 
interpreted and understood by different practitioners and the researcher, 
which due to its being poorly defined did seem to vary, which echoes those 
confusions noted in the background chapter concerning the adult constructs 
downwardly extended to children in ESPD and brings about a question as to 
whether this is the ‘common language’ that ESPD’s proposers suggest we 
need (Vizard et al., 2009:29).  
 
The Evoking Images Repertoire 
This repertoire concerned the images the ESPD label could evoke of children. 
As Murray Edelman (1977) argues ‘a term is the thought it evokes, not a tool 
for expressing a pre-existing thought’ (p. 24). The images participants thought 
ESPD might evoke were those of psychopaths, both ‘real’ and fictional and 
of children who had committed serious acts of interpersonal violence and 
grave crimes in high profile cases. Commenting on ‘statement as function’ 
(Foucault, 1972:98) Linda Graham (2005) suggests this can be theorised as a 
‘discursive junction box where words and things intersect and become 
invested with particular relations of power’ (p.7). These images may suggest 
we need to think about the socio-cultural or socio-historical contexts from 
 
which participants arguments may be drawn or influenced, so ‘when 
analysing our always partial piece of the argumentative texture we look also 
to the broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more 
generally’ (Wetherell, 1998). This is what Shapiro (1992) means by the 
concept of ‘proto conversations’ the conversational or discursive history 
which makes this particular conversation possible’ (Wetherell, 1998:403). 
This repertoire illustrated this most starkly as it appeared to bring together 
certain factors, which, like Graham’s (2005) ‘junction box’, saw ESPD as 
inextricably linked to those events and developments in the UK or in 
psychology and psychiatry which have made ESPD possible. These were the 
invention of the psychopathy checklist and checklist for youth (Hare, 1993, 
1997), the employment of Cleckley’s criteria for psychopathy in that checklist 
which has seen it conflate psychopathy and violence (Skeem & Cooke, 2008), 
popular media representations of violent ‘psychopaths’ (Harris, 1981), and 
the murder of James Bulger and the case of the ‘J’ children (See appendix x) 
both of which are linked to the main proposer of ESPD as she was an ‘expert 
witness’ in both trials (Morrison, 1996). The Bulger case also brought about 
the changes in law relating to youth crime (Fionda, 2005) and which ushered 
in an interventionist imperative in law (Muncie, 2010) and the Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998) which makes the ESPD ‘conversation’ possible. The 
citing of these cases appeared to form ‘extreme case formulations’ 
(Pomerantz, 1986) which may be an issue if ESPD is going to be used as a 
 
marker of risk as these cases were so high profile they have become distorted 
(Young, 1996). As we are not concerned with motivations in DA it is unclear 
as to whether this indicated children ‘like this’ would be treated differently 
by the practitioners or whether participants were keen not to demonise 
children who have violently offended as they often are in our penal populist 
culture (Green, 2010).  
 
Although a detailed history of the emergence of childhood (see Postman, 
1994) or of delinquency (Pearson, 1983) and violence and murder by children 
(see Loach, 2009) and associated historical issues in politics and media (see 
Green, 2010) or Law (see Cavadino, 1996) are well beyond the scope of this 
research, each of the aforementioned authors explore in some sense the 
categorising and separation of children from adults.  Discursive psychologists 
would argue that we need to think about the politics of category construction 
here (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001; Edwards, 1991) and in particular, 
categorising children as ‘innocent’ is a complex system of meanings and 
practices which produce knowledges and forms of truth about children and as 
such ‘innocence’ is constructed in relation to power as an ‘ideological field’ 
against which other versions of children are constructed (Reynolds and 
Wetherell, 2003: 493). This leads to the opposite construction of children as 
evil in popular discourses concerning children who offend (Fionda, 2005). 
With regard to children who may be labelled ESPD who may have offended 
 
violently or sexually ‘it is not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain 
that they form; it is not even their point of emergence or their mode of 
characterisation; but the relation between the surfaces on which they appear’ 
Foucault (2002 52).  
 
The Excluded and Untreatable Repertoire 
Unsurprisingly this repertoire was common to all. Children were positioned 
as powerless and excluded and a significant majority of participants thought 
that by using a term connected to PD this could become iatrogenic, which is 
to cause an illness or disorder through labelling itself (Illich, 1975). Some 
participants thought the ESPD labels connotations about treatability might 
cause children’s traits to become ingrained in the way they were perceived 
and treated by practitioners, positioning practitioners as a potential source of 
iatrogenesis.  Participants thought that this would happen due to the way 
practitioners might potentially ‘treat and interact’ with those children. As 
mentioned in the results section, some speakers exercised autonomy and 
refused to see these young people ‘spoken by’ ESPD and they demonstrated 
their autonomy by choosing not to use this term and in particular refused to 
reference personality disorder at all favouring ‘emerging difficulties’ as an 
alternative construction (Willig, 2008). This appears to illustrate the 
arguments in the methodology section with regard to being able to negotiate 
 
around discourses, and rejecting them with counter-discourse (Moussa & 
Scapp, 1996).  
 
Within this repertoire there was subject positioning of self and other 
professionals as being frustrated and angry at being forced to work with 
something that they had no treatment or services for. This might be 
unsurprising when taken in context with the socio-political climate which has 
seen a government initiative to improve services for people with personality 
disorder diagnoses including making changes to the mental health act and the 
public vilification of psychiatrists by politicians preceding the DSPD pilots 
for not treating PD (Hansard, 1998). Many participants appeared to take the 
same position as they would with adults with PD, rather than seeing ESPD as 
a term to signal ‘risk’ early and the position taken rarely changed from that 
taken up in relation to adults who had been formally diagnosed.  During the 
interviews many participants, thought there was not enough research or 
treatments to warrant the term.  This positioning often brought about 
discourses of being forced into a position where practitioners appeared to be 
frustrated, angry and very wary of criticism if they cannot give meaningful 
treatments.  Again, despite reluctance in DA to infer too far past the discourse 
itself this did raise questions about how this might play out in terms of power 
relations in the clinical context. Other practitioners were adamant nothing 
could be done for these young people and actually drew upon the DSPD 
 
project to subject position the government as forcing them to work with 
dangerous or potentially dangerous people, although there was often a theme 
that we can already predict who these young people are and ‘where some 
young people are going’ which subject positioned children as having no hope. 
Interestingly some participants used ridicule by taking government 
terminologies such as the ‘what works’ strategy and using them sarcastically 
to make their arguments (Potter, 1995:167). This raised another question, 
when taken in historical context as there may now be more resistance from 
practitioners to work with these children due to feeling forced by 
governments to treat something, which since the nineteen century has 
signalled ‘untreatable’ (Paris, 1996).  
 
The Ideological Dilemmas 
Throughout the repertoires there were considerable ideological dilemmas 
arising in participants talk (Billig et al., 1988). This is perhaps unsurprising 
due to the patterning of ideologies involved. These justifications, blamings, 
and inconsistencies, are characteristic qualities of the interpretative repertoire 





Our label/Their label 
A primary role of ‘the rhetorical analyst is to determine how constructions of 
“the real” are made persuasive’ (Simons, 1990:11) and throughout the 
interviews there appeared to be a sense of speakers reifying ESPD in their 
talk which took several different forms (Tillich, 1988; Potter, 1995). A 
reifying discourse constructs versions of the world as solid and factual, 
turning the abstract into a material thing and producing something as an object 
(Potter, 1995:107). This is similar to Foucault’s (1980) ‘effects in the real’ 
that is, the ways in which particular objects become formed (p.237). Many 
speakers reified the ESPD term by referring to it as a diagnosis as happened 
with DSPD before it. (e.g. White, 1999). It is unclear as to why practitioners 
referred to the ESPD term as a diagnosis in the same way as commentators 
on the DSPD pilots, though it could be argued the terms themselves draw 
from psychiatric diagnoses (in their appropriation of personality disorder) 
which could itself  be classed as an act of reification by politicians and 
psychiatrists  (DoH, 1999, Edelman, 1977). This could also be considered in 
the framework of Foucault’s concept of the statement as ‘a function’ 
(Foucault, 1972:98). This is where words intersect in ways that lead to their 
becoming invested with ‘power relations’ (Foucault, 1991a:201) in an ‘act of 
formulation’ (Foucault, 1972:93) which ‘enable forms to become manifest’ 
(Foucault, 1972:99) and ‘to appear’ as objects (Foucault, 1972:50) ‘fully 
formed and armed’ (Foucault, 1972:47). Thus the appropriation of the 
 
personality disorder construct, in the ESPD term, may have a reifying quality 
which invests it with power as it infers formal diagnosis of personality 
disorder and all meaning that accompanies that diagnosis (Tucker, 2009). It 
also appears to define a young person’s identity as many reified it referring 
to it as something that can be ‘got’ or as something the child ‘is’ (Avdi, 2005). 
As Laing (1990) suggested the diagnosis (or term) which is assumed to be a 
diagnosis) becomes the identity of the person. Erving Goffman (1986) 
suggests this is the process by which the person is thus reduced in our minds 
from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. This reification 
and erroneous referring to the term as a diagnosis was ideologically 
dilemmatic as practitioners tended to do this while presenting others as 
potentially using it ‘incorrectly’. An associated ideological dilemma arising 
here out of the use/misuse repertoire, the excluded and untreatable repertoire 
and the evoking images repertoire was that many thought the term meant that 
‘people’ would have negative attitudes towards the young people, it would 
not serve much purpose and the child would not benefit from being identified 
with this term. However, the label was positioned as better than other labels 
such as ‘evil’. This created a dilemma for participants in that they thought the 
label was largely unhelpful but it could be positioned as somewhat better than 




Looking past labels/Unable to look past labels 
Across the data set, professions and institutions, despite the participants often 
positioning themselves and their institutions as able to ‘look past the label’ or 
as being ‘wary’ of labels and their connotations, many also began to 
contradict this position throughout their interviews as they spoke about 
children who might potentially be described using this term manipulating 
them or feeling they needed protection from them and there was a tendency 
with this label to have very set notions of the child who was most often 
separated in their talk from other offenders, even violent sexual offenders. 
This also brought about worries about training and skills to handle these 
young people. Many participants, despite their rhetoric concerning not 
treating children differently if they were identified with the ESPD label did 
demonstrate different ideas  about this group. Additionally, those who often 
thought they looked past the label actually appeared to draw their image of 
the child (potentially ‘at risk’ for PD) as the same as adults with ‘severe 
personality disorders’.  
 Children with very complex traumas which could be conceptualised within 
the ESPD construct framework were often positioned as powerless, as welfare 
cases or as intellectually deficit, misunderstood or in need of understanding. 
However, when referring to their behaviours, the children were positioned as 
powerful in terms of their abilities to manipulate and as children practitioners 
require being ‘protected’ from. This notion of manipulation, linked 
 
inextricably to ASPD, appeared to function ideologically to position children 
with suspected ESPD as somehow more ‘powerful’ than adult practitioners 
trained to deal with children with incredibly complex presentations and 
possibly violent and challenging behaviours. The notion of manipulation also 
appears to infer psychological and intellectual superiority which is consistent 
with Cleckleys (1941) definition of the psychopath which has been employed 
in the PCL-RV (Hare, 1993, 1996) but would seem to contradict the profiles 
of children sampled in the ESPD traits study 35% of whom suffered 
intellectual disability (an IQ score of minus 70) and 67% of whom were 
excluded from school (Vizard et al., 2007:35).  
 
Early Intervention/Early Exclusion 
The ideological dilemma which was the most prevalent appeared to arise out 
of the excluded and untreatable repertoire. This had two particularly strong 
themes in that many practitioners who were concerned about children being 
potentially excluded if identified by a term referencing PD also appeared  
discursively to exclude children of certain ages from intervention themselves 
due to beliefs that early intervention was the only ‘treatment’. This also 
became dilemmatic in another sense as the practitioners conceded risk 
prediction in psychiatry was poor (Coid et al., 2013). 
 
 
Beliefs in early intervention were often inconsistent, in that it was never clear 
what it was, time frames varied for this, none cited actual treatments on 
intervening and many cited children involved with multiple services from 
very young ages, but these services (most often the practitioners own places 
of work) were not considered ‘early interventions’ (see Pelosi, 2008). This 
ideological dilemma was also evidenced in the Early Intervention in 
Personality Disorder Conference report (Vizard et al., 2009) as the treatments 
presented were not suitable for looked after children of which 90% of the 
ESPD study were. Issues of untreatable children without services to meet their 
needs (Epps, 2006) then becomes the argument for ‘earlier intervention’ 
excluding those older children (in some cases those over three years old for 
some participants in this study) and reinforcing ideas that ESPD rather than 
signalling ‘at risk’ signalled ‘untreatable’. As Anthony Pelosi (2008) writes 
on early intervention in psychiatry: 
 ‘this self-imposed lack of clinical experience combined with relentless 
political lobbying have lead to unacceptable distortions of healthcare 
priorities. It is time to divert resources to ordinary clinicians who are 
prepared to tackle the genuine challenges of treating and trying to prevent 
severe mental illness’ (p.1).  
 
When viewed in a CDP framework this belief in early intervention appeared  
connected to the working up of interest management because despite most 
 
practitioners citing poverty as the ‘cause’ of PD (Magnavita, 2000) this was 
not what the practitioners wanted the government to tackle and fund, instead 
they wanted funding to ‘treat’ at early ages without citing what this might 
look like in practice, nor did they say by which risk assessment processes we 
might predict who should receive such ‘treatment’. This appears to lend 
weight to critical perspectives which view psychiatry/psychology as social 
control professions (Cohen, 1975). 
 
Moreover, these notions of ‘early intervention’ also appeared to function 
rhetorically to prevent any discourses about the possible failings by services 
in certain cases, where despite many ‘early interventions’ children have not 
been safeguarded for  (Bentovim et al., 2009). More ‘effective earlier 
intervention’ rhetoric can be seen frequently in serious case reviews like the 
case of the ‘J’ children (Carlisle, 2012:50) despite significant service 
involvement since birth (appendix x). In a variety of contexts ‘early 
intervention’ appears to serve as a powerful bottom-line argument even when 
it fails (Edwards et al., 2005; Pelosi, 2008). As illustrated in the extracts 
timeframes varied greatly between participants for ‘early intervention’ from 
ages 0-3 for one participant and up to ‘adolescence’ for another and few 
believed psychiatry was reliable enough to predict who might require such 
interventions, thus conceding money and resources would be wasted in many 
targeted cases, which conflicted with their economic arguments for early 
 
intervention (Pelosi, 2008; Coid et al., 2013). Moreover, if we intervene early 
in something that has not yet developed but we merely suspect will develop, 
how would we evidence efficacy or outcomes in our political era of evidence-
based practice? This is something the Governments Allen (2011) report for 
‘Early Intervention’ fails to mention. Billig and Colleagues (1988) have 
argued inconsistencies like these noted can be easily illustrated in an assumed 
coherent intellectual ideology (like early intervention) when viewed 
discursively.  
 
The basic premise of this piece of research was to interrogate the ideological 
functions of ESPD as a discursive formation and it was here, perhaps that one 
could best see what Linda Graham (2005) describes as a ‘discursive junction-
box’ in which words and things intersect and become invested with relations 
of power, resulting in an interpellative event’ (p.7) where these discourses of 
non-treatability, ingrained traits, lack of treatments then meet with discourses 
of early intervention, risk assessment and prediction in psychiatry and each 
of these become reified in the ESPD term itself (Tillich, 1988). Early 
intervention thus becomes an offensive rhetoric, in that it undermines 
alternative arguments and may, ideologically function to exclude young 
people with complex trauma difficulties of a certain age by dominating 
discourses focusing on those much younger children and families. Thus we 
could say in terms of subject positioning the ‘interpellative event’ as Linda 
 
Graham refers to this, drawing from Althusser’s (1971) explanation of the 
way ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ via interpellation of subjects ‘hailed’ by 
discourse (p.48) that the dominant discourses of early intervention serve to 
interpellate the high risk children we work with now into a subject position of 
‘no hope’.  
 
From a CDP perspective, early intervention is fascinating ideologically as it 
is both an intellectual and a lived ideology (Billig et al., 1988:28 my italics). 
This may be what invests it with such power in terms of the power/knowledge 
equation (Foucault, 1980). Early intervention is both a ‘scientific’ and a 
‘common-sense’ ideology and interestingly in this context these types of 
ideologies do not conflict with each other as Billig and Colleagues (1988:32) 
argue. Perhaps because early intervention is a fragmented, inconsistent 
‘scientific’ concept which, because it appears to make good ‘common-sense’ 
it is never really explained. It is fair to generalise that most people, regardless 
of their epistemological entitlement (or lack of entitlement) to speak about 
early intervention or ESPD (Potter, 1995) would agree that ‘prevention is 
better than cure’. However, such idiomatic expressions (Drew & Holt (1989) 
tell us nothing about the process involved similarly to proponents of ‘early 
intervention’ (see Allen Report, 2011).  
 
 
Here it is argued, is where this current study may expose the discourse 
processes by which ESPD with its connection to ‘early intervention’ may 
‘lock’ high-risk older children into restricted discourses concerning services 
and treatment (Wetherell et al., 2001:326). For ESPD so far, ‘early 
intervention’ is the only ‘treatment’ (Vizard et al., 2004, 2009) working as an 
offensive rhetoric (Potter, 1995:107) and ‘winning argument’ for all 
participants in this study (Edley, 2001) in a local rhetorical war (Lyotard, 
1984:17) by cancelling out all other discourses concerning treatment for those 
children experiencing complex trauma now (Garland, 1995) thus those 
children were discursively excluded and were positioned as untreatable in 
exactly the same way as their adult counterparts with formal PD diagnoses 
have been historically (Paris, 1996).  
 
Meeting the Research Aims 
The research aims drew from the Foucauldian philosophy (1980) that we can 
reveal the ideological function of a science by questioning it as a discursive 
formation and the discursive psychological position on rhetoric (Potter 1996) 
and as such it does seem that this has brought about a new ‘version’ of ESPD. 
It also appears to meet its aim in terms of highlighting potential reification of 
ESPD. This mostly revealed how, for these participants it may function 
discursively in ways opposite to those intended by the proposers. ESPD 
 
appeared to evoke images of adult psychopaths, of violent or grave crimes 
and actual high profile cases rather than signalling ‘at risk for’ (Vizard et al., 
2007). ESPD also appeared to discursively exclude rather than include in 
terms of ‘early intervention’ or ‘treatment’ (Vizard et al., 2009) and as far as 
claims that ‘the right terms in the wrong hands can lead to the pejorative use 
of an otherwise non-pejorative label’ (Vizard et al., 2009:29) this study 
appeared to illustrate how those ‘right hands’ some with similar professions 
to the proposers themselves had to work up their epistemological entitlements 
to use this term and that it had pejorative connotations for many. Moreover, 
many of those ‘right hands’ discursively reified ESPD inappropriately as a 
diagnosis (Tillich, 1988) and one with a very poor prognosis. This was 
accompanied by frustration at being forced to work with the historically 
untreatable which may be an issue relationally when working with children 
suspected of developing serious interpersonal difficulties (Bleiberg, 2001). In 
these respects it did seem as though the research met its aims, had 
authenticity, some transferability (Wetherell et al., 2001; Fairclough, 2001) 
and due to the sample and richness of the data revealed a version which we 
might be reasonably confident of in the wider context (Hammersley, 1992). 
However, the title to this thesis may be misleading as it cannot cover all 
ESPD’s possible reification processes or rhetorical and ideological functions 
(Ely et al., 1991).  
 
 
A Critical Appraisal of Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is open to interpretation (Lynch, 2000). A significant short-
coming with concurrent reflexive analyses (Ely, 1999) of research such as 
this is that the researcher is perhaps too close to the topic over the two years 
to evaluate as reflexively as they might later (Mouthner & Doucett, 
2003:415).  This can make it difficult to know what should be included as 
relevant (Ely, 1999) and unlike most DA researchers, this researcher also 
practices psychodynamic therapy so there is an awareness of the potential for 
unconscious processes here which may remain unconscious. In this respect 
certain perspectives on reflexivity are problematic. How does one say for 
certain how they might have shaped the research (Atkinson, 2000) and 
balance accountability/critical thinking without becoming too subjective or 
confessional (Finlay, 1998, 2002).  
There was an attempt to be transparent by contextualising the researchers 
approach in the preface as a reflexive consideration in line with Burr (2003) 
who has argued DA researchers should contextualise their research by 
incorporating their accounts and subjectivities (Kidder and Fine, 1997). 
However, the preface is a discourse, full of rhetoric and the researcher’s 
rhetorical strategies continue throughout from the literature review, to the 
presentation of the research process and through to analysis, discussion and 
to this very sentence (Gough, 2003). Harper (1999) notes these difficulties 
with balancing notions of being too interested or biased. However, bias occurs 
 
in all research (Ely et al., 1991) and there are objections to ‘autobiographical 
accounts’ in research so these were kept to a minimum though a certain 
amount of information can help to identify personal and methodological 
failings and it is acknowledged this will take a narrative form, as did the 
preface (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982).  
  
Future Research 
This study had a relatively broad aim, but a fairly limited scope and the 
findings may be best viewed as indicating some interesting opportunities for 
future researchers. Primarily the research may indicate future opportunities to 
approach terminology used to describe groups in the positivist field as 
discursive formations which may help to gauge where these might need 
modification. Terms do not simply identify that which they are intended to 
describe they are interpreted, invested with power relations, ideologies and 
they function rhetorically (Billig et al., 1988). This may require far more 
consideration in propositions for new terminologies than those concerning 
ESPD afford to it. Despite concentration on ‘evidence’ in such studies there 
is never evidence provided for rhetorical claims that the ESPD label would  
help ‘nip offending behaviour in the bud’ (Vizard, 2009) wich is simply an 
echo of the interventionist imperatives in the wording of the Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998). Studies like this one may indicate an ethically just 
 
(Derrida, 1992) requirement for analysis of discourses concerning the way we 
propose labels to ‘manage and identify’ (Vizard, 2004) ‘problem’ groups 
(Graham, 2005) because DA can reveal potential issues with those labels in 
ways positivist medico-legal approaches cannot accommodate.  
 
A major research opportunity would be to investigate early intervention as a 
discursive formation in itself. The ways that early intervention appeared to 
cause ideological dilemmas and cancel out all other treatment discourses was 
an indication that this too should be investigated in DA research. The 
‘justifications and blaming’s’ (Reynolds and Wetherell, 2003) it appeared to 
support were also perhaps worthy of far more attention than could be given 
here. Early intervention in PD, when investigated as a discursive formation 
could be particularly interesting as it is both a ‘common sense’ and an 
‘intellectual’ ideology (Billig, 1988) which would be a fascinating topic in 
terms of the power/knowledge equation (Foucault, 1980). Thus, it might be 
particularly suited to Wetherell’s (1998) ‘productive synthesis’ of DP and 
FDA and revisit those realist/relativist debates if studied as ‘promissory 
discourses’ such as those DA studies concerning psychopathy which have 
seen participants discursively construct neuroscience as the ‘answer’ 
(Pickersgill, 2011).  
 
 
Limitations of the current study 
 
The main limitation of the study is the methodology itself (Habbermas, 1987). 
Methodology constrains research findings as it provides a hermeneutical lens 
through which a particular version could be produced and presented, where 
others could not. The employment of any other methodology, such as 
grounded theory (Glazer & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006) or interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (Smith & Olsen, 2003) could yield another, 
different version.   
 
One of the more common issues in studies of this kind is the use of semi-
structured interviews (Wetherell et al.,2001) which are a somewhat 
‘contrived’ way of collecting data (Speer, 2002). As the researcher has an 
agenda and takes a critical stance to the topic this can produce particular 
power relations which may be re-produced in the write up (Parker, 1994). 
This is something which is difficult to ‘control for’ despite claims of 
reflexivity (Scheurich, 1997). The research context may also have had 
particular effects on some participant’s answers and this may well have been 
lessened by change in environment (Potter, 1995). This may have influenced 
certain ideological dilemmas (Billig, 1988). Some of these issues may have 
been better handled in a more naturalistic method of group discussion in a 
 
neutral setting (Potter, 2002). Though group discussions bring with them 
other power relations which may be problematic, for example there was a 
‘hierarchy’ of professions, perhaps some would exert their ‘epistemological 
entitlement’ over others using those strategies illustrated in the results 
chapter.  
 
Another associated issue is that due to limited space, much of the researchers 
interaction had to be removed from the results section and this means 
responses may be somewhat decontextualized (Potter, 1996). As DA sees the 
interviewer as another participant (Wetherell et al., 2001) so it was noted in 
the results/discussion where researcher may have influenced the participant 
or constrained response (Willig, 2009). Another possible criticism here could 
arise from the necessity, particularly in the ideological dilemmas section to 
have to provide two somewhat decontextualized extracts to demonstrate the 
dilemmas, however ideological dilemmas run through whole interviews, 
rather than single responses (Billig et al., 1988). For this reason one of those 
transcripts from which one of the double extracts were taken was chosen as 
the sample transcript (See appendix ix). The researchers own critical stance 
may also influence the analysis in that they decide which repertoires appear 
more dominant so those which could not be included are provided (See 
appendix xi) However, admittedly being a novice in DA may mean that I have 
imported my own categories on to the research process (Schegloff, 1997).  
 
 
A major limitation methodologically is that it is difficult for the most 
seasoned of DA researchers to decide what is relativist or critical realist 
(discursive or non-discursive) which Mather (2000) suggests results from the 
fact that the debate largely focuses on whether linguistic statements refer to 
anything other than themselves. Moreover, this can bring another problem in 
terms of notions of a causal relationship between the micro and the macro 
(discursive and extra-discursive) as put forward by CDP researchers 
(Wetherell, 1998; Edley & Wetherell, 2001) because causality  can be 
exaggerated (Pratten, 2009) despite failure to clarify impact of social 
structural forces on this. Some of these epistemological debates may well 
reveal further limitations to this piece of research as the many perspectives 
on this could not be covered.   
The most pertinent question arising from this is perhaps whether the 
researcher would employ a critical discursive psychological approach to the 
topic should she begin the process again. In terms of researcher competency, 
it might have been wiser to have used one approach and to have expanded 
that knowledge base more fully. In terms of suitability to research question, 
this still appears to be a productive methodology which appeared to ‘fill the 
gaps’ concerning this terminology which could not be explored in the 
positivist/empiricist research so far concerning ESPD and language as 
constitutive (Edley, 2001). However, this ‘productive synthesis’ (Wetherell, 
 
1998) sometimes felt, in a small research piece like this as though it 
encountered issues which have been highlighted with critical realist work 
before, that these two essentially incompatible epistemologies can result in 
analyses which may veer inconsistently between these positions 
(Speer,2007:129). This study did somewhat appear to veer towards the 
Discursive Psychological in terms of analysis and Foucauldian philosophy 
(perhaps rather than methodology) was more supportive as a foundation. 
Should the researcher attempt this again, separate analyses could be more 
productive, though it could be difficult to separate them. Speer’s (2007) 
criticism appears to assume these epistemologies as fixed truths which can be 
easily distinguished from each other which may not be so. Such conflicts 
concerning the realist debates will continue in social constructionism (Edley, 
2001) and in a study of this size it is accepted those debates cannot be 
adequately explored. 
  
A particularly pervasive issue with ‘ESPD’ and associated terms such as 
‘callous-unemotional’ which has been raised by the proposers and the 
participants in this research, is that of ‘appropriate’ use (Vizaard et al., 2009). 
This begs the reflexive question, has this researcher ‘used’ ESPD 
appropriately? This is difficult to answer as appropriate usage is worked up 
in argument because ESPD is a construct, which like PD is poorly defined 
and takes on different forms across papers from ‘severe personality disorder 
 
emerging in childhood’ (Vizard, 2004) ‘emerging severe personality disorder 
traits in childhood’ (Vizard, 2007) to ‘early severe personality disorder’ 
(Vizard, 2009) according to context. As the proposers suggest we do need a 
common language to use, but it doesn’t seem we have one here and meaning 
varies widely amongst practitioners. This makes critical discursive work 
difficult, so it is acknowledged some participants (all of whom were familiar 
with the concept) may have been talking about different things. However, any 
confusion  might be further indicative of potentially serious clinical/research 
issues with terms drawn from ill-defined diagnostic constructs such as ‘PD’ 
or ‘psychopathy’ which often confound research validity and reliability in the 
positivist sciences (Livesley 2001) and could be an issue for future ESPD 
studies.  
Michel Foucault (1980) said he did not care to dictate how things should be 
in terms of a so-called ‘Foucaudian approach’ because, had he done so, he 
would have fallen foul of his own critique (Graham, 2005). Following from 
this, DA researchers are wary of dictating too far the potential 
implications/applications of research (Wetherell, et al., 2001). With that in 
mind, this author is somewhat cautious in stating what implications her 
research might have for ‘counselling psychology’ lest she falls foul of her 
own critical approach to reification processes and contradicts her 
epistemological standpoint. One must also be mindful that any statements 
made about this would necessarily assume that we know what counselling 
 
psychology ‘is’ which is made further problematic considering counselling 
psychology is a discipline which is heavily influenced by pluralism in 
philosophy and postmodern thought (See Clark & Loewenthal, 2014). To 
adequately consider the potential implications of this research for the 
discipline itself would require complex interrogation of what the discipline of 
counselling psychology was historically constructed and positioned against 
and the political aspects of this for therapy itself (for a brief review see Pugh 
& Coyle, 2000; Strawbridge & James, 2001). Unfortunately, there is no 
sufficient space for that here. However, when looked at in the most simplistic 
terms, some counselling psychologists would argue that counselling 
psychology has a ‘critical edge’ over other applied psychology disciplines 
(Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2010) and there are claims that its aims are focused 
towards social justice (Rostosky & Riggle, 2011) or political reform in 
applied psychology (Rubel & Ratts, 2011). If this is so (which this author 
would argue is highly debatable) then the potential implications of this piece 
for the discipline should be self-explanatory (Toporek & Vaughn, 2010). 
Moreover, (in terms of counselling psychology’s most simplistic 
representations of its identity) the current study’s critical focus on 
constructions of psychopathology, the political influence of  ‘standardised’ 
measures for assessment of constructs such as ‘personality’ or ‘psychopathy’ 
and it’s questioning what counts as ‘scientific evidence’ in particular contexts 
or what that ‘evidence’ might mean for a relational approach to subjectivities 
 
in the consulting room – does appear to echo particular factors which have 
been identified by other counselling psychologists and our registering body 
as central to the foundations and ‘identity’ of our discipline (See Strawbridge 
et al. 2010; BPS, 2005; Strawbridge & James, 2001). Therefore, if indeed 
these factors are integral to the discipline itself, then this research is an 
attempt to uphold integral foundational values of that discipline in knowledge 
production and dissemination. However, as Parker (1995) argues there may 
not actually be a place inside psychology for a truly critical psychology to 
start and this assertion appears to have more and more resonance for 
critically-focused counselling psychologists in the current political climate. 
So, in the most part, when taking into account another of counselling 
psychology’s principle focuses – that of ‘reflexive’ practices (Ely et al., 1999) 
it is hoped that while questioning the reification and objectification processes 
in psychiatric category construction, research like the present piece might 
primarily encourage the ‘counselling psychologist’ to reconsider their own 
place and the place of their discipline within those processes. Historical 
notions of our discipline as having some ethical or critical ‘edge’ over other 
applied psychology disciplines could lead us into a way of thinking about our 
own in ways which may help us to unwittingly dodge our own complicity in 
the construction and practice of disciplinary technologies on docile bodies 
(Foucault, 1977). While counselling psychologists proliferate in public 
services in a climate of epistemologically debatable ‘evidence-based practice’ 
 
(See Proctor, 2005) it is argued that research such as the current piece may 
indicate where the so-called ‘scientist-practitioner’ (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 
2010) should interrogate and revise their own influences in the constructions 
and reifications of ‘psychological intervention’ as it evolves further into a 
disciplinary technology (Foucault, 1977) by agents of social control (Cohen, 
1975) via the psy-complex (Rose, 1984) in a disconcerting era of risk politics 
















It has been argued that there are no definitive or simple ways to decide what 
is a good or bad discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1997) most probably due to 
these binary language categories being far too close to notions of objective 
truths in themselves (Smith et al., 2010). However, it is hoped what has been 
presented here by a novice DA researcher is a good enough DA study (Smith, 
2004). Alhough, in consideration of the methodology in conjunction with the 
researcher’s intentions, one would like to discount the notion of a 
‘conclusion’ per se. This research was not intended as an objective final word. 
Instead it is intended as a piece which picked up from issues concerning the 
use of this ESPD term and others like it and should be seen as another 
discourse, bringing about an alternative version and possibly new research 
opportunities or hypotheses (Potter & Wetherell, 1987:171). This is hoped to 
encourage further debate about the ESPD terminology and those children who 








Appendix I  
 
Timeline of events, publications and discourses of relevance to the study 
These are supplied for the reader to give context to some of the events 
mentioned in the main study. References for the papers and publication are 
in the main references. These are not exhaustive.  
 
1993  
James Bulger aged two is killed by Robert Thompson and Jon Venables. 
Both are aged ten and known as Boy A and Boy B 
1993  
Shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair speaks about the Bulger Murder in 
House of Commons   
1993  
Thompson and Venables are tried as adults in an adult court for Murder, 
Trial Judge Justice Morland controversially allows the boys to be named 
1993 
 Eileen Vizard gives evidence of Robert Thompson’s moral culpability 
1993 
Robert Thompson receives a longer sentence than Jon Venables 
1994  
Home Secretary Michael Howard intervenes in Thompson and Venables 
Tarriff increasing it to 15 years for each 
1996  
Lin Russell and Daughter Megan are murdered by Michael Stone 
1996  





New Labour Government come to power after 18 years of conservative rule 
in UK 
1997  
White paper ‘No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime 
in England and Wales’ is published 
1997  
Howards intervention in minimum sentence for Bulger Murder is overturned 
by House of Lords 
1997 
Doli Incapax is abolished 
1997  
Dedicated ‘Social Exclusion unit’ is set up by New Labour 
1998  
Michael Stone is convicted of the Russell Murders  
1998  
Crime and Disorder Act  
1999  
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999  
Managing dangerous people with severe personality disorders  (DSPD) 
programme initiative green paper 
2000  
Victoria Climbie is murdered 
2001  
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables are released on life-licence after 8 
years in secure units. Home Secretary David Blunkett adds his own 




Laming Review of Climbie case shows 12 occasions where services failed 
to intervene and save Victoria’s life 
2001  
800 children under 15 were given custodial sentences (up from 100 in 1992) 
2001  
Independent review is published stating Michael Stone was not refused 
psychiatric services  
2002  
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child formally raise 
concerns about the youth justice policy and practice in England and Wales 
2002  
Lord Laming reopens the Victoria Climbie inquiry after it is revealed key 
social services documents were not submitted 
2002  
Two social workers are sacked for gross misconduct in the Climbie case 
2003  
Respect and Responsibility: taking a stand against anti-social behaviour 
paper is published 
2003  
House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights 
state concern about criminalising interventions at a young age and 
extraordinarily high rates of child incarceration 
2004  
First Proposal for Emerging Severe Personality Disorder  
2007  
Jon Venables is re-called to prison after child pornography charges. Robert 
Thompson is thought to be rehabilitated. 
2007  
Baby ‘P’ or Peter Connelly in found dead in his cot 
 
2007 
 Early Intervention in PD conference 
2007  
Inquiry into Baby ‘P’ Case details service failures  
2007  
First ESPD study is funded by the Ministry of Justice 
2009  
The ‘J children’ violently and sexually assault two children  
2009  
Social exclusion conference paper is released 
2009  
Leaked report in baby ‘P’ case shows further missed opportunities to save 
him 
2009  
Eileen Vizard is exert witness in ‘J’ children case 
2010  
The Omand Review: Independent serious further offence review: The case 
of Jon Venables is published and states there were no indications of sexual 
interests in children 
2011  
The Graham Allen Report, The Next Steps: Early Intervention is published 
2011  
The UK riots take place 
2012  





James Bulger Murder 
In 1993 two year old James Bulger was abducted from a shopping centre in 
Bootle Liverpool by two ten year old boys. They took him on a walk and on 
to a railway line where he was subjected to an attack by the two boys who 
pelted him with stones, removed his lower garments, threw paint and batteries 
at him, beat him with bars and finally laid him across the railway track. The 
boys then covered his face with his underpants and stones and left his body 
there to be cut in two by an on-coming train (Smith, 2011: 89). Despite the 
shocking nature of the case, detailed histories of childhood and murder show 
that such behaviour by children is not new or as exceptional as is often 
claimed (Loach, 2010). There were also other similar cases around the same 
time such as the Silje Redergard case in Norway in 1994, where three six year 
old boys asked five year old Silje to undress and then took it in turns to punch 
and kick her, beat her with stones and stomp on her body before leaving her 
to die of hypothermia in the snow (Green, 2010:7). In the Redergard case, 
none of the perpetrators were prosecuted as they were below the age of 
criminal responsibility (15 years old in Norway) and the case became solely 
a matter for welfare and psychological services and, in keeping with 
Norwegian law the press were required to keep confidential the names of the 
purpetrators and their families which can be starkly contrasted with the events 
following the Bulger case (Green, 2010:8). Robert Thompson and Jon 
 
Venables were tried for murder in an adult crown court and Eileen Vizard 
provided expert testimony (Morrison, 1997). A catalogue of errors were noted 
across the case, from issues concerning the trial of the boys as adults (EHCR, 
1999, HMCS, 2000, UNCRC, 2000) and the trial judge’s decision regarding 
removing the boys right to anonymity in line with public and press demand 
(Gillan, 1999) which has lead to considerable (and on-going) public cost in 
providing the perpetrators with new identities and police protection, 
particularly in the case of Jon Venables who re-offended on child 
pornography charges and was re-called to prison via his life licence in 2010 
















DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2000:701) 
fourth edition (DSM-IV-TR) currently defines ASPD (in Axis II Cluster B) 
as:  
A) There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the 
rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three or 
more of the following:  
1. failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful 
behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are 
grounds for arrest; 
2. deception, as indicated by repeatedly lying, use of aliases, or 
conning others for personal profit or pleasure; 
3. impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; 
4. irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated 
physical fights or assaults; 
5. reckless disregard for safety of self or others; 
6. consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to 
sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial 
obligations; 
 
7. lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or 
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another; 
B) The individual is at least age 18 years. 
C) There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 
years. 
D) The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the 


















The PCL-R Items 
Each item is scored as either: 0 = not present; 1 = possibly present or 2 = 
definitely present. In order for an item to be scored as present there should be 
evidence throughout the lifetime of the individual and across several domains 
of functioning. This necessary factor brings significant issue with the youth 
version (Malatesti & McMillan, 2010). 
Assessment relies on the triangulation of evidence in order to effectively 
assess the interpersonal features represented in factors 1 and 2. Once scored 
on each item, those scores are summed.  
An individual's score is then compared to those obtained in a normative 
sample, and scores are reported on that basis. Hare suggests that scores over 
30 indicate psychopathy. However, debates continue regarding whether a 
dichotomous or dimensional approach should be taken to PCL-R scores (e.g. 
Hare 1998; Weaver et al, 2006).  
For further information see Hare, R.D., Clarke, D. A., Grann, M. & 
Thornton, D. (2000) Psychopathy and the Predictive Validity of the PCL-R: 
An International Perspective. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 18, 623-
645. 
 
Item  Factor  Facet  Item  
1  1  1  Glibness/Superficial charm  
2  1  2  Grandiose Sense of self worth  
3  2  3  Need for stimulation/Proneness to 
boredom  
4  1  1  Pathological lying  
5  1  1  Conning/Manipulative  
6  1  2  Lack of remorse or guilt  
7  1  2  Shallow Affect  
8  1  2  Callous/Lack of empathy  
9  2  3  Parasitic Lifestyle  
10  2  4  Poor behavioural controls  
 
11  -  -  Promiscuous sexual behaviour  
12  2  4  Early behavioural problems  
13  2  3  Lack of realistic, long term goals  
14  2  3  Impulsivity  
15  2  3  Irresponsibility  
16  1  2  Failure to accept responsibility for 
own actions  
17  -  -  Many short term marital 
relationships  
18  2  4  Juvenile delinquency  
19  2  4  Revocation of conditional release  






















To meet the DSPD criteria men must be assessed as:  
 
1. Being more likely than not to commit an offence that might be expected to 
lead to serious physical or psychological harm, from which the victim would 
find it difficult or impossible to recover. 
 
2. Having a severe personality disorder, as determined by one of the 
following: 
 
i) A high psychopathy score, as measured by the PCL-R (indicated by a score 
of more than 30) 
 
ii) A PCL-R score of 25 or more, plus at least one personality disorder 
(excluding antisocial), according to ICD-10 or DSM-IV criteria. 
 
iii) Two or more personality disorders (including antisocial), according to 
ICD-10 or DSM-IV criteria. 
 
 
3. Having a link between their personality disorder and previous offence(s) 
and/or offence-like behaviour in prison/hospital. 
 
4. There must be a functional link established between their dangerous 






































                                                                                   
clarkd12@roehampton.ac.uk 
                                                                                   Contact number 




I am writing to you to request your time to participate in a doctorate level 
research project. I am a student at the University of Roehampton, London 
and I would very much welcome the chance to come and interview you at 
your convenience. 
I have set out the project below and I have provided both details of the study 
topic and information about the research and interviews and I have enclosed 




Title of Project 
  
A critical discourse analytic study of practitioner understandings of Emerging 
Severe Personality Disorder (ESPD) in childhood  
 
 
Brief description of study 
 
Participants will be interviewed in a semi-structured format about ESPD in 
childhood. Interviews will take no more than 90 minutes. Interviews will be 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. They will be transcribed on a PC and 
analysed using Discourse Analysis. All participants will remain anonymous 
and all identifying material will be edited out of the recording and transcript. 
All data will be collected, handled and stored in line with BPS ethical 
guidelines for human research. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me directly should you want any other 
information before committing to an actual interview or to make 
arrangements to meet for an interview. I have also added my Director of 
Studies contact details below for your convenience.  







Director of Studies Contact Details:  
 











































PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
WorkingTitle of Project 
 
Practitioner understandings of Emerging Severe Personality Disorder 
(ESPD) in childhood  
 
 
Brief description of study 
 
Participants will be interviewed in a semi-structured format about ESPD in 
childhood. Interviews will take no more than 90 minutes. Interviews will be 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. They will be transcribed on a PC and 
analysed using Discourse Analysis. All participants will remain anonymous 
and all identifying material will be edited out of the recording and transcript. 
All data will be collected, handled and stored in line with BPS ethical 
guidelines for human research. 
 








 I agree to take part in this research and I am aware that I am free to 
withdraw at any point. I can do this by contacting the investigator who 
will remove all data pertaining to me from the study. 
 I understand that the information I provide will be treated in 
confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected 
in the publication of any findings. 
  I have been made fully aware that should I disclose information about 
possible harm to myself or others, that there are limits to 
confidentiality and I have been made fully aware that in this 
circumstance the researcher would alert their supervisors and 
Director of studies and the relevant support and or authorities. I 
understand this is a normal policy in psychology research to 








Please note: You will be verbally briefed and debriefed at participation stage. 
However, if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any 
other queries please raise this with the investigator. You may also wish to 
contact the researchers Director of Studies as the researcher is a student. 
However, should you wish to speak to an independent party, unconnected to 
the research, or would like support following participation Head of 
Department details are supplied below for your convenience. 
 
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:   
 














Head of Department Contact Details: 
 





















Transcription Conventions   
 
These transcription conventions are adapted from Gail Jefferson (see 
Atkinson & Heritage, 1984: ix-xvi).   
 
Symbols used Indicate:    
° °                 Encloses speech that is quieter than the surrounding talk 
(1)             Pause length in seconds.  If presented as  
(.)                Pause is too short to measure 
 -                  Word broken off  
↑                Rising intonation  
↓                Lowering intonation  
CAPITAL     Talk that is louder than the surrounding talk  
Underline  emphasis 
 > <              Encloses speeded-up talk  
.hhh             In-breath  
hhh              Out-breath   
[ ]                 Overlapping speech  
( )                 Encloses words the transcriber is unsure about.  
 { }                Refers to tone or gesture, e.g. {laughs}  






Appendix IX: Sample transcript 
 
 
Int: Okay (.)  the labelling of children and young people with personality 
disorders, or  emerging personality disorders is often considered controversial by 
clinicians and therapists and I wondered how you feel about that? 
Par:      I would agree it is controversial, I think the problem when you (1) I think 
one, personality disorder, to infer somebody’s got a disordered personality, I think 
in its self is quite damaging for a young person and I think once they’ve got a label 
like that attached to their (.) to their name, I mean it kind of has a lot of negative 
impact for the young person themselves. I also think there’s often very strong 
branded terms that come alongside personality disorder the word manipulative gets 
used all the time /erm/ 
callous, that they’re /erm/ (.) so you see the person very differently when 
the term PD is kind of associated with it. So I think, well (.) with any label, 
I think it helps explain a cluster of symptoms if you will but it also has a 
lot of damaging effects because of (.) /erm/ the label itself has caused a lot 
of problems for people in the past, I think, so I don’t particularly think it’s 
helpful (1) not only that I think it has a lot of impact in terms of excluding 
from services. I’ve known when I’ve worked in Adult with people who’ve 
got a label of personality disorder and you are trying to engage them in 
different services in the community or you’re trying to engage them in 
different treatments /erm/ many, many, many services have on their 
exclusion criteria personality disorder because they see it as /erm/ too 
complex or it’s too difficult to treat or (.) so it’s very excluding for a lot of 
people in terms of the label 
 
Int:     absolutely, and I mean you brought up treatment, obviously having worked 
at [….] 
Par:     Mmmm 
Int:     and working with (.) /erm/ did you work with DSPD? 
Par:    No, I worked in the mental health unit but obviously if people had a 
diagnosis of mental health and various different personality disorders, sort 
of labels they’d been attached to along the way 
Int:     Well, this label that has been proposed of Emerging Severe Personality 
Disorder, how do you    feel about that one? 
Par:    (.hhh) I think it’s just a very, very worrying one. The terms before (1) 
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (.) the term, you find it very 
much in the media and it causes kind of panic, so how, is that (.) you know, 
in terms of how a child (.) how a child perceives that label themselves? but 
also how others will perceive that child? and they will see them in a very 
different way rather than the child themselves and what’s (.) what’s 
happened for the child in order to get to that point? Therefore what are the 
needs of the child? The label kind of takes over doesn’t it? I would say so 
Int:     Precisely 
Par:   (.hhh) worrying (1) and I don’t particularly like it in adults, you know, so I 
think, in young people it’s even more concerning. A lot of their 
personalities are still yet to develop and there’s a lot of development - and 
there’s a lot of ways - you know there’s huge amounts of young people that 
will offend in their youth and then go on to, to, you know, the offending 
kind of diminishes and they go on to have, kind of, relatively normal happy 
 
lives so how can you put a label on child like that and (.) and kind of 
restrict many things and access to many different things, um and y’know 
what I mean? 
Int:     Yes 
Par:    and it’s kind of worrying, I mean how do you know? Cause it is worrying, 
there is a few of the young children who offend and do go on to have life-
long problems and life-long offending even, I think determining that from 
a young age is kind of setting the scene for what’s going to happen in the 
future, and that’s(.) that’s not always true. You can’t always predict what’s 
going to happen to these young people. 
Int:    it sounds like it has a predictive value? 
Par:    ↑Yes, yes, yes 
Int:    predictive? 
Par:   ↑Yeah, Yeah 
Int:    I guess in secure units working therapeutically  
Par:    [=Yeah?] 
Int:    what would that label say to you, or to other clinician’s? 
Par:    I just don’t see the benefit of it at all. We have, you know, I think about (.) 
I use attachment theory a lot, I mean that’s a lot of my work is kind of 
hitched on the theory of attachment and many, many, well probably all of 
the children we see have had very disruptive, very difficult early lives and 
so, that first three years of life /erm/ when your brain is developed, you 
know and they’ve had a lot of developmental trauma, that’s what I see as 
having the impact on the difficulties that they’re - that we see every day 
 
with the young people that we work with and there’s lots and lots and lots 
of evidence that shows, yes, it’s very difficult for children who have been 
kind of subject to developmental trauma in their early years to make 
improvements in their early attachments but we know that it can happen 
and we know that these children can improve. There’s brain studies that 
actually show that their brains can, the connections can be re-made, but, 
that haven’t connected in the young child, when they were growing naught 
to three, so we can see that there are improvements that can be made, but 
in terms of putting a label like that on - I think it’s really damaging and I 
know when you see them, and when children are put into an environment 
like this [secure unit] where they’re cared for, nurtured, loved, they’re (.)  
they’re kept secure, they are given boundaries we can see the huge 
amounts of progress that’s made when, if you read on a piece of paper how 
much of a risk they are in the community and how much damage they’ve 
done and all this different kind of stuff, you might need to put a label on 
their difficulties, but it doesn’t make a difference when they come in here 
and we see how much they improve so I don’t see how a label like that 
would kind of help really. It doesn’t make sense. 
Int:    So, what really came across strongly there was the importance of the 
relationship, to what you do therapeutically 
Par:    Uh-huh 
Int:     That the relationship appears to be the therapeutic factor 
Par:    Oh yeah (.) yep, yep 
 
Int:     and I was just thinking(.) how do you think referring to ESPD would affect 
the work that you do? 
Par:  Well, it’s different when you’re a therapist because like you do see (1) you 
know you read the notes you see all these kind of things, particularly in 
adult forensic because there’s lots of labels brandished around and used to 
try and describe somebody’s pattern of behaviour so you get(.) you read a 
file and you see the behaviours which are always very risky and you see 
different labels associated with them and then you meet the actual person 
and they’re just a person underneath it all and you are trying to work with  
the person through the therapeutic relationship and the relationship is key, 
like you said, so I think therapeutically, it’s the same with any other label 
you’re working with the person beyond the label, so I think Emerging 
Severe (.) Dangerous Severe Personality has negative connotations 
immediately as soon as you read it but once you meet the person, you do 
get beyond (.) you will get beyond that, like you do get beyond any other 
label really in terms of /erm/ (.) but, then it’s how others perceive it for me 
– people who maybe don’t work therapeutically, who (.) who might make 
judgements about that person who might feel extremely anxious about 
working with somebody with dangerous or severe personality disorder who 
may, y’know? its other services, who, y’know (1) we have different panic 
reactions from lots of different people in terms of the label its self so I 
think it’s more how other people would respond to it rather than (1) I think 
therapeutically it wouldn’t have much of an impact on me, I don’t think, 
 
well, /erm/ I just don’t think I would like it, the effect. I don’t think it 
would be effective for the child and I don’t see what benefit it would be 
Int:  A minute ago you mentioned the media, and obviously we are talking here 
about cases of young people causing serious cases of interpersonal 
violence and I just wondered what you thought might have contributed to 
these proposals?  
Par:  Yeah, well I think there’s lots in the media about when people - when they 
are released into the community and they re-offend, so there’s a lot about 
that sense of ‘they’ve let them out too early and it’s all that sort of ‘it’s the 
services fault’ and all that kind of thing and therefore there’s often some 
kind of idea about how can we detain this young person or people longer 
than (.) /erm/ you know, in order to reduce the fear politically about 
particularly high profile cases that come to light and that get kind of 
branded in the press, so you see that a lot in adult under Dangerous Severe 
Personality Disorder where it’s been sort of quite political and high profile, 
then they are seen not to want to release that person based on not wanting 
to be seen to be the people that have released them, rather than it being 
based on the person’s risk. That’s the worry (.) it should always be based 
on risk rather than on political reasons and not wanting to be seen as the 
person that’s released them. So it’s, I think in terms of young offenders, 
it’s the same thing. You get the odd very high profile young offender that 
comes to light and erm, people don’t like the idea of releasing them, so, 
that may be part of it I don’t know 
Int:  And how does the media affect you, working with these children? 
 
Par:  /erm/ 
Int:  Well, reading between the lines - 
Par:  [=Yeah] 
Int:   you think ESPD could be used as some form of excuse? /erm/ if a young 
person did re-offend ‘Well they had this, there was nothing we could do 
with them’? 
Par:  Yeah, well, yeah. That’s possibly an issue isn’t it? Yeah, an excuse in 
terms of services you mean? 
Int:  Mmm 
Par:  In terms of saying we could not deal with them because they’ve got that. 
Mmmm, yeah, mmmm, that’s probably a point. I think as well, in terms of 
the media, you just get so cross, because people just don’t understand, they 
don’t know what’s going on behind - (.) they just see the behaviour and 
what they have done, so I’ll just be like throwing my pen at the TV or 
something, I get quite cross. It just infuriates me because of the lack of 
awareness and understanding but not just (.) It’s, it’s not so much what’s 
reported but, well that gets me cross, but its more, kind of politically the 
reaction to it, to things like that. I’m a huge believer in early intervention 
and early attachment and all the kind of - that’s where most of the 
resources need to go in terms of helping these young people at an early age 
and you can see it developing and you can see the difficulties, but unless 
people, politicians start thinking about the long term implications of (.) of 
putting more in place in the early years, then this is going to be (1) this is 
going to become more of an issue. I just feel like sometimes we deal with -
 
we criminalise too early, too quickly and don’t see the difficulties these 
young people have as a social problem. That’s what we need to be doing 
more and I guess with that will come the media thinking about it in a 
different way, because it’s both politically and the media that criminalise 
these young people and so, until something changes politically I don’t 
think the media will follow so (.) 
Int:  Absolutely, and I just wondered along with that, as you were sort of 
saying, with the early intervention, many of the children in that ESPD 
study had been incredibly let down in their formative years 
Par:  [=Mmmm] 
Int:   I just wondered what you thought about that 
Par:  I agree, the difficulty is it’s kind of, you know, the developmental trauma 
that in every, single (.) well, I’m sure there’s exceptions, but you know as 
soon as you meet them, with every offender I have ever worked with, you 
can see the trauma they’ve experienced from a young age in various 
different ways and it’s not just a class thing, it’s across cultures, its across 
– (.) You know that these people have had tough lives and not had the best 
opportunities, so you know part of our role is about how can you give these 
young people the best opportunities to try and change some of that to make 
a difference? And we do have many success stories so we know that it can 
work and things can change but obviously the greater the trauma and the 
more difficult the experience of the child then the greater the difficulty to 
do that so, I think labelling them with a sort of Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorder label has a huge impact on that person when they’ve 
 
experienced such difficulties. But I do understand on the other hand /erm/ 
the concerns about risk because we do have some young people in here, 
who because of their early experiences of life, you know, I would argue, 
because of the developmental trauma they have experienced, their brains 
haven’t developed in the way that a secure child has developed so in terms 
of their ability to empathise, their ability to show remorse, their brain 
hasn’t connected in that way for them to be able to do that. So, I do 
understand that a lot of the young people we see are very risky and 
therefore we have concerns when its coming to release and things like that, 
when its coming up to release them into the community, and whether, you 
know, if that young person is, you know, safe enough to do that. So I think 
it’s how we manage that and I think there has to be ways to help /erm/ with 
different orders to protect the public but also to protect that young person 
from kind of a life sentence or whatever, so there is a kind of seeing the 
individual but there’s also the managing the risk, and we do have to do 
that, does that make sense? 
Int:  Yes 
Par:  So a lot of (.) some of the young people that we see /erm/ are extremely (.) 
If they’re on a sentence where they’re gonna be released and are still 
extremely high risk and there are a lot of mental health issues / erm/ we 
might look at kind of getting them sectioned if we are concerned about 
their high level of risk but also their risk to themselves and all the mental 
health reasons and if we don’t think they are safe in the community /erm/ 
and that and I guess that’s where the anxiety about this label is coming 
 
from, its like what do we do with these young people? But, my worry is, 
why do you need to stick a label like that on these young people when they 
have clearly got mental health problems and they’ve got - do you know 
what I mean? 
Int:  yes 
Par:  You know, what’s the problem with what works now? You know, I guess 
my question is (.) we, we seem to deal with them okay now, they end up in 
a mental health facility for a while, while they can help reduce their risk 
and also address their mental health needs and they have regular tribunals 
and they get released when their risk is lowered and they are safe enough 
to be released so I don’t understand why a label like that would have to, 
would have to come into play really and one that sticks with them for life, I 
mean how do we decide when dangerous and severe personality disorder is 
no longer dangerous and severe? 
Int:  Or when it’s emerged? 
Par:   
Yep
  
Int:  Or doesn’t emerge? 
Par:  Or when it’s emerging? You know we’ve got a child in here now, who 
initially we had a lot of concerns about regarding his lack of ability to 
empathise, his lack of remorse, he really struggled to relay anything 
emotionally and it’s taken a long, long, long time and very, very, drip, drip, 
drip, and we are just starting to see little bits, and it is little bits, but this a 
 
child who, six months ago, you might have given that label ESPD or 
emerging psychopath or all the horrible terms that you could think about, 
but actually now you’d probably see him and think very differently so, you 
know it’s very dangerous. I think, looking at a child and the risk that they 
are at the time when they are in a violent (.) when they’ve come from an 
environment that’s very chaotic that’s very (.) you know, there’s not a lot 
around them in terms of structure and boundaries and nothing to protect 
them and look after them, to six months down the line when they’ve had a 
lot of that, then things can change quite quickly, then I guess when do you 
decide to put that label on them? Because my experience of when people 
have been diagnosed with personality disorder it’s been kind of two, three 
separate session assessments based on where they are now and the 
historical factors and, and then its decided.  So, when does that, when 
you’ve got that label, when does that change? When does that label (.) 
cause it doesn’t does it? It stays with them and so for young people who’ve 
had extremely chaotic lives, you need to try them in lots of different 
contexts and you’ll find (1) it’s about protecting them and about giving 
them the best chance in order for things to improve, and for them to make 
the connections they haven’t made when they were younger, because they 
weren’t able to, because they didn’t have the opportunities, so, does that 
kind of make sense?  
Int:  It makes perfect sense and you know again, it’s back to relationships, 
something that you know ‘Callous-Unemotional’ ‘High-Risk/High-Harm’ 
all of these kind of - 
 
Par:  [=Narcisicistic] 
Int:  Narcisicistic 
Par:  Mmmm 
Int:   if you see ‘Callous-Unemotional’ hasn’t got any empathy, well then they 
can’t basically do relationships 
Par:  Yeah, Yeah 
Int:  and what you were saying they are not held 
Par:  they are not contained 
Int:  but one of the things you were saying there you know ‘why do we need 
this?’ one of the, one of the things that was said was that we need this for 
management and identification of these young people but it sounds to me 
like you already know who they are? 
Par:  Yeah, Yeah 
Int:  and you are already managing them 
Par:  Yeah, why do we have to stick a label on it again? Which is the question 
isn’t it? And I think it’s, that it’s, often I think when legislation becomes an 
issue because why can’t you say ‘these are the kind of behaviours, these 
are the emotions, this is the mental health, why can’t you do a holistic kind 
of assessment and say because of that this young person is extremely high 
risk and we don’t feel at the moment we’ve done enough to reduce that risk 
because of du, duh, duh, duh, duh, duh, duh? and this is what they 
therefore need in order to continue to reduce the risk? That’s what we do 
now, why not continue to do this? Why does there have to be a label put on 
that person in order to (1) and you know its legislation isn’t it? That’s kind 
 
of what’s maybe pushing for this in order to (.) like it is in adult and I just 
don’t understand, there’s too much change with a young person’s life, 
there’s too many factors that influence at that age that you can’t (.) you 
can’t predict (.) you can’t stick a label on it. It’s not static, its relational and 
these young people, it’s amazing what changes they can make when they 
are given a different environment, a different kind of nurture, different 
kind of relationships that they’ve never had, you can’t, you can’t say that 
that’s it, a label like that is lifelong and it’s not something that’s seen as 
though it can change, so it’s (.) I (.) It’s very worrying people are thinking 
like that you know, even if, like I said, if you can take a more holistic 
approach and pull all the factors together about why they are a risk, 
because that’s all they are worrying about isn’t it? It’s all about risk, and 
yes, I would agree some young people are. I would say ‘I don’t want that 
young person on the streets tomorrow they are not safe, they’re not, they’re 
too high risk based on the amount of trauma they’ve experienced or the 
amount of, /erm/, their inability to regulate their emotions or their /erm/, 
their need to kind of fulfil, /erm/, adrenalin-type kind of things, their 
relational problems, their family issues, their lack of support in the 
community all the different, millions of different factors, substance-misuse 
issues’ all of those kind of things (1) Why can’t you use that type of 
holistic approach to say because of these they are a risk and then you can 
manage the risks independently, you can look at them and say ‘Well, this 
seems to be improving, duh, duh, duh’ whereas Personality Disorder is 
more concrete you are saying, because of all the terms, ‘un-treatability’ all 
 
those kind of connotations come with that and at the moment that’s not 
going to change and hasn’t changed for a long, long time and so if you’re 
sticking that on a young person, who’s very changeable and manageable 
and can be moulded at this stage it’s just (.) horrendous 
Int:  and what I notice there you kept making a link there each time with ‘what 
has happened to this child?’ and it must be mentioned every time in 
context with that child 
Par:  ↑Yes! Yes! Yes!  
Int:   and Emerging Severe Personality Disorder doesn’t tell us anything about 
what that child has experienced themselves, no matter what they’ve done 
Par:  ↓ No, No 
Int:  you know, you don’t put a child into a secure unit, just for 
Par:  [=it’s last] 
Int:  It’s a last, last resort so we know the cases we are talking about, so it’s not 
sort of ‘bleeding heart’ labelling sort of stuff? 
Par:  {Shakes head} 
Int:  but what really stood out and has stood out in everything you’ve been 
saying, is this need to keep mentioning, you know, this is what’s gone 
before and I was just wondering if, you know the label sort of (.) takes that 
child’s behaviour out of context for you? 
Par:  Yeah, completely 
Int:  and I was just wondering how that would help to understand them better? 
Par:  well it doesn’t does it, it makes it sometimes worse because at least, I felt, 
not long ago, they had the /erm/ ‘Doncaster Boy’s’  
 
Int:  In Edlington? 
Par:  Yes 
Int:  Yes 
Par:  and I read a couple of newspaper articles and /erm/ I felt, and there was 
lots of negative stuff as there so often is politically, but I also felt, 
comparing it to the Bulger case (.) who were (.) these were ‘evil boys’ was 
the front page and they were born evil and duh, duh, duh, duh and I felt, 
with the Edlington boys, there was a slight shift, they were saying they 
were from a very, very (1) it acknowledged that they were from a very, 
very difficult background, their parents had loads of issues, and I think 
‘toxic upbringing’ was a term that was used, but I felt that for a start people 
were starting to see that these weren’t evil born individuals that from aged 
10 should be locked up for life, that they were saying these are very(.) you 
know they’ve had a very difficult time of it and so that’s taken how many 
years since the Bulger Case, for even a slight shift to see that these young 
people don’t just behave this way in isolation, its due to many, many 
different factors. I’m not excusing their behaviour but it’s about 
understanding what on earth has happened in these children’s early life for 
them to be so damaged to do the kind of damage that they do to others and 
that’s the same as every young person we see here, so if, and it is about 
understanding, it’s(.) its seeing it as a social problem, not, that, this isn’t a 
problem that they are born this way and that, you know we’re born to 
socialise and that’s what human beings are, we need that appropriate care 
and socialisation in order for our brains to develop and that’s why we are 
 
born so early, all the kind of early attachment stuff and so we need (1) and 
it’s about getting people to understand that and understand why young 
people who’ve been severely kind of abused aren’t able to empathise and 
aren’t able, because it’s never been developed. They’ve never had that 
development and that label takes all that understanding away and it’s 
taken, gosh, god knows how long to get people to start thinking about that 
and a lot of politician’s are thinking about early intervention and looking at 
the impact, like the Graham Allen report, it’s fantastic, it’s looking at, 
y’know, why early intervention is so key and by getting it in early and 
helping protect these kid’s at a young age, the amount of, damage 
limitation is huge! Financially as well, because that’s obviously the 
political (1) 
Int:  Of course, economics, yes 
Par:  because if you think, if you stop a child, if you protect a child at naught to 
three age from the abuse that they’re (1) you know, they can make a lot 
more significant repair than the ones we see all the time that have kind of 
not had the protection that they needed. They’ve been emotionally abused, 
if not physically, sexually and neglected for significant amounts of time, so 
their (.) The developmental trauma they’ve experienced is so prolific that 
they experience extremely high-risk behaviours (1) which is what we see 
and so, the kind of amount of money that costs,/erm/ in terms of keeping 
them in secure units, school exclusions, paying for placements, looked 
after children, all the things that cost so much money and it just makes 
sense, so that’s how we need to view these young people, that’s how we 
 
need to see it as a society and that we need to help, support and see it as a 
social and emotional problem rather than giving them a label that rather 
has connotations about risk. You see the label, the behaviour and the risk, 
that’s all you see, rather than the full whole picture. 
Int:  You know talking about the Edlington case, I was just wondering how 
would the ESPD label, and these young boys would fit the criteria for it, 
how would that have prevented anything?  
Par:  Mmmm 
Int:  Because they are already linked in? 
Par:  Mmm, yes, well I guess it’s the same with anything though, its like are 
they wanting to use the label to take them off the streets quicker in terms of 
going down the mental health facilities, I don’t know what they’re thinking 
is behind it as to whether (2) 
Int:  its not clear? 
Par:  it’s not clear, it, its (.) Oh, I don’t think that would happen a great deal 
more because it all comes down to money a lot of the time and that’s awful 
but a lot of the young people that’s out there that are huge risks that don’t 
get section 25’s because of the huge amount of money it costs the local 
authority to keep a child in local authority so, in /erm/ different facilities, 
mental health facilities or all these different facilities, so I don’t know in 
terms of politically what the, what difference it would have made? I don’t 
know (.) I don’t know. It depends on what the thinking behind it is, 
whether it’s something that they /erm/ I don’t know 
 
Int:  The proposal is not really clear (1) and although I want to asks you loads 
of questions, I know you have got to get on 
Par:  {laughs} Yeah 
Int:  so the last thing I sort of wanted to ask you was have you ever worked with 
a child that you sort of think may have met the criteria for this sort of label 
Par:  {Loud sigh} 
Int:  or would you not even - 
Par:  Yeah, well I’ve no real idea what the criteria really would be, I mean I’ve 
met, a lot, lot, lot of young people who would come under sort of 
personality labels, Personality Disorder labels, i.e.  Borderline Personality 
Disorder, Anti-Social Personality Disorder, Schizoid Personality Disorder, 
you can give every child you ever see one of the labels that determines(.) 
you know, but again it’s how you see it, and I don’t see it in that way, and 
there’s a great article by Olans and Levy and they talk about (.) they’re 
American, so they kind of talk very much about how you know early 
attachment history and anti-social personality disorder is becoming huge, 
bigger and bigger because of the way communities have broken up and the 
way families breakdown and all the different difficulties in early 
attachments and things like that, so (sigh) I don’t know what the criteria for 
the Dangerous Personality Disorders is and whether that links in with 
psychopathy and the hare psychopathy scale 
Int:  There’s a youth version 
Par:  Yeah 
Int:  which doesn’t fit the construct properly 
 
Par:  yeah 
Int:  So there’s an issue there? Psychopathy is an adult construct, but that’s how 
they are-  
Par:  they are diagnosing through the-  
Int:  Psychopathy checklist youth version 
Par:  Yeah, right, and again (.) yeah (.) and I think it’s worrying and I think it 
has happened here, that they were either concerned about one young man 
who was a huge, huge, huge, risk and they were wondering about whether 
(1) and I think that’s the only person that they’ve ever had here that they 
thought would meet the criteria and so use the psychopathy checklist 
Int:  Really? Only one? 
Par:  Only one (.) only one 
Int:  Really? That’s very interesting 
Par:  He was the only one, the only one and again, if you see the trauma in the 
kids we see here who’ve experienced horrific traumas in their lives  (.) 
This young man had experienced horrific maternal abuse and the mother 
had committed a lot of offences with him and […….] (1) Horrific, horrific 
stories (1) so in terms of his ability to empathise and that kind of thing, 
again it becomes an issue of ‘We’re worried about this young person, how 
can we protect the public and also keep him protected as well?’ because we 
knew that by leaving him, he’d go out and commit another offense, 
something quite severe(.) So it’s about, I think, legislation needs to kind of 
help the process in protecting, you know there are some people who we 
feel are too risky to leave when they are here in the centre, it’s different for 
 
welfare, because that gets reviewed and the court can decide whether they 
keep them here longer. The issue, I guess, is for the young people who are 
on a determinate sentence, /erm/ who’re given a length of time here and 
then they leave and there’s huge, huge, huge risks and I guess that’s where 
this is coming from in terms of what do we do with these young people and 
I guess I’m not disputing that that is an issue, because it is an issue /erm/ 
and I certainly wouldn’t want him living in my street based on the huge 
number of risks he had, but that was taken away, what needed to be 
thought about was the amount of trauma this young boy had experienced 
from birth, horrific, horrific, horrific abuse and so it’s how do we as 
society protect the public from, y’know somebody who’s such high risk? 
So yes, I don’t think he was ready to leave when he did, so how do we do 
that? How do we manage that in a safe way without (1) I wouldn’t use a 
label like this or legislation like that to do that, but I guess it’s how else 
you do you it? and we seem to be finding ways at the moment that fit under 
mental health but I think, you know, I guess, that’s the political drive, you 
know thinking how do we do this? And how is it when they do, you know 
if you were to go down the mental health route again for me, for the young 
person, how do you take that label away to then say, he needs to show he’s 
reduced his risk and he’s safe and I think that has to be paramount doesn’t 
it?  
Int:  Yes 
Par:  That’s very important, isn’t it?  
Int:  Yes, absolutely 
 
Par:  So it’s important to look at all the different factors and then reduce them 
and see them as dynamic and yes there are static factors that are kind of 
historical and can’t change but there’s things that can change. Severe 
Personality Disorder is a very, very difficult label to kind of show you’ve 
reduced your risk for it, and that kind of thing so, I guess that’s the real 
issue really (.) and although I can understand the context that its coming 
from to some extent and it is a concern /erm/ and the same when I worked 
at [……..] and we had people who were coming to the end of their prison 
sentence and then they were shipped off to [ High Security Hospital] on the 
last day, because they were deemed such a high risk, so for the actual 
person it was horrendous because they thought they were getting out and 
then they were kind of put under a different section, for something or 
other, but I also think we have a duty to protect the public and when people 
are ridiculously high risk we have to put some things in place, but it’s the 
label, how you manage that? you don’t? I don’t see why you have to put a 
label on it. Why can’t you just have a number of high risk factors that are 
not yet reduced? Why does it have to be labelled? 
Int:  Absolutely (.) I’ve got one more question 
Par:  Yeah, yeah, 
Int:  because it sort of leads from that, but as you are talking about these young 
people it becomes very clear, just like in the study they are of a certain 
class and I’m just wondering what you think of that? 
Par:  Mmmm,  
Int:  The young people with Emerging Severe Personality Disorder? 
 
Par:  Well for me, it’s all kind of, well, you know, I think in terms of 
developmental trauma kind of perspective so for me it’s what happened in 
the early years and so unfortunately class plays an issue because these are 
the most (1) / erm/ they are given so many fewer opportunities. So these 
are often young people that are from very deprived backgrounds, parents 
were unable to parent, weren’t parented themselves, so they were unable to 
parent appropriately, they don’t know how to do it. A lot of them come 
from, kind of very (.) you know some of them are in huge poverty, so these 
young people are getting to nursery age and having absolutely no (.) they 
are not even able to play with other children, they don’t know how to do it, 
they don’t know, they get excluded from school quite quickly, they don’t 
know how to relate to peers their own age, they often have learning needs 
because they’ve never been able. You know, there is so many different 
issues and it’s about opportunities and unfortunately it does become an 
unequal society, doesn’t it? That a lot of these young people have a lot less 
opportunities than others and I think that’s part of the reason why 
unfortunately there’s a lot of class issues. I wouldn’t say it’s just a class 
issue because we have middle-class young people that have had abusive 
backgrounds for lots of different reasons and who also are deemed kind of 
high risk but, very rare. You know it’s very rare that you see that, it’s often 
from very chaotic, very deprived early backgrounds really. It’s sad. 
Int:  If you had a chance to talk to the proposers of ESPD label as someone 
working with these children, what would you say? 
 
Par:  Well, I guess like I’ve said really, I’d want to question why do they have to 
have that label? What’s the purpose of that label? Why does a child that’s 
risky have to have a label like that? I’d like to know why they are using 
psychopathy checklists in order to diagnose this? And also how they are 
measuring it and also how it’s decided when those risks are reduced and 
how do we decide at tribunals when to release them? So I’d want to know 
the process a little bit more 
{ sound of unit doors banging and interrupted by the Consultant 
Psychiatrist]  
Par:  That’s ok were just finished 















The Case of the ‘J’ Children 
A violent and sexually humiliating assault lasting over 90 minutes, involving 
torture which was filmed on a mobile phone and almost resulted in death of 
one of the victims was carried out by the ‘J’ children, two brothers aged 11 
and 10 years old in 2009. The victims were two boys aged 11 and 9 years old 
who did not know their attackers. The brothers subsequently pleaded guilty 
to a charge of grievous bodily harm with intent at in 2009. ESPD proponent 
Eileen Vizard told the sentencing judge that the younger brother was a ‘very 
high risk’ to the community and was at risk of becoming ‘a seriously 
disturbed psychopathic offender’ unless he was properly treated. Vizard said 
he demonstrated ‘callous, unemotional traits’ and ‘showed very little, hardly 
any empathy for his victims’ (BBC, 2010) 
A serious case review found in the two years leading up to the offence, the 
boys were involved with 31 services and there were 101 incidents recorded, 
many involving serious interpersonal violence caused and suffered by the 
children and one of the reasons cited for these failings was noted as lack of 
‘effective’ or ‘earlier’ early intervention (Carlisle, 2012:50) despite 
considerable service involvement throughout the boys lives since birth. 
 
The following agencies had contact with the family at various times over 14 
years:  
Action for Children 
Children’s Social Care Services  
Bassetlaw Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
CAMHS 
Doncaster Youth Offending Service 
ABC Plus Team  
Families First 
Family Intervention Project (FIP) 
Youth Inclusion Support Service (YISS) 
Education (Schools and Learner Engagement)  
Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council  
Neighbourhoods and Communities Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council  
NHS Doncaster Primary Care Trust 
South Yorkshire Police and  Fire and Rescue Service 
St Leger Homes (ALMO) Arms Length Management Organisation  
 
 
Source: Carlisle (2012) Serious Case Review   
Appendix XI 
Interpretative Repertoires which could not be included 
The repertoires which could not be included in the analysis are listed in 




ESPD Catch all term 
 
ESPD Will be applied to too many children  
 
ESPD Will become overused like Conduct Disorder 
 
ESPD Social problem 
 
ESPD Problem of poverty 
 
ESPD Iatrogenic: Children take on the behaviours 
 
ESPD Preventative Detention 
 
ESPD Confused terminology ‘pulled together’ 
 
ESPD Robert Thompson & Jon Venables/ J Children 
 
ESPD Government lead 
 
ESPD Preventative detention 
 




ESPD May help to target resources 
 
ESPD The Proposers 
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